feat(host): execute granted fs.read through the capability broker (H3-A partial)
- CapabilityBroker::execute separates authorization from execution; native plugins requesting fs.read get real project file bytes through ProjectFs - unsupported capabilities (fs.write/net/process/console/vendor without a handler) return capability.unavailable instead of empty success - keep audit decisions for granted/denied/unavailable without logging contents - document that worker capability bridging, live ABI session identity and OS isolation (H3-B) remain open; no G-C claim is made
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@@ -121,8 +121,12 @@ before reading. Full symlink/race hardening is an open P4 item.
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`capabilities.check_plugin(package)` on **every call**; loading also checks
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the same grant once;
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* plugin host-capability requests → `CapabilityBroker` checks the package and
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effective grants; unknown/vendor capabilities without a trusted policy entry
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become `capability.unavailable`/`permission.denied`;
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effective grants and **executes** granted `fs.read` through `ProjectFs`,
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returning the real file bytes. Other core capabilities (`fs.write`,
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`net.request`, `process`, console/math/log/...), and vendor capabilities
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without a trusted executing handler, return `capability.unavailable`; they
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never pretend an empty reply is success. Unknown/vendor names without a
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trusted policy entry become `capability.unavailable`/`permission.denied`;
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* print → output budget only.
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Static analysis may warn, but it never replaces these runtime checks. There is
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@@ -272,9 +276,11 @@ Neither command executes project code. Specifically:
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3. Network capability exists in the model but no host operation uses it; there
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is no `--allow-net` flag.
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4. Write-path symlink TOCTOU (see §2.1).
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5. Plugin worker isolation is unimplemented; only trusted in-process native
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plugins are possible. The capability broker exists, but no vendor handler is
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shipped.
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5. Plugin **worker crash isolation** is implemented, but the worker capability
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bridge is not: worker capability requests are still denied. Only trusted
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in-process native plugins can use the broker's `fs.read` execution. No
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vendor-executing handler is shipped, and broker execution is a cooperative
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API contract, not an OS sandbox.
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6. `plugin_handle` wire values are structurally reconstructable, but host
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authority comes only from the `PluginHandleTable` owner/run/generation
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check; untrusted plugin/foreign output containing a handle is rejected
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