docs(release): reconcile status, compatibility and release evidence
- adopt docs/STABLE_RELEASE_IMPLEMENTATION.md as the single next-phase plan - archive the stale M0.5 status snapshot under docs/history/ - record real local gate results, the red baseline CI, the Windows autocrlf reproduction and the unresolved macOS/native-CI status - add COMPATIBILITY.md (protocol versions + honest platform matrix), CHANGELOG.md, dual license files, docs/releasing.md and docs/security-gate.md - keep strict fail-closed: document the container EPERM/read-only cgroup probe and the exact G-C requirements instead of claiming isolation - document foreign environment binding (ADR-0020) and add a release-candidate CI job that is gated on all platform jobs
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# Linux strict-isolation security gate (G-C) — evidence report
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Status: **G-C NOT PASSED. `strict` remains `Unavailable` and fails closed.**
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Snapshot: workspace `0.1.0`, 2026-11-20. No release tag.
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This report records what was actually probed on the development host and why no
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`StrictIsolation::Available` claim is made. It is evidence, not a plan to
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weaken the gate.
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## 1. Host and capability probe
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Command output (abridged; host name removed):
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```text
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user: uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
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kernel: Linux 7.0.0-43-generic x86_64
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virt: container-other
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apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns: 1
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max_user_namespaces: 60339
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cgroup2 mount: ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,nsdelegate,memory_recursiveprot
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cgroup controllers: cpuset cpu io memory hugetlb pids rdma misc dmem
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unshare --user --map-root-user true
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-> unshare: write failed /proc/self/uid_map: Operation not permitted (exit 1)
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unshare --user --map-root-user --net true
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-> unshare: unshare failed: Operation not permitted (exit 1)
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bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net --ro-bind / / true
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-> bwrap: No permissions to create a new namespace (exit 1)
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sudo -n true
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-> sudo: The "no new privileges" flag is set, which prevents sudo from
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running as root (exit 1)
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```
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The workspace root is writable, but the host root filesystem and cgroup2 mount
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are read-only. The process is root inside a container with `no_new_privs` set;
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`sudo` cannot gain privileges and the parent container refuses namespace
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creation. `user.max_user_namespaces` being non-zero does not help because the
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container policy/AppArmor boundary rejects the actual `uid_map` write.
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## 2. Consequence
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- A real Linux adapter (namespaces + seccomp/no_new_privs + cgroup v2 + fd and
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process-tree control) cannot be built, applied and verified here.
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- Implementing an adapter and flipping `Available` without executing the escape
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and resource-limit tests would be a false security claim. It was not done.
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- `PlatformCapabilities::detect()` continues to report `unavailable` with a
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reason; `enforce` refuses before any host/plugin is constructed. There is no
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fallback to `project`.
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- Native plugin loading (`--trust-native-plugin`) is unrelated to strict mode
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and remains an explicit in-process trust decision; the broker and worker
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transport are not OS isolation.
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Command evidence:
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```bash
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marqdo run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict
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# exit 1, stderr: refusing to run in strict mode: ...
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marqdo inspect examples/hello.mq.md --platform --json
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# platform.strict.state == "unavailable"
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```
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## 3. What G-C still requires
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1. A controllable Ubuntu VM or self-hosted runner that permits user, mount,
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PID and network namespaces and delegated cgroup v2 controllers, reachable
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from an ordinary (non-root) test user.
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2. A trusted supervisor that applies filesystem/network/process/resource
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policy and reaps the child tree, plus a runtime probe that reports the
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mechanisms actually applied.
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3. Execution of the full negative matrix from
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`docs/STABLE_RELEASE_IMPLEMENTATION.md` §10.5 with a malicious helper:
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direct syscall reads/writes, `/proc` and inherited-fd access, IPv4/IPv6/DNS
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and Unix sockets, fork/exec, CPU/memory/fd/process/output limits, and
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`--trust-native-plugin` rejection.
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4. A security-lane CI URL on the same commit, and only then an ADR that flips
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`Unavailable` to `Available` for that specific platform.
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Until all four hold, any release must state: **strict OS isolation is not
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available; untrusted code must not be executed with Marqdo expecting isolation.**
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