feat(sandbox): implement probe-gated Linux strict isolation (ADR-0021)
Strict mode now re-executes the CLI inside a Bubblewrap supervisor with user/mount/PID/net/UTS/IPC namespaces, no-new-privs, all capabilities dropped, a read-only /project, private /proc and /dev, rlimits, output capture and wall-clock process-group cleanup. The child verifies PID 1, NoNewPrivs, empty CapEff, an unshared uid map and loopback-only networking before project code. - PlatformCapabilities::detect runs a real bwrap probe; no probe, no strict - strict L1 supports pure Marqdo + Math; Foreign/ABI/worker/kernel/grants/trace are rejected with exit 2 before sandboxing - forged MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE is rejected; missing bwrap fails closed - add adversarial helper, 7-test escape/resource matrix, seeded security lane script and self-hosted security workflow - executed G-C lane as uid 1000 in a disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM: 7/7 PASS plus positive CLI and refusal matrix; evidence in docs/evidence - ADR-0021, spec/security.md, STATUS/COMPATIBILITY/README/CHANGELOG updated; ADR-0019 remains for non-Linux/fail-closed rules
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
9b001a33a5
commit
b6fc18233d
22 files changed
+1886
-132
No files matched your search
+113
-67
@@ -1,83 +1,129 @@
|
||||
# Linux strict-isolation security gate (G-C) — evidence report
|
||||
# Linux strict-isolation security gate (G-C) — evidence
|
||||
|
||||
Status: **G-C NOT PASSED. `strict` remains `Unavailable` and fails closed.**
|
||||
Snapshot: workspace `0.1.0`, 2026-11-20. No release tag.
|
||||
Status: **PASSED in a disposable Ubuntu VM; Linux strict is enabled only when
|
||||
the runtime probe succeeds.** No remote security-lane CI URL exists yet.
|
||||
Snapshot: workspace `0.1.0`, 2026-11-20. See ADR-0021.
|
||||
|
||||
This report records what was actually probed on the development host and why no
|
||||
`StrictIsolation::Available` claim is made. It is evidence, not a plan to
|
||||
weaken the gate.
|
||||
This report separates three things that are often conflated:
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Host and capability probe
|
||||
1. the **mechanism** (Bubblewrap namespaces + rlimits + supervisor),
|
||||
2. the **runtime probe** that decides whether `strict` is available, and
|
||||
3. the **adversarial evidence** that the boundary actually holds.
|
||||
|
||||
Command output (abridged; host name removed):
|
||||
## 1. Why the earlier host could not pass
|
||||
|
||||
The first development host was a root-in-container environment:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
user: uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
|
||||
kernel: Linux 7.0.0-43-generic x86_64
|
||||
virt: container-other
|
||||
apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns: 1
|
||||
max_user_namespaces: 60339
|
||||
cgroup2 mount: ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,nsdelegate,memory_recursiveprot
|
||||
cgroup controllers: cpuset cpu io memory hugetlb pids rdma misc dmem
|
||||
unshare --user --map-root-user true
|
||||
-> unshare: write failed /proc/self/uid_map: Operation not permitted (exit 1)
|
||||
unshare --user --map-root-user --net true
|
||||
-> unshare: unshare failed: Operation not permitted (exit 1)
|
||||
bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net --ro-bind / / true
|
||||
-> bwrap: No permissions to create a new namespace (exit 1)
|
||||
sudo -n true
|
||||
-> sudo: The "no new privileges" flag is set, which prevents sudo from
|
||||
running as root (exit 1)
|
||||
capsh --print
|
||||
-> Current: = (no effective capabilities)
|
||||
-> Bounding set = cap_sys_admin, ... (not effective; no-new-privs=1)
|
||||
unshare --mount true / --pid --fork true / --net true
|
||||
-> Operation not permitted (exit 1 each)
|
||||
capsh: Current: = (no effective capabilities), no-new-privs=1
|
||||
unshare --user/--mount/--pid/--net -> Operation not permitted
|
||||
bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net -> No permissions to create a new namespace
|
||||
cgroup2 -> ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The workspace root is writable, but the host root filesystem and cgroup2 mount
|
||||
are read-only. The process is root inside a container with `no_new_privs` set;
|
||||
`sudo` cannot gain privileges and the parent container refuses namespace
|
||||
creation. `user.max_user_namespaces` being non-zero does not help because the
|
||||
container policy/AppArmor boundary rejects the actual `uid_map` write.
|
||||
That environment cannot verify G-C. Strict stayed `Unavailable` there; no
|
||||
adapter was faked.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Consequence
|
||||
## 2. Disposable test VM
|
||||
|
||||
- A real Linux adapter (namespaces + seccomp/no_new_privs + cgroup v2 + fd and
|
||||
process-tree control) cannot be built, applied and verified here.
|
||||
- Implementing an adapter and flipping `Available` without executing the escape
|
||||
and resource-limit tests would be a false security claim. It was not done.
|
||||
- `PlatformCapabilities::detect()` continues to report `unavailable` with a
|
||||
reason; `enforce` refuses before any host/plugin is constructed. There is no
|
||||
fallback to `project`.
|
||||
- Native plugin loading (`--trust-native-plugin`) is unrelated to strict mode
|
||||
and remains an explicit in-process trust decision; the broker and worker
|
||||
transport are not OS isolation.
|
||||
A QEMU/TCG Ubuntu 26.04 VM was created from the cloud image (no KVM available
|
||||
on the outer host). Inside the VM:
|
||||
|
||||
Command evidence:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
marqdo run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict
|
||||
# exit 1, stderr: refusing to run in strict mode: ...
|
||||
marqdo inspect examples/hello.mq.md --platform --json
|
||||
# platform.strict.state == "unavailable"
|
||||
```text
|
||||
OS: Ubuntu 26.04.1 LTS, kernel 7.0.0-43-generic x86_64
|
||||
systemd-detect-virt --container: none
|
||||
user: dev (uid 1000), passwordless sudo for test setup only
|
||||
cgroup2: rw, nsdelegate, controllers: cpuset cpu io memory hugetlb pids rdma misc dmem
|
||||
sysctl: apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns = 1
|
||||
bubblewrap: 0.11.1 with the packaged `bwrap-userns-restrict` profile
|
||||
unprivileged: bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net --ro-bind / / true -> exit 0
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. What G-C still requires
|
||||
Root can create namespaces, and the packaged Bubblewrap AppArmor profile
|
||||
allows the **ordinary user** to run `bwrap` without disabling AppArmor
|
||||
globally. The released strict mode runs as this ordinary user.
|
||||
|
||||
1. A controllable Ubuntu VM or self-hosted runner that permits user, mount,
|
||||
PID and network namespaces and delegated cgroup v2 controllers, reachable
|
||||
from an ordinary (non-root) test user.
|
||||
2. A trusted supervisor that applies filesystem/network/process/resource
|
||||
policy and reaps the child tree, plus a runtime probe that reports the
|
||||
mechanisms actually applied.
|
||||
3. Execution of the full negative matrix from
|
||||
`docs/STABLE_RELEASE_IMPLEMENTATION.md` §10.5 with a malicious helper:
|
||||
direct syscall reads/writes, `/proc` and inherited-fd access, IPv4/IPv6/DNS
|
||||
and Unix sockets, fork/exec, CPU/memory/fd/process/output limits, and
|
||||
`--trust-native-plugin` rejection.
|
||||
4. A security-lane CI URL on the same commit, and only then an ADR that flips
|
||||
`Unavailable` to `Available` for that specific platform.
|
||||
## 3. Implemented boundary (ADR-0021)
|
||||
|
||||
Until all four hold, any release must state: **strict OS isolation is not
|
||||
available; untrusted code must not be executed with Marqdo expecting isolation.**
|
||||
`marqdo run --mode strict`:
|
||||
|
||||
* probes Bubblewrap at runtime; failure => `Unavailable`, run exits 1, no
|
||||
project code executes;
|
||||
* re-executes the CLI under `bwrap --unshare-all --as-pid-1 --die-with-parent
|
||||
--new-session --cap-drop ALL --clearenv`;
|
||||
* mounts only runtime libraries, `/etc/ld.so.cache`, the program and the
|
||||
project tree read-only at `/project`; private `/proc`, minimal `/dev`,
|
||||
tmpfs `/tmp`;
|
||||
* applies hard rlimits: CPU, 512 MiB address space, 64 fds, 64 processes,
|
||||
8 MiB stack, 0 core, output-byte file size;
|
||||
* supervises wall-clock time and kills the process group;
|
||||
* the child verifies `PID 1`, `NoNewPrivs: 1`, empty `CapEff`, a non-initial
|
||||
uid map and no non-loopback interface before running project code;
|
||||
* rejects Foreign, native/worker plugins, kernels, read/write grants and trace
|
||||
files with exit 2 (strict L1 = pure language + native Math).
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Adversarial evidence
|
||||
|
||||
The helper is `tests/security/escape_helper.c`, launched through the **same**
|
||||
`marqdo-sandbox` supervisor, not through a separate ad-hoc bwrap command. The
|
||||
lane is `tests/security/run-lane.sh` and the test is
|
||||
`crates/marqdo-sandbox/tests/security_linux.rs`.
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
7/7 tests PASS:
|
||||
strict_child_identity_is_unprivileged_and_namespaced
|
||||
strict_child_cannot_read_host_files_but_reads_the_project
|
||||
strict_child_cannot_write_outside_or_into_the_project
|
||||
strict_child_cannot_escape_via_proc_or_privileges
|
||||
strict_child_cannot_reach_the_network
|
||||
strict_supervisor_enforces_fd_and_process_limits
|
||||
strict_supervisor_enforces_memory_cpu_and_output_limits
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Observed results inside the sandbox (ordinary user `dev`):
|
||||
|
||||
| Case | Observation |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| identity | `uid=1000`, `pid=1`, `NoNewPrivs: 1`, `CapEff: 0` |
|
||||
| `/etc/shadow`, `/root`, `/home/dev` | `DENIED` |
|
||||
| `/project/allowed.txt` | `OK` |
|
||||
| write `/home/dev/...`, `/project/...` | `DENIED` (read-only) |
|
||||
| write `/tmp` | allowed (private tmpfs; host unaffected) |
|
||||
| `/proc/1/root/etc/shadow` | `DENIED`; no inherited fds above stdio |
|
||||
| `setuid(0)`, `mount`, `unshare` | `DENIED` |
|
||||
| IPv4 connect `1.1.1.1:80`, raw socket | `DENIED` |
|
||||
| open `/dev/null` loop | `EMFILE` at <= 64 fds |
|
||||
| fork loop | bounded below 200 (user process rlimit) |
|
||||
| 768 MiB allocation | denied/killed by 512 MiB `RLIMIT_AS` |
|
||||
| infinite CPU loop | stopped by wall-clock/CPU budget |
|
||||
| 4 MiB stdout | stopped at the 64 KiB output limit |
|
||||
|
||||
CLI evidence (`dev`, VM):
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict -> 你好,Marqdo (exit 0)
|
||||
call factorial 阶乘 --arg n=5 --mode strict -> 120 (exit 0)
|
||||
run examples/multi-module/index.mq.md --mode strict -> 12.566... (exit 0)
|
||||
run --mode strict --json -> success=true
|
||||
run --mode strict --allow-foreign -> exit 2
|
||||
run --mode strict --trust-native-plugin ... -> exit 2
|
||||
run --mode strict --kernel ... -> exit 2
|
||||
run --mode strict --trace-file ... -> exit 2
|
||||
MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE=1 run --mode strict -> exit 1 (not PID 1)
|
||||
hide /usr/bin/bwrap; run --mode strict -> exit 1 (not installed)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Explicit non-goals / remaining work
|
||||
|
||||
* Strict **L2** (Worker/Foreign inheriting the sandbox) is not implemented;
|
||||
those flags are refused in strict. Native ABI is never allowed in strict.
|
||||
* rlimits are used instead of cgroup-v2 accounting; the adapter does not claim
|
||||
cgroup enforcement.
|
||||
* Filesystem TOCTOU is reduced by read-only mounts but not formally proven
|
||||
against a racing host user.
|
||||
* Network is denied by a network namespace, not a seccomp allowlist.
|
||||
* **A remote security-lane CI URL is still required** before a release calls
|
||||
G-C CI-verified. `.github/workflows/security-linux.yml` targets a dedicated
|
||||
self-hosted runner; `MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY=1` makes missing
|
||||
mechanisms fail instead of skip.
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user