feat(sandbox): implement probe-gated Linux strict isolation (ADR-0021)
Strict mode now re-executes the CLI inside a Bubblewrap supervisor with user/mount/PID/net/UTS/IPC namespaces, no-new-privs, all capabilities dropped, a read-only /project, private /proc and /dev, rlimits, output capture and wall-clock process-group cleanup. The child verifies PID 1, NoNewPrivs, empty CapEff, an unshared uid map and loopback-only networking before project code. - PlatformCapabilities::detect runs a real bwrap probe; no probe, no strict - strict L1 supports pure Marqdo + Math; Foreign/ABI/worker/kernel/grants/trace are rejected with exit 2 before sandboxing - forged MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE is rejected; missing bwrap fails closed - add adversarial helper, 7-test escape/resource matrix, seeded security lane script and self-hosted security workflow - executed G-C lane as uid 1000 in a disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM: 7/7 PASS plus positive CLI and refusal matrix; evidence in docs/evidence - ADR-0021, spec/security.md, STATUS/COMPATIBILITY/README/CHANGELOG updated; ADR-0019 remains for non-Linux/fail-closed rules
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@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ portable/tested locally but the native platform lane has not run here;
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| Worker ABI + `fs.read` bridge | PASS (Unix) | UNVERIFIED | UNSUPPORTED (tests are Unix-gated) |
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| Foreign Python/Node | PASS (system `python3`/`node`) | UNVERIFIED | UNVERIFIED |
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| Foreign pinned environment binding | PASS | UNVERIFIED | UNVERIFIED |
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| `strict` OS isolation | **FAIL-CLOSED / G-C NOT PASSED** | FAIL-CLOSED | FAIL-CLOSED |
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| `strict` OS isolation | PASS when runtime probe passes (VM-verified); no CI URL yet | FAIL-CLOSED | FAIL-CLOSED |
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The Ubuntu column is from this development host (Ubuntu 26.04 container). It is
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**not** a GitHub Actions result: this checkout has no GitHub remote or CI
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@@ -46,14 +46,16 @@ reproduce the Windows checkout byte behavior.
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- Rust 1.82+ (verified with 1.100.0).
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- Linux/macOS: a C compiler for Native ABI fixtures; Python/Node only for
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Foreign kernels.
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- `strict` additionally requires a kernel/environment that permits user,
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mount, PID and network namespaces, plus delegated cgroups. The current
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container does not, so strict is refused. See
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[`docs/security-gate.md`](docs/security-gate.md).
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- `strict` additionally requires Bubblewrap and a kernel/environment that
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permits user, mount, PID and network namespaces. It is enabled only when the
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runtime probe passes; the current development container fails that probe, so
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strict is refused there. See [`docs/security-gate.md`](docs/security-gate.md)
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and ADR-0021.
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## Explicitly unsupported in this candidate
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- OS-level strict isolation on any platform (G-C not passed).
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- OS-level strict isolation on macOS/Windows (Linux only, probe-gated).
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- Strict L2: Worker/Foreign execution inside strict (refused in L1).
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- Windows Native/Worker ABI runtime support.
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- Automatic uv/npm/venv provisioning; only an explicitly provisioned, pinned
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directory is verified (and must contain a regular-file executable).
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