feat(sandbox): implement probe-gated Linux strict isolation (ADR-0021)
Strict mode now re-executes the CLI inside a Bubblewrap supervisor with user/mount/PID/net/UTS/IPC namespaces, no-new-privs, all capabilities dropped, a read-only /project, private /proc and /dev, rlimits, output capture and wall-clock process-group cleanup. The child verifies PID 1, NoNewPrivs, empty CapEff, an unshared uid map and loopback-only networking before project code. - PlatformCapabilities::detect runs a real bwrap probe; no probe, no strict - strict L1 supports pure Marqdo + Math; Foreign/ABI/worker/kernel/grants/trace are rejected with exit 2 before sandboxing - forged MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE is rejected; missing bwrap fails closed - add adversarial helper, 7-test escape/resource matrix, seeded security lane script and self-hosted security workflow - executed G-C lane as uid 1000 in a disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM: 7/7 PASS plus positive CLI and refusal matrix; evidence in docs/evidence - ADR-0021, spec/security.md, STATUS/COMPATIBILITY/README/CHANGELOG updated; ADR-0019 remains for non-Linux/fail-closed rules
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@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
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name: Linux strict security lane (G-C)
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# This workflow intentionally does NOT run on GitHub-hosted runners. G-C
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# requires a disposable Ubuntu VM/self-hosted runner with permitted user,
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# mount, PID and network namespaces and the Bubblewrap AppArmor profile.
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# A missing runner or a skipped test fails the gate; it is never counted as a
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# pass. See docs/security-gate.md and ADR-0021.
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on:
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workflow_dispatch:
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schedule:
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- cron: "17 3 * * 1"
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jobs:
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strict-security:
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name: strict isolation escape matrix
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runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, marqdo-security]
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timeout-minutes: 45
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v4
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- name: Host capability report
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run: |
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id
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uname -a
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systemd-detect-virt --container || true
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bwrap --version
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cc --version | head -1
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cat /proc/self/uid_map
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findmnt -t cgroup2 || true
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- name: Run G-C matrix
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run: ./tests/security/run-lane.sh
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@@ -17,3 +17,6 @@ examples/plugin-multi-export/build/
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# Release artifacts
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# Release artifacts
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dist/
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dist/
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# Local VM/QEMU tooling and disk images
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.tools/
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+14
-4
@@ -19,6 +19,14 @@ currently `0.1.0`; no release tag has been cut. Dates use ISO 8601.
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`entrypoint` must resolve inside `environment_dir`, built-in providers cannot
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`entrypoint` must resolve inside `environment_dir`, built-in providers cannot
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be bound to one, the child gets only the environment executable directory on
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be bound to one, the child gets only the environment executable directory on
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`PATH`, and `interpreter_version` is verified before execution.
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`PATH`, and `interpreter_version` is verified before execution.
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- Linux strict isolation (ADR-0021): a Bubblewrap supervisor with user/mount/
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PID/net/UTS/IPC namespaces, no-new-privs, capability dropping, a read-only
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`/project`, rlimits, output/wall-clock supervision and child
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self-verification. Probe-gated; L1 supports pure Marqdo + Math only.
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- Adversarial G-C lane (`tests/security/escape_helper.c`,
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`crates/marqdo-sandbox/tests/security_linux.rs`, `tests/security/run-lane.sh`)
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covering filesystem, `/proc`, network, process, privilege and resource
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escapes. 7/7 PASS in a disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM.
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- Release documentation (`COMPATIBILITY.md`, `docs/releasing.md`) and the
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- Release documentation (`COMPATIBILITY.md`, `docs/releasing.md`) and the
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Linux security-gate evidence report (`docs/security-gate.md`).
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Linux security-gate evidence report (`docs/security-gate.md`).
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- `check_never_spawns_a_foreign_kernel`: proves static `check` does not spawn a
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- `check_never_spawns_a_foreign_kernel`: proves static `check` does not spawn a
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@@ -43,10 +51,12 @@ currently `0.1.0`; no release tag has been cut. Dates use ISO 8601.
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### Security
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### Security
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- `strict` remains `Unavailable` on every platform. This host cannot create
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- Linux `strict` is implemented and probe-gated. It is `Available` only when a
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user/network namespaces (`EPERM` inside a container, cgroup2 read-only, no
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real Bubblewrap smoke test succeeds; otherwise it stays `Unavailable` and
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non-interactive sudo), so no Linux OS-isolation adapter was implemented or
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refuses. There is no silent downgrade to `project`.
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verified. There is no silent downgrade to `project` mode.
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- Strict L1 covers pure Marqdo and native Math; Foreign, native/worker
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plugins, kernels, external grants and trace files are rejected before the
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sandbox starts. Strict L2 inheritance is future work.
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- Capability brokers and worker processes remain cooperative
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- Capability brokers and worker processes remain cooperative
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authorization/crash isolation, not an OS sandbox.
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authorization/crash isolation, not an OS sandbox.
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+8
-6
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ portable/tested locally but the native platform lane has not run here;
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| Worker ABI + `fs.read` bridge | PASS (Unix) | UNVERIFIED | UNSUPPORTED (tests are Unix-gated) |
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| Worker ABI + `fs.read` bridge | PASS (Unix) | UNVERIFIED | UNSUPPORTED (tests are Unix-gated) |
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| Foreign Python/Node | PASS (system `python3`/`node`) | UNVERIFIED | UNVERIFIED |
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| Foreign Python/Node | PASS (system `python3`/`node`) | UNVERIFIED | UNVERIFIED |
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| Foreign pinned environment binding | PASS | UNVERIFIED | UNVERIFIED |
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| Foreign pinned environment binding | PASS | UNVERIFIED | UNVERIFIED |
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| `strict` OS isolation | **FAIL-CLOSED / G-C NOT PASSED** | FAIL-CLOSED | FAIL-CLOSED |
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| `strict` OS isolation | PASS when runtime probe passes (VM-verified); no CI URL yet | FAIL-CLOSED | FAIL-CLOSED |
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The Ubuntu column is from this development host (Ubuntu 26.04 container). It is
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The Ubuntu column is from this development host (Ubuntu 26.04 container). It is
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**not** a GitHub Actions result: this checkout has no GitHub remote or CI
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**not** a GitHub Actions result: this checkout has no GitHub remote or CI
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@@ -46,14 +46,16 @@ reproduce the Windows checkout byte behavior.
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- Rust 1.82+ (verified with 1.100.0).
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- Rust 1.82+ (verified with 1.100.0).
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- Linux/macOS: a C compiler for Native ABI fixtures; Python/Node only for
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- Linux/macOS: a C compiler for Native ABI fixtures; Python/Node only for
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Foreign kernels.
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Foreign kernels.
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- `strict` additionally requires a kernel/environment that permits user,
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- `strict` additionally requires Bubblewrap and a kernel/environment that
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mount, PID and network namespaces, plus delegated cgroups. The current
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permits user, mount, PID and network namespaces. It is enabled only when the
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container does not, so strict is refused. See
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runtime probe passes; the current development container fails that probe, so
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[`docs/security-gate.md`](docs/security-gate.md).
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strict is refused there. See [`docs/security-gate.md`](docs/security-gate.md)
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and ADR-0021.
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## Explicitly unsupported in this candidate
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## Explicitly unsupported in this candidate
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- OS-level strict isolation on any platform (G-C not passed).
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- OS-level strict isolation on macOS/Windows (Linux only, probe-gated).
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- Strict L2: Worker/Foreign execution inside strict (refused in L1).
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- Windows Native/Worker ABI runtime support.
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- Windows Native/Worker ABI runtime support.
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- Automatic uv/npm/venv provisioning; only an explicitly provisioned, pinned
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- Automatic uv/npm/venv provisioning; only an explicitly provisioned, pinned
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directory is verified (and must contain a regular-file executable).
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directory is verified (and must contain a regular-file executable).
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Generated
+1
@@ -497,6 +497,7 @@ dependencies = [
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name = "marqdo-sandbox"
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name = "marqdo-sandbox"
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version = "0.1.0"
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version = "0.1.0"
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dependencies = [
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dependencies = [
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"libc",
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"serde",
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"serde",
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]
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]
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@@ -17,8 +17,11 @@ plugin ABI v2 are not claimed to work here.
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> Foreign providers are implemented and covered by tests on Linux. The
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> Foreign providers are implemented and covered by tests on Linux. The
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> Windows AST and macOS plugin CI failures are fixed in source, but the native
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> Windows AST and macOS plugin CI failures are fixed in source, but the native
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> Windows/macOS lanes have not been re-run from this checkout. **`strict` OS
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> Windows/macOS lanes have not been re-run from this checkout. **`strict` OS
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> isolation is not available**: it fails closed on every platform (G-C not
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> isolation is available on Linux only when the runtime Bubblewrap probe
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> passed), and the broker/worker are not a sandbox. See
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> passes**; it was verified against the full escape/resource matrix in a
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> disposable Ubuntu VM (ADR-0021). macOS/Windows fail closed, strict L2
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> (Worker/Foreign) is not implemented, and the broker/worker are not a
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> sandbox. See
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> [`docs/STATUS.md`](docs/STATUS.md), [`COMPATIBILITY.md`](COMPATIBILITY.md)
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> [`docs/STATUS.md`](docs/STATUS.md), [`COMPATIBILITY.md`](COMPATIBILITY.md)
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> and [`docs/security-gate.md`](docs/security-gate.md). The single next-phase
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> and [`docs/security-gate.md`](docs/security-gate.md). The single next-phase
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> plan is [`docs/STABLE_RELEASE_IMPLEMENTATION.md`](docs/STABLE_RELEASE_IMPLEMENTATION.md).
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> plan is [`docs/STABLE_RELEASE_IMPLEMENTATION.md`](docs/STABLE_RELEASE_IMPLEMENTATION.md).
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@@ -90,8 +93,10 @@ executes anything.
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`run`/`call`/`check` never fetch or rewrite the lock.
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`run`/`call`/`check` never fetch or rewrite the lock.
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* **P4 security core** — capability-checked host operations, project-relative
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* **P4 security core** — capability-checked host operations, project-relative
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FS globs with traversal rejection, budgets, effect trace, `pure`/`project`
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FS globs with traversal rejection, budgets, effect trace, `pure`/`project`
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modes, and **`strict` mode fails closed** because no verified OS isolation
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modes, and **Linux `strict` mode** using Bubblewrap namespaces, no-new-privs,
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adapter exists.
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capability dropping, rlimits, a wall-clock supervisor and child
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self-verification (ADR-0021). It is probe-gated and verified in a disposable
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Ubuntu VM; unsupported hosts fail closed.
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* **P5 Math/Foreign** — native `Formula` value from `$$...$$`; `math.parse/
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* **P5 Math/Foreign** — native `Formula` value from `$$...$$`; `math.parse/
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eval/substitute` over a documented exact-rational subset; one-shot Python/
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eval/substitute` over a documented exact-rational subset; one-shot Python/
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Node kernels via `foreign.run/call` with typed wire protocol, timeout and
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Node kernels via `foreign.run/call` with typed wire protocol, timeout and
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@@ -117,9 +122,12 @@ cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
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## Deliberate limits (do not assume)
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## Deliberate limits (do not assume)
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* **Strict sandbox is not implemented.** `--mode strict` exits 1; there is no
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* **Strict is Linux-only and L1-only.** `--mode strict` enables the
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verified OS isolation. `project` mode is cooperative and in-process. Worker
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Bubblewrap supervisor only when its runtime probe passes; otherwise it exits
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plugins provide crash/address-space isolation, not an OS sandbox.
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1. It supports pure Marqdo + Math and rejects Foreign, plugins, kernels,
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external grants and trace files (exit 2). Worker plugins provide
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crash/address-space isolation, not an OS sandbox, and are not allowed in
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strict.
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* **Native plugins run in-process** and require an explicit unsafe trust flag.
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* **Native plugins run in-process** and require an explicit unsafe trust flag.
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A plugin can crash or read the host; a C ABI is not a sandbox.
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A plugin can crash or read the host; a C ABI is not a sandbox.
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* **Package management is path + pinned-Git only.** There is no registry,
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* **Package management is path + pinned-Git only.** There is no registry,
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+102
-1
@@ -59,6 +59,31 @@ impl SandboxSettings {
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})
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})
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}
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}
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/// Reject strict-mode requests that this L1 isolation level does not
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/// support. Strict currently covers pure Marqdo and native Math only;
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/// granting Foreign, ABI plugins, tools or trace files would require
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/// extending the supervisor contract first.
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pub fn strict_preflight(&self) -> Result<(), String> {
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let requested = self.allow_foreign
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|| !self.allow_read.is_empty()
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|| !self.allow_write.is_empty()
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|| !self.allow_plugin.is_empty()
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|| !self.plugins.is_empty()
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|| self.trust_native_plugin
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|| !self.kernels.is_empty()
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|| self.trace_file.is_some();
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if requested {
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return Err(
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"strict mode currently supports pure Marqdo and native Math only; \
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--allow-read/--allow-write/--allow-foreign/--allow-plugin/--plugin/\
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--trust-native-plugin/--kernel/--trace-file are rejected. Use \
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--mode project for those capabilities."
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.to_string(),
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);
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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/// Build the effective capability set.
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/// Build the effective capability set.
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pub fn capabilities(&self) -> Result<Capabilities, String> {
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pub fn capabilities(&self) -> Result<Capabilities, String> {
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let mode = self.sandbox_mode()?;
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let mode = self.sandbox_mode()?;
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@@ -91,7 +116,10 @@ impl SandboxSettings {
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}
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}
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Ok(capabilities)
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Ok(capabilities)
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}
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}
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SandboxMode::Strict => Ok(Capabilities::project()),
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SandboxMode::Strict => {
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self.strict_preflight()?;
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Ok(Capabilities::project())
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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@@ -625,6 +653,43 @@ fn resolve_link(
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}
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}
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}
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}
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/// Re-execute this CLI inside the strict Linux supervisor.
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fn launch_strict_process(
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project_root: &Path,
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document: Option<&Path>,
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settings: &SandboxSettings,
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) -> i32 {
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let program = match std::env::current_exe() {
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Ok(path) => path,
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Err(error) => {
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eprintln!("error: cannot locate the marqdo executable: {error}");
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return 1;
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}
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};
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let args: Vec<std::ffi::OsString> = std::env::args_os().skip(1).collect();
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let output_limit = settings
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.max_output
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.unwrap_or(1024 * 1024)
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.min(64 * 1024 * 1024);
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let timeout = Duration::from_secs(settings.timeout.unwrap_or(30));
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let command = marqdo_sandbox::StrictHostCommand {
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program: &program,
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args: &args,
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project_root,
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document,
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original_document: document,
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output_limit,
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timeout,
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};
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match marqdo_sandbox::launch_strict(&command) {
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Ok(code) => code,
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Err(error) => {
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eprintln!("error: {error}");
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1
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}
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}
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}
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/// `marqdo run` / `marqdo call`.
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/// `marqdo run` / `marqdo call`.
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pub fn execute(
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pub fn execute(
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file: Option<&Path>,
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file: Option<&Path>,
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@@ -676,6 +741,42 @@ pub fn execute(
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return 2;
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return 2;
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}
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}
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};
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};
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if mode == SandboxMode::Strict {
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if let Err(error) = settings.strict_preflight() {
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if json {
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output::print_json(&json!({"success": false, "error": error}));
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} else {
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eprintln!("error: {error}");
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}
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return 2;
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}
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if marqdo_sandbox::marker_present() {
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// We were re-executed by the supervisor: validate the marker set
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// before running any project code.
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if let Err(reason) = marqdo_sandbox::verify_active() {
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if json {
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output::print_json(&json!({
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"success": false,
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"error": format!("strict isolation verification failed: {reason}"),
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}));
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} else {
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eprintln!("error: strict isolation verification failed: {reason}");
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}
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return 1;
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}
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} else {
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let platform = PlatformCapabilities::detect();
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if let Err(error) = marqdo_sandbox::enforce(mode, &platform) {
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if json {
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output::print_json(&json!({"success": false, "error": error.to_string()}));
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} else {
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eprintln!("error: {error}");
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}
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return 1;
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}
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return launch_strict_process(&project.root, file, settings);
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}
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}
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let platform = PlatformCapabilities::detect();
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let platform = PlatformCapabilities::detect();
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if let Err(error) = marqdo_sandbox::enforce(mode, &platform) {
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if let Err(error) = marqdo_sandbox::enforce(mode, &platform) {
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if json {
|
if json {
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|||||||
@@ -331,11 +331,42 @@ fn examples_run_end_to_end_including_foreign_when_available() {
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);
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);
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}
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}
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|
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fn strict_is_available(root: &Path) -> bool {
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let hello = root.join("examples").join("hello.mq.md");
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|
let output = cli(
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root,
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&["inspect", hello.to_str().unwrap(), "--platform", "--json"],
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|
);
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|
if !output.status.success() {
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return false;
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}
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let value = json_stdout(&output);
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|
value["platform"]["strict"]["state"] == "available"
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}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#[test]
|
#[test]
|
||||||
fn strict_mode_refuses_without_isolation() {
|
fn strict_mode_enforces_isolation_or_refuses_closed() {
|
||||||
let root = repo_root();
|
let root = repo_root();
|
||||||
let hello = root.join("examples").join("hello.mq.md");
|
let hello = root.join("examples").join("hello.mq.md");
|
||||||
let output = cli(&root, &["run", hello.to_str().unwrap(), "--mode", "strict"]);
|
let output = cli(&root, &["run", hello.to_str().unwrap(), "--mode", "strict"]);
|
||||||
|
if strict_is_available(&root) {
|
||||||
|
assert_exit(&output, 0, "strict mode must succeed when the gate passes");
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(stdout_text(&output), "你好,Marqdo\n");
|
||||||
|
// External execution surfaces are rejected at the strict L1 boundary.
|
||||||
|
let foreign = cli(
|
||||||
|
&root,
|
||||||
|
&[
|
||||||
|
"run",
|
||||||
|
hello.to_str().unwrap(),
|
||||||
|
"--mode",
|
||||||
|
"strict",
|
||||||
|
"--allow-foreign",
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
assert_exit(&foreign, 2, "strict must reject foreign grants");
|
||||||
|
assert!(stderr_text(&foreign).contains("strict mode currently supports"));
|
||||||
|
return;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
assert_exit(
|
assert_exit(
|
||||||
&output,
|
&output,
|
||||||
1,
|
1,
|
||||||
@@ -763,7 +794,7 @@ fn runtime_error_in_imported_module_reports_that_module() {
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#[test]
|
#[test]
|
||||||
fn platform_reports_strict_unavailable_until_security_gate_passes() {
|
fn platform_reports_strict_capability_truthfully() {
|
||||||
let root = repo_root();
|
let root = repo_root();
|
||||||
let hello = root.join("examples").join("hello.mq.md");
|
let hello = root.join("examples").join("hello.mq.md");
|
||||||
let output = cli(
|
let output = cli(
|
||||||
@@ -773,10 +804,17 @@ fn platform_reports_strict_unavailable_until_security_gate_passes() {
|
|||||||
assert_exit(&output, 0, "inspect --platform");
|
assert_exit(&output, 0, "inspect --platform");
|
||||||
let value = json_stdout(&output);
|
let value = json_stdout(&output);
|
||||||
let strict = &value["platform"]["strict"];
|
let strict = &value["platform"]["strict"];
|
||||||
assert_eq!(
|
match strict["state"].as_str() {
|
||||||
strict["state"], "unavailable",
|
Some("available") => {
|
||||||
"strict must stay unavailable until the ADR-0019 security gate passes: {strict}"
|
assert!(
|
||||||
|
strict["mechanism"]
|
||||||
|
.as_str()
|
||||||
|
.map(|mechanism| mechanism.contains("bubblewrap"))
|
||||||
|
.unwrap_or(false),
|
||||||
|
"available strict needs the real mechanism: {strict}"
|
||||||
);
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
Some("unavailable") => {
|
||||||
assert!(
|
assert!(
|
||||||
strict["reason"]
|
strict["reason"]
|
||||||
.as_str()
|
.as_str()
|
||||||
@@ -784,6 +822,9 @@ fn platform_reports_strict_unavailable_until_security_gate_passes() {
|
|||||||
.unwrap_or(false),
|
.unwrap_or(false),
|
||||||
"unavailable strict needs an actionable reason: {strict}"
|
"unavailable strict needs an actionable reason: {strict}"
|
||||||
);
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
other => panic!("unexpected strict state: {other:?} ({strict})"),
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
assert_eq!(value["platform"]["worker_processes"], true);
|
assert_eq!(value["platform"]["worker_processes"], true);
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -11,3 +11,6 @@ authors.workspace = true
|
|||||||
[dependencies]
|
[dependencies]
|
||||||
serde = { workspace = true }
|
serde = { workspace = true }
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
[target.'cfg(unix)'.dependencies]
|
||||||
|
libc = { workspace = true }
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -5,8 +5,16 @@
|
|||||||
//! provide OS-level isolation: a cooperative in-process check is not a sandbox
|
//! provide OS-level isolation: a cooperative in-process check is not a sandbox
|
||||||
//! (blueprint section 9). This crate is deliberately honest about that.
|
//! (blueprint section 9). This crate is deliberately honest about that.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
use std::path::Path;
|
||||||
|
use std::time::Duration;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
|
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
|
||||||
|
mod linux;
|
||||||
|
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
|
||||||
|
pub use linux::{marker_present, probe, verify_active, StrictOutcome};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/// Execution mode requested on the command line.
|
/// Execution mode requested on the command line.
|
||||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||||
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
|
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
|
||||||
@@ -103,21 +111,29 @@ impl PlatformCapabilities {
|
|||||||
/// security contract. The isolated worker transport is implemented, but a
|
/// security contract. The isolated worker transport is implemented, but a
|
||||||
/// plain child process is not an OS sandbox.
|
/// plain child process is not an OS sandbox.
|
||||||
pub fn detect() -> Self {
|
pub fn detect() -> Self {
|
||||||
let reason = if cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
|
let strict = if cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
|
||||||
"no OS isolation adapter (namespaces/seccomp/cgroups) is implemented in this build"
|
match linux::probe() {
|
||||||
|
Ok(mechanism) => StrictIsolation::Available { mechanism },
|
||||||
|
Err(reason) => StrictIsolation::Unavailable { reason },
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
} else if cfg!(target_os = "macos") {
|
} else if cfg!(target_os = "macos") {
|
||||||
"no verified macOS sandbox adapter is implemented in this build"
|
StrictIsolation::Unavailable {
|
||||||
|
reason: "no verified macOS sandbox adapter is implemented in this build"
|
||||||
|
.to_string(),
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
} else if cfg!(target_os = "windows") {
|
} else if cfg!(target_os = "windows") {
|
||||||
"no verified Windows job-object/appcontainer adapter is implemented in this build"
|
StrictIsolation::Unavailable {
|
||||||
|
reason: "no verified Windows job-object/appcontainer adapter is implemented in this build".to_string(),
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
} else {
|
} else {
|
||||||
"platform isolation is not implemented for this target"
|
StrictIsolation::Unavailable {
|
||||||
|
reason: "platform isolation is not implemented for this target".to_string(),
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
};
|
};
|
||||||
Self {
|
Self {
|
||||||
os: std::env::consts::OS.to_string(),
|
os: std::env::consts::OS.to_string(),
|
||||||
arch: std::env::consts::ARCH.to_string(),
|
arch: std::env::consts::ARCH.to_string(),
|
||||||
strict: StrictIsolation::Unavailable {
|
strict,
|
||||||
reason: reason.to_string(),
|
|
||||||
},
|
|
||||||
worker_processes: true,
|
worker_processes: true,
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -131,6 +147,11 @@ pub enum SandboxError {
|
|||||||
/// Explanation from [`PlatformCapabilities`].
|
/// Explanation from [`PlatformCapabilities`].
|
||||||
reason: String,
|
reason: String,
|
||||||
},
|
},
|
||||||
|
/// The strict supervisor could not launch, verify or supervise the child.
|
||||||
|
LaunchFailed {
|
||||||
|
/// Actionable explanation.
|
||||||
|
message: String,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
impl std::fmt::Display for SandboxError {
|
impl std::fmt::Display for SandboxError {
|
||||||
@@ -140,6 +161,9 @@ impl std::fmt::Display for SandboxError {
|
|||||||
f,
|
f,
|
||||||
"refusing to run in strict mode: {reason}. Strict mode requires verified OS-level isolation and never falls back to an unrestricted process."
|
"refusing to run in strict mode: {reason}. Strict mode requires verified OS-level isolation and never falls back to an unrestricted process."
|
||||||
),
|
),
|
||||||
|
SandboxError::LaunchFailed { message } => {
|
||||||
|
write!(f, "strict isolation failed: {message}")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -150,6 +174,10 @@ impl std::error::Error for SandboxError {}
|
|||||||
pub fn enforce(mode: SandboxMode, platform: &PlatformCapabilities) -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
|
pub fn enforce(mode: SandboxMode, platform: &PlatformCapabilities) -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
|
||||||
match mode {
|
match mode {
|
||||||
SandboxMode::Strict => {
|
SandboxMode::Strict => {
|
||||||
|
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
|
||||||
|
if verify_active().is_ok() {
|
||||||
|
return Ok(());
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
if platform.strict.is_available() {
|
if platform.strict.is_available() {
|
||||||
Ok(())
|
Ok(())
|
||||||
} else {
|
} else {
|
||||||
@@ -164,6 +192,49 @@ pub fn enforce(mode: SandboxMode, platform: &PlatformCapabilities) -> Result<(),
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// A command to execute inside the strict Linux sandbox.
|
||||||
|
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
|
||||||
|
pub struct StrictHostCommand<'a> {
|
||||||
|
/// Program bound read-only into the sandbox and executed.
|
||||||
|
pub program: &'a Path,
|
||||||
|
/// Arguments passed to the program.
|
||||||
|
pub args: &'a [std::ffi::OsString],
|
||||||
|
/// Project directory mounted read-only at `/project`.
|
||||||
|
pub project_root: &'a Path,
|
||||||
|
/// Entry document as passed on the command line; rewritten to the sandbox
|
||||||
|
/// path. `None` keeps the CLI default (index.mq.md).
|
||||||
|
pub document: Option<&'a Path>,
|
||||||
|
/// Original document token to replace in `args` (same value as `document`
|
||||||
|
/// when present).
|
||||||
|
pub original_document: Option<&'a Path>,
|
||||||
|
/// Combined per-stream output cap in bytes.
|
||||||
|
pub output_limit: usize,
|
||||||
|
/// Wall-clock budget for the supervised process tree.
|
||||||
|
pub timeout: Duration,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Launch a command inside the strict sandbox (Linux only).
|
||||||
|
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
|
||||||
|
pub fn launch_strict(command: &StrictHostCommand<'_>) -> Result<i32, SandboxError> {
|
||||||
|
linux::launch(command)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Launch a command inside the strict sandbox and return its captured outcome.
|
||||||
|
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
|
||||||
|
pub fn launch_strict_capture(
|
||||||
|
command: &StrictHostCommand<'_>,
|
||||||
|
) -> Result<linux::StrictOutcome, SandboxError> {
|
||||||
|
linux::launch_capture(command)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Launch a command inside the strict sandbox (unsupported elsewhere).
|
||||||
|
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
|
||||||
|
pub fn launch_strict(_command: &StrictHostCommand<'_>) -> Result<i32, SandboxError> {
|
||||||
|
Err(SandboxError::StrictUnavailable {
|
||||||
|
reason: "strict OS isolation is only implemented on Linux".to_string(),
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||||
mod tests {
|
mod tests {
|
||||||
use super::*;
|
use super::*;
|
||||||
@@ -178,7 +249,14 @@ mod tests {
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
#[test]
|
#[test]
|
||||||
fn strict_refuses_when_isolation_is_unavailable() {
|
fn strict_refuses_when_isolation_is_unavailable() {
|
||||||
let platform = PlatformCapabilities::detect();
|
let platform = PlatformCapabilities {
|
||||||
|
os: "test".to_string(),
|
||||||
|
arch: "test".to_string(),
|
||||||
|
strict: StrictIsolation::Unavailable {
|
||||||
|
reason: "test host has no verified isolation".to_string(),
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
worker_processes: true,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
let result = enforce(SandboxMode::Strict, &platform);
|
let result = enforce(SandboxMode::Strict, &platform);
|
||||||
assert!(result.is_err());
|
assert!(result.is_err());
|
||||||
assert!(format!("{}", result.unwrap_err()).contains("strict"));
|
assert!(format!("{}", result.unwrap_err()).contains("strict"));
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,477 @@
|
|||||||
|
//! Linux strict-isolation supervisor.
|
||||||
|
//!
|
||||||
|
//! The mechanism is Bubblewrap (`bwrap`) plus a small trusted supervisor in
|
||||||
|
//! this process:
|
||||||
|
//!
|
||||||
|
//! * user, mount, PID, network, UTS, IPC and cgroup namespaces
|
||||||
|
//! (`--unshare-all --as-pid-1`);
|
||||||
|
//! * a read-only view of the runtime libraries, the project root and the
|
||||||
|
//! program itself; no host `/etc`, `/root`, `$HOME` or other projects;
|
||||||
|
//! * a tmpfs `/tmp`, a private `/proc` and a minimal `/dev`;
|
||||||
|
//! * `no_new_privs`, all capabilities dropped, empty environment;
|
||||||
|
//! * hard rlimits for CPU, address space, file size, file descriptors,
|
||||||
|
//! processes, stack and core dumps;
|
||||||
|
//! * a wall-clock supervisor with process-group cleanup and bounded captured
|
||||||
|
//! output.
|
||||||
|
//!
|
||||||
|
//! Bubblewrap is a construction mechanism, not a certificate: [`probe`] runs
|
||||||
|
//! a real sandbox smoke test at runtime and strict is reported unavailable if
|
||||||
|
//! the host cannot create the namespaces. The sandboxed process additionally
|
||||||
|
//! verifies its own markers (`PID 1`, `NoNewPrivs`, unshared uid map, no
|
||||||
|
//! non-loopback interface) before executing user code.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
use std::ffi::OsString;
|
||||||
|
use std::fs;
|
||||||
|
use std::io::{self, Read, Write};
|
||||||
|
use std::os::unix::process::{CommandExt, ExitStatusExt};
|
||||||
|
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
|
||||||
|
use std::process::{Child, Command, ExitStatus, Stdio};
|
||||||
|
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
use crate::{SandboxError, StrictHostCommand};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Environment variable that marks a re-executed strict child.
|
||||||
|
pub const ACTIVE_ENV: &str = "MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE";
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Path of the program inside the sandbox.
|
||||||
|
const SANDBOX_PROGRAM: &str = "/run/marqdo-program";
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Candidate absolute Bubblewrap paths. `PATH` lookup is deliberately avoided
|
||||||
|
/// so a project-local binary cannot impersonate the supervisor tool.
|
||||||
|
const BWRAP_PATHS: [&str; 3] = ["/usr/bin/bwrap", "/bin/bwrap", "/usr/local/bin/bwrap"];
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const PROBE_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
|
||||||
|
const MAX_STACK_BYTES: u64 = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
|
||||||
|
const MAX_ADDRESS_SPACE: u64 = 512 * 1024 * 1024;
|
||||||
|
const MAX_PROCESSES: u64 = 64;
|
||||||
|
const MAX_OPEN_FILES: u64 = 64;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
fn bwrap_path() -> Option<PathBuf> {
|
||||||
|
BWRAP_PATHS
|
||||||
|
.iter()
|
||||||
|
.map(PathBuf::from)
|
||||||
|
.find(|path| path.is_file())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Probe the real availability of the strict mechanism.
|
||||||
|
pub fn probe() -> Result<String, String> {
|
||||||
|
let bwrap = bwrap_path().ok_or_else(|| {
|
||||||
|
"bubblewrap (`bwrap`) is not installed; install it or use project mode".to_string()
|
||||||
|
})?;
|
||||||
|
let version = bwrap_version(&bwrap)?;
|
||||||
|
let mut command = Command::new(&bwrap);
|
||||||
|
command
|
||||||
|
.args(common_args())
|
||||||
|
.args(["--", "/bin/true"])
|
||||||
|
.stdin(Stdio::null())
|
||||||
|
.stdout(Stdio::piped())
|
||||||
|
.stderr(Stdio::piped());
|
||||||
|
let mut child = command
|
||||||
|
.spawn()
|
||||||
|
.map_err(|error| format!("cannot start the bubblewrap probe: {error}"))?;
|
||||||
|
let status = wait_with_deadline(&mut child, PROBE_TIMEOUT)?;
|
||||||
|
let mut stderr = String::new();
|
||||||
|
if let Some(mut pipe) = child.stderr.take() {
|
||||||
|
let _ = pipe.read_to_string(&mut stderr);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if !status.success() {
|
||||||
|
return Err(format!(
|
||||||
|
"bubblewrap cannot create the required namespaces: {}",
|
||||||
|
stderr.trim()
|
||||||
|
));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
Ok(format!(
|
||||||
|
"bubblewrap {version} (user/mount/PID/net/UTS/IPC namespaces + no-new-privs + rlimits)"
|
||||||
|
))
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
fn bwrap_version(bwrap: &Path) -> Result<String, String> {
|
||||||
|
let output = Command::new(bwrap)
|
||||||
|
.arg("--version")
|
||||||
|
.stdin(Stdio::null())
|
||||||
|
.output()
|
||||||
|
.map_err(|error| format!("cannot run `{}`: {error}", bwrap.display()))?;
|
||||||
|
if !output.status.success() {
|
||||||
|
return Err("`bwrap --version` failed".to_string());
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
|
||||||
|
let version = text
|
||||||
|
.lines()
|
||||||
|
.next()
|
||||||
|
.unwrap_or("")
|
||||||
|
.split_whitespace()
|
||||||
|
.nth(1)
|
||||||
|
.unwrap_or("unknown")
|
||||||
|
.to_string();
|
||||||
|
Ok(version)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
fn common_args() -> Vec<OsString> {
|
||||||
|
let mut args: Vec<OsString> = [
|
||||||
|
"--unshare-all",
|
||||||
|
"--as-pid-1",
|
||||||
|
"--die-with-parent",
|
||||||
|
"--new-session",
|
||||||
|
"--cap-drop",
|
||||||
|
"ALL",
|
||||||
|
"--clearenv",
|
||||||
|
"--setenv",
|
||||||
|
"PATH",
|
||||||
|
"/usr/bin:/bin",
|
||||||
|
"--setenv",
|
||||||
|
"HOME",
|
||||||
|
"/tmp",
|
||||||
|
"--setenv",
|
||||||
|
"LANG",
|
||||||
|
"C.UTF-8",
|
||||||
|
"--proc",
|
||||||
|
"/proc",
|
||||||
|
"--dev",
|
||||||
|
"/dev",
|
||||||
|
"--tmpfs",
|
||||||
|
"/tmp",
|
||||||
|
"--dir",
|
||||||
|
"/run",
|
||||||
|
]
|
||||||
|
.into_iter()
|
||||||
|
.map(OsString::from)
|
||||||
|
.collect();
|
||||||
|
for directory in ["/usr", "/bin", "/sbin", "/lib", "/lib64"] {
|
||||||
|
let path = Path::new(directory);
|
||||||
|
if path.exists() {
|
||||||
|
args.extend([
|
||||||
|
OsString::from("--ro-bind"),
|
||||||
|
OsString::from(directory),
|
||||||
|
OsString::from(directory),
|
||||||
|
]);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if Path::new("/etc/ld.so.cache").is_file() {
|
||||||
|
args.extend([
|
||||||
|
OsString::from("--ro-bind"),
|
||||||
|
OsString::from("/etc/ld.so.cache"),
|
||||||
|
OsString::from("/etc/ld.so.cache"),
|
||||||
|
]);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
args
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Verify that this process really is the strict child created by [`launch`].
|
||||||
|
pub fn verify_active() -> Result<(), String> {
|
||||||
|
if std::env::var(ACTIVE_ENV).ok().as_deref() != Some("1") {
|
||||||
|
return Err("strict active marker is absent".to_string());
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
// `--as-pid-1` makes the supervised program PID 1 in its own PID namespace.
|
||||||
|
let pid = unsafe { libc::getpid() };
|
||||||
|
if pid != 1 {
|
||||||
|
return Err(format!(
|
||||||
|
"strict child is not PID 1 in a private PID namespace (pid {pid})"
|
||||||
|
));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let status = fs::read_to_string("/proc/self/status")
|
||||||
|
.map_err(|error| format!("cannot read /proc/self/status: {error}"))?;
|
||||||
|
if !status.lines().any(|line| line == "NoNewPrivs:\t1") {
|
||||||
|
return Err("strict child does not have no_new_privs set".to_string());
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let effective = status
|
||||||
|
.lines()
|
||||||
|
.find_map(|line| line.strip_prefix("CapEff:\t"))
|
||||||
|
.unwrap_or("");
|
||||||
|
if effective.bytes().any(|byte| byte != b'0') {
|
||||||
|
return Err("strict child still has effective capabilities".to_string());
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let uid_map = fs::read_to_string("/proc/self/uid_map")
|
||||||
|
.map_err(|error| format!("cannot read uid_map: {error}"))?;
|
||||||
|
let unshared = uid_map.lines().any(|line| {
|
||||||
|
let fields: Vec<&str> = line.split_whitespace().collect();
|
||||||
|
!(fields.len() == 3 && fields[0] == "0" && fields[1] == "0" && fields[2] == "4294967295")
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
if !unshared {
|
||||||
|
return Err("strict child did not create a private user namespace".to_string());
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let interfaces = fs::read_to_string("/proc/net/dev")
|
||||||
|
.map_err(|error| format!("cannot read /proc/net/dev: {error}"))?;
|
||||||
|
let non_loopback = interfaces.lines().skip(2).any(|line| {
|
||||||
|
let name = line.split(':').next().unwrap_or("").trim();
|
||||||
|
!name.is_empty() && name != "lo"
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
if non_loopback {
|
||||||
|
return Err("strict child still has a non-loopback network interface".to_string());
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
Ok(())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Whether the current process claims to be a strict child. The marker alone
|
||||||
|
/// is not trusted; callers must use [`verify_active`].
|
||||||
|
pub fn marker_present() -> bool {
|
||||||
|
std::env::var(ACTIVE_ENV).ok().as_deref() == Some("1")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Result of one supervised strict execution.
|
||||||
|
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
|
||||||
|
pub struct StrictOutcome {
|
||||||
|
/// Process exit code when the program exited normally.
|
||||||
|
pub exit_code: Option<i32>,
|
||||||
|
/// Terminating signal, when the program was killed by the supervisor,
|
||||||
|
/// a resource limit or the kernel.
|
||||||
|
pub signal: Option<i32>,
|
||||||
|
/// Captured stdout (bounded by the output limit).
|
||||||
|
pub stdout: Vec<u8>,
|
||||||
|
/// Captured stderr (bounded by the output limit).
|
||||||
|
pub stderr: Vec<u8>,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Launch `command` inside the strict sandbox and return its exit code,
|
||||||
|
/// forwarding captured output to this process's stdout/stderr.
|
||||||
|
pub fn launch(command: &StrictHostCommand<'_>) -> Result<i32, SandboxError> {
|
||||||
|
let outcome = run(command)?;
|
||||||
|
let mut stdout = io::stdout().lock();
|
||||||
|
let _ = stdout.write_all(&outcome.stdout);
|
||||||
|
let _ = stdout.flush();
|
||||||
|
let mut stderr = io::stderr().lock();
|
||||||
|
let _ = stderr.write_all(&outcome.stderr);
|
||||||
|
let _ = stderr.flush();
|
||||||
|
finish(outcome)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Launch `command` and return its captured outcome without forwarding it.
|
||||||
|
/// Used by the adversarial security lane.
|
||||||
|
pub fn launch_capture(command: &StrictHostCommand<'_>) -> Result<StrictOutcome, SandboxError> {
|
||||||
|
run(command)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
fn finish(outcome: StrictOutcome) -> Result<i32, SandboxError> {
|
||||||
|
if let Some(code) = outcome.exit_code {
|
||||||
|
return Ok(code);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let signal = outcome.signal.unwrap_or_default();
|
||||||
|
let message = match signal {
|
||||||
|
libc::SIGXCPU => "strict child exceeded its CPU budget".to_string(),
|
||||||
|
libc::SIGXFSZ => "strict child exceeded its output budget".to_string(),
|
||||||
|
libc::SIGKILL => "strict child was killed by the resource supervisor".to_string(),
|
||||||
|
other => format!("strict child terminated by signal {other}"),
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
Err(SandboxError::LaunchFailed { message })
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
fn run(command: &StrictHostCommand<'_>) -> Result<StrictOutcome, SandboxError> {
|
||||||
|
if command.project_root == Path::new("/") {
|
||||||
|
return Err(SandboxError::LaunchFailed {
|
||||||
|
message: "strict mode refuses to expose the host root as the project".to_string(),
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let project_root =
|
||||||
|
fs::canonicalize(command.project_root).map_err(|error| SandboxError::LaunchFailed {
|
||||||
|
message: format!(
|
||||||
|
"cannot resolve the strict project root `{}`: {error}",
|
||||||
|
command.project_root.display()
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
})?;
|
||||||
|
// The document (when supplied) must be inside the project root. It is
|
||||||
|
// rewritten to the sandbox path, so the host's absolute layout never leaks
|
||||||
|
// into the child and no other directory needs to be mounted.
|
||||||
|
let document = match command.document {
|
||||||
|
Some(document) => {
|
||||||
|
let absolute =
|
||||||
|
fs::canonicalize(document).map_err(|error| SandboxError::LaunchFailed {
|
||||||
|
message: format!("cannot resolve strict document: {error}"),
|
||||||
|
})?;
|
||||||
|
let relative =
|
||||||
|
absolute
|
||||||
|
.strip_prefix(&project_root)
|
||||||
|
.map_err(|_| SandboxError::LaunchFailed {
|
||||||
|
message: format!(
|
||||||
|
"strict document `{}` is outside the project root `{}`",
|
||||||
|
absolute.display(),
|
||||||
|
project_root.display()
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
})?;
|
||||||
|
Some(Path::new("/project").join(relative))
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
None => None,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
probe().map_err(|reason| SandboxError::LaunchFailed { message: reason })?;
|
||||||
|
let bwrap = bwrap_path().ok_or_else(|| SandboxError::LaunchFailed {
|
||||||
|
message: "bubblewrap disappeared after the probe".to_string(),
|
||||||
|
})?;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let mut args = common_args();
|
||||||
|
args.extend([
|
||||||
|
OsString::from("--ro-bind"),
|
||||||
|
project_root.as_os_str().to_os_string(),
|
||||||
|
OsString::from("/project"),
|
||||||
|
OsString::from("--ro-bind"),
|
||||||
|
command.program.as_os_str().to_os_string(),
|
||||||
|
OsString::from(SANDBOX_PROGRAM),
|
||||||
|
OsString::from("--setenv"),
|
||||||
|
OsString::from(ACTIVE_ENV),
|
||||||
|
OsString::from("1"),
|
||||||
|
OsString::from("--chdir"),
|
||||||
|
OsString::from("/project"),
|
||||||
|
OsString::from("--"),
|
||||||
|
OsString::from(SANDBOX_PROGRAM),
|
||||||
|
]);
|
||||||
|
// Rewrite the document argument to its `/project/...` sandbox path. The
|
||||||
|
// CLI passed the original token, so replace exactly that token; all other
|
||||||
|
// arguments (flags, function name, typed --arg values) are unchanged.
|
||||||
|
let mut replaced = document.is_none();
|
||||||
|
for argument in command.args {
|
||||||
|
if let Some(document) = &document {
|
||||||
|
if Path::new(argument) == command.original_document.unwrap_or(Path::new("")) {
|
||||||
|
args.push(document.as_os_str().to_os_string());
|
||||||
|
replaced = true;
|
||||||
|
continue;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
args.push(argument.clone());
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if !replaced {
|
||||||
|
return Err(SandboxError::LaunchFailed {
|
||||||
|
message: "strict launcher could not rewrite the document argument".to_string(),
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let stdout = CaptureFile::create("stdout")?;
|
||||||
|
let stderr = CaptureFile::create("stderr")?;
|
||||||
|
let limit = command.output_limit.max(1024) as u64;
|
||||||
|
let timeout = command.timeout;
|
||||||
|
let cpu_limit = timeout.as_secs().saturating_add(2).max(1);
|
||||||
|
let mut supervisor = Command::new(&bwrap);
|
||||||
|
supervisor
|
||||||
|
.args(&args)
|
||||||
|
.stdin(Stdio::null())
|
||||||
|
.stdout(Stdio::from(stdout.reopen()?))
|
||||||
|
.stderr(Stdio::from(stderr.reopen()?));
|
||||||
|
// SAFETY: the closure only calls async-signal-safe libc functions
|
||||||
|
// (`setpgid`, `setrlimit`) between fork and exec.
|
||||||
|
unsafe {
|
||||||
|
supervisor.pre_exec(move || {
|
||||||
|
if libc::setpgid(0, 0) != 0 {
|
||||||
|
return Err(io::Error::last_os_error());
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_CPU, cpu_limit, cpu_limit)?;
|
||||||
|
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_AS, MAX_ADDRESS_SPACE, MAX_ADDRESS_SPACE)?;
|
||||||
|
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_NOFILE, MAX_OPEN_FILES, MAX_OPEN_FILES)?;
|
||||||
|
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_NPROC, MAX_PROCESSES, MAX_PROCESSES)?;
|
||||||
|
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_FSIZE, limit, limit)?;
|
||||||
|
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_STACK, MAX_STACK_BYTES, MAX_STACK_BYTES)?;
|
||||||
|
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_CORE, 0, 0)?;
|
||||||
|
Ok(())
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let mut child = supervisor
|
||||||
|
.spawn()
|
||||||
|
.map_err(|error| SandboxError::LaunchFailed {
|
||||||
|
message: format!("cannot start the strict supervisor: {error}"),
|
||||||
|
})?;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let status = match wait_with_deadline(&mut child, timeout) {
|
||||||
|
Ok(status) => status,
|
||||||
|
Err(message) => {
|
||||||
|
let _ = unsafe { libc::kill(-(child.id() as i32), libc::SIGKILL) };
|
||||||
|
let _ = child.kill();
|
||||||
|
let _ = child.wait();
|
||||||
|
let _ = stdout.read_all();
|
||||||
|
let _ = stderr.read_all();
|
||||||
|
return Err(SandboxError::LaunchFailed { message });
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Ok(StrictOutcome {
|
||||||
|
exit_code: status.code(),
|
||||||
|
signal: status.signal(),
|
||||||
|
stdout: stdout.read_all()?,
|
||||||
|
stderr: stderr.read_all()?,
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
fn set_limit(resource: libc::__rlimit_resource_t, soft: u64, hard: u64) -> io::Result<()> {
|
||||||
|
let limit = libc::rlimit {
|
||||||
|
rlim_cur: soft as libc::rlim_t,
|
||||||
|
rlim_max: hard as libc::rlim_t,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
if unsafe { libc::setrlimit(resource, &limit) } != 0 {
|
||||||
|
return Err(io::Error::last_os_error());
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
Ok(())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
fn wait_with_deadline(child: &mut Child, timeout: Duration) -> Result<ExitStatus, String> {
|
||||||
|
let deadline = Instant::now() + timeout;
|
||||||
|
loop {
|
||||||
|
if let Some(status) = child
|
||||||
|
.try_wait()
|
||||||
|
.map_err(|error| format!("cannot wait for the strict child: {error}"))?
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
return Ok(status);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if Instant::now() >= deadline {
|
||||||
|
return Err(format!(
|
||||||
|
"strict child exceeded its wall-clock budget of {} second(s)",
|
||||||
|
timeout.as_secs()
|
||||||
|
));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(5));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
struct CaptureFile {
|
||||||
|
path: PathBuf,
|
||||||
|
file: Option<fs::File>,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
impl CaptureFile {
|
||||||
|
fn create(tag: &str) -> Result<Self, SandboxError> {
|
||||||
|
let nanos = std::time::SystemTime::now()
|
||||||
|
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
|
||||||
|
.map(|duration| duration.as_nanos())
|
||||||
|
.unwrap_or(0);
|
||||||
|
let path = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
|
||||||
|
"marqdo-strict-{tag}-{}-{nanos}",
|
||||||
|
std::process::id()
|
||||||
|
));
|
||||||
|
let file = fs::OpenOptions::new()
|
||||||
|
.read(true)
|
||||||
|
.write(true)
|
||||||
|
.create_new(true)
|
||||||
|
.open(&path)
|
||||||
|
.map_err(|error| SandboxError::LaunchFailed {
|
||||||
|
message: format!("cannot create strict capture file: {error}"),
|
||||||
|
})?;
|
||||||
|
Ok(Self {
|
||||||
|
path,
|
||||||
|
file: Some(file),
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
fn reopen(&self) -> Result<fs::File, SandboxError> {
|
||||||
|
self.file
|
||||||
|
.as_ref()
|
||||||
|
.ok_or_else(|| SandboxError::LaunchFailed {
|
||||||
|
message: "strict capture file is closed".to_string(),
|
||||||
|
})?
|
||||||
|
.try_clone()
|
||||||
|
.map_err(|error| SandboxError::LaunchFailed {
|
||||||
|
message: format!("cannot clone strict capture file: {error}"),
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
fn read_all(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SandboxError> {
|
||||||
|
let mut file = fs::File::open(&self.path).map_err(|error| SandboxError::LaunchFailed {
|
||||||
|
message: format!("cannot read strict capture file: {error}"),
|
||||||
|
})?;
|
||||||
|
let mut bytes = Vec::new();
|
||||||
|
file.read_to_end(&mut bytes)
|
||||||
|
.map_err(|error| SandboxError::LaunchFailed {
|
||||||
|
message: format!("cannot read strict capture file: {error}"),
|
||||||
|
})?;
|
||||||
|
Ok(bytes)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
impl Drop for CaptureFile {
|
||||||
|
fn drop(&mut self) {
|
||||||
|
drop(self.file.take());
|
||||||
|
let _ = fs::remove_file(&self.path);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
|
|||||||
|
//! Adversarial Linux strict-isolation lane.
|
||||||
|
//!
|
||||||
|
//! These tests launch a native helper through the **same** `marqdo-sandbox`
|
||||||
|
//! supervisor used by `marqdo run --mode strict`, then exercise direct
|
||||||
|
//! syscalls for filesystem, network, process, privilege and resource escapes.
|
||||||
|
//!
|
||||||
|
//! They require a host where [`marqdo_sandbox::probe`] succeeds (Bubblewrap
|
||||||
|
//! plus permitted user/mount/PID/net namespaces). On an incapable host they
|
||||||
|
//! are skipped **unless** `MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY=1` is set, which the
|
||||||
|
//! G-C security lane must set so a missing mechanism can never count as a
|
||||||
|
//! pass.
|
||||||
|
//!
|
||||||
|
//! The helper path can be supplied with `MARQDO_SECURITY_HELPER` (used when
|
||||||
|
//! running this test binary inside the disposable security VM). Otherwise the
|
||||||
|
//! test compiles `tests/security/escape_helper.c` with `cc`.
|
||||||
|
#![cfg(target_os = "linux")]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
use std::ffi::OsString;
|
||||||
|
use std::fs;
|
||||||
|
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
|
||||||
|
use std::process::Command;
|
||||||
|
use std::time::Duration;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
use marqdo_sandbox::{launch_strict_capture, probe, StrictHostCommand, StrictOutcome};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
fn required() -> bool {
|
||||||
|
std::env::var("MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY")
|
||||||
|
.ok()
|
||||||
|
.as_deref()
|
||||||
|
== Some("1")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
fn helper() -> Option<PathBuf> {
|
||||||
|
if let Ok(path) = std::env::var("MARQDO_SECURITY_HELPER") {
|
||||||
|
let path = PathBuf::from(path);
|
||||||
|
assert!(path.is_file(), "MARQDO_SECURITY_HELPER does not exist");
|
||||||
|
return Some(path);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let source = Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")).join("../../tests/security/escape_helper.c");
|
||||||
|
let output = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
|
||||||
|
"marqdo-escape-helper-{}{}",
|
||||||
|
std::process::id(),
|
||||||
|
std::env::consts::EXE_SUFFIX
|
||||||
|
));
|
||||||
|
let status = Command::new("cc")
|
||||||
|
.args(["-O2", "-o"])
|
||||||
|
.arg(&output)
|
||||||
|
.arg(&source)
|
||||||
|
.status()
|
||||||
|
.ok()?;
|
||||||
|
if !status.success() {
|
||||||
|
return None;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
Some(output)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
fn setup() -> Option<(PathBuf, PathBuf, PathBuf)> {
|
||||||
|
if let Err(reason) = probe() {
|
||||||
|
if required() {
|
||||||
|
panic!("G-C security lane requires strict isolation but probe failed: {reason}");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
eprintln!("skipping strict security lane: {reason}");
|
||||||
|
return None;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let helper = match helper() {
|
||||||
|
Some(helper) => helper,
|
||||||
|
None => {
|
||||||
|
if required() {
|
||||||
|
panic!("G-C security lane could not build or find escape_helper");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
eprintln!("skipping strict security lane: no escape helper/cc");
|
||||||
|
return None;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let project = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("marqdo-security-{}", std::process::id()));
|
||||||
|
let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&project);
|
||||||
|
fs::create_dir_all(&project).expect("create security project");
|
||||||
|
fs::write(project.join("allowed.txt"), "allowed\n").expect("write allowed file");
|
||||||
|
// A host-only path that is not mounted into the sandbox for any user. The
|
||||||
|
// sandbox has no `$HOME`, so attempting to write here must fail.
|
||||||
|
let home = std::env::var_os("HOME")
|
||||||
|
.map(PathBuf::from)
|
||||||
|
.unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("/home"));
|
||||||
|
let outside = home.join(format!("marqdo-escape-{}", std::process::id()));
|
||||||
|
let _ = fs::remove_file(&outside);
|
||||||
|
Some((helper, project, outside))
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
fn run(helper: &Path, project: &Path, outside: &Path, mode: &str) -> StrictOutcome {
|
||||||
|
let args = vec![OsString::from(mode), outside.as_os_str().to_os_string()];
|
||||||
|
let command = StrictHostCommand {
|
||||||
|
program: helper,
|
||||||
|
args: &args,
|
||||||
|
project_root: project,
|
||||||
|
document: None,
|
||||||
|
original_document: None,
|
||||||
|
output_limit: 64 * 1024,
|
||||||
|
timeout: Duration::from_secs(3),
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
launch_strict_capture(&command).unwrap_or_else(|error| panic!("{mode}: {error}"))
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
fn text(outcome: &StrictOutcome) -> String {
|
||||||
|
String::from_utf8_lossy(&outcome.stdout).to_string()
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn strict_child_identity_is_unprivileged_and_namespaced() {
|
||||||
|
let Some((helper, project, outside)) = setup() else {
|
||||||
|
return;
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let outcome = run(&helper, &project, &outside, "alive");
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(outcome.exit_code, Some(0), "{}", text(&outcome));
|
||||||
|
let output = text(&outcome);
|
||||||
|
assert!(
|
||||||
|
output.contains("uid=1000") || output.contains("uid=1001"),
|
||||||
|
"{output}"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
assert!(
|
||||||
|
!output.contains("uid=0 "),
|
||||||
|
"strict child ran as root: {output}"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
assert!(
|
||||||
|
output.contains("pid=1"),
|
||||||
|
"strict child is not PID 1: {output}"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
assert!(output.contains("NoNewPrivs:\t1"), "{output}");
|
||||||
|
let cap_eff = output
|
||||||
|
.lines()
|
||||||
|
.find_map(|line| line.strip_prefix("CapEff:"))
|
||||||
|
.unwrap_or("")
|
||||||
|
.trim();
|
||||||
|
assert!(
|
||||||
|
cap_eff.bytes().all(|byte| byte == b'0'),
|
||||||
|
"strict child kept capabilities: {cap_eff}"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&project);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn strict_child_cannot_read_host_files_but_reads_the_project() {
|
||||||
|
let Some((helper, project, outside)) = setup() else {
|
||||||
|
return;
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let outcome = run(&helper, &project, &outside, "read");
|
||||||
|
let output = text(&outcome);
|
||||||
|
assert!(output.contains("read_project_allowed=OK"), "{output}");
|
||||||
|
for key in ["read_etc_shadow", "read_root_key", "read_home_key"] {
|
||||||
|
assert!(output.contains(&format!("{key}=DENIED")), "{key}: {output}");
|
||||||
|
assert!(!output.contains(&format!("{key}=LEAK")), "{key}: {output}");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&project);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn strict_child_cannot_write_outside_or_into_the_project() {
|
||||||
|
let Some((helper, project, outside)) = setup() else {
|
||||||
|
return;
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let outcome = run(&helper, &project, &outside, "write");
|
||||||
|
let output = text(&outcome);
|
||||||
|
assert!(output.contains("write_outside=DENIED"), "{output}");
|
||||||
|
assert!(output.contains("write_project=DENIED"), "{output}");
|
||||||
|
assert!(output.contains("write_tmp=WROTE"), "{output}");
|
||||||
|
assert!(
|
||||||
|
!outside.exists(),
|
||||||
|
"strict child created a host file at {}",
|
||||||
|
outside.display()
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&project);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn strict_child_cannot_escape_via_proc_or_privileges() {
|
||||||
|
let Some((helper, project, outside)) = setup() else {
|
||||||
|
return;
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let proc = run(&helper, &project, &outside, "proc");
|
||||||
|
let output = text(&proc);
|
||||||
|
assert!(output.contains("proc_pid1_root_etc=DENIED"), "{output}");
|
||||||
|
assert!(
|
||||||
|
output.contains("inherited_fds_above_stdio=NONE"),
|
||||||
|
"{output}"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
let privileges = run(&helper, &project, &outside, "priv");
|
||||||
|
let output = text(&privileges);
|
||||||
|
assert!(output.contains("setuid_root=DENIED"), "{output}");
|
||||||
|
assert!(output.contains("mount_tmpfs=DENIED"), "{output}");
|
||||||
|
assert!(!output.contains("setuid_root=OK"), "{output}");
|
||||||
|
assert!(!output.contains("mount_tmpfs=OK"), "{output}");
|
||||||
|
let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&project);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn strict_child_cannot_reach_the_network() {
|
||||||
|
let Some((helper, project, outside)) = setup() else {
|
||||||
|
return;
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let outcome = run(&helper, &project, &outside, "net");
|
||||||
|
let output = text(&outcome);
|
||||||
|
assert!(!output.contains("CONNECTED"), "{output}");
|
||||||
|
assert!(output.contains("socket_ipv4=DENIED"), "{output}");
|
||||||
|
assert!(output.contains("socket_raw=DENIED"), "{output}");
|
||||||
|
let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&project);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn strict_supervisor_enforces_fd_and_process_limits() {
|
||||||
|
let Some((helper, project, outside)) = setup() else {
|
||||||
|
return;
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let fds = run(&helper, &project, &outside, "fds");
|
||||||
|
let output = text(&fds);
|
||||||
|
assert!(output.contains("fd_limit=BOUNDED"), "{output}");
|
||||||
|
let count: usize = output
|
||||||
|
.lines()
|
||||||
|
.find_map(|line| line.strip_prefix("open_fds="))
|
||||||
|
.and_then(|value| value.parse().ok())
|
||||||
|
.unwrap_or(usize::MAX);
|
||||||
|
assert!(count <= 64, "strict child opened {count} fds");
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let forks = run(&helper, &project, &outside, "fork");
|
||||||
|
let output = text(&forks);
|
||||||
|
assert!(output.contains("process_limit=BOUNDED"), "{output}");
|
||||||
|
let forked: usize = output
|
||||||
|
.lines()
|
||||||
|
.find_map(|line| line.strip_prefix("forked="))
|
||||||
|
.and_then(|value| value.parse().ok())
|
||||||
|
.unwrap_or(usize::MAX);
|
||||||
|
assert!(forked < 200, "strict child forked {forked} processes");
|
||||||
|
let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&project);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn strict_supervisor_enforces_memory_cpu_and_output_limits() {
|
||||||
|
let Some((helper, project, outside)) = setup() else {
|
||||||
|
return;
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let memory = run(&helper, &project, &outside, "mem");
|
||||||
|
let output = text(&memory);
|
||||||
|
assert!(
|
||||||
|
!output.contains("malloc_768m=OK"),
|
||||||
|
"768 MiB allocation escaped the memory limit: {output}"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let args = vec![OsString::from("cpu")];
|
||||||
|
let command = StrictHostCommand {
|
||||||
|
program: &helper,
|
||||||
|
args: &args,
|
||||||
|
project_root: &project,
|
||||||
|
document: None,
|
||||||
|
original_document: None,
|
||||||
|
output_limit: 64 * 1024,
|
||||||
|
timeout: Duration::from_secs(2),
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let cpu = launch_strict_capture(&command).expect_err("CPU loop must be stopped");
|
||||||
|
let message = cpu.to_string();
|
||||||
|
assert!(
|
||||||
|
message.contains("wall-clock") || message.contains("CPU"),
|
||||||
|
"unexpected CPU failure: {message}"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let output_limit = launch_strict_capture(&StrictHostCommand {
|
||||||
|
program: &helper,
|
||||||
|
args: &[OsString::from("output")],
|
||||||
|
project_root: &project,
|
||||||
|
document: None,
|
||||||
|
original_document: None,
|
||||||
|
output_limit: 64 * 1024,
|
||||||
|
timeout: Duration::from_secs(3),
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
.expect("output helper should be captured, not spawn-failed");
|
||||||
|
assert!(
|
||||||
|
output_limit.signal == Some(libc::SIGXFSZ) || output_limit.exit_code != Some(0),
|
||||||
|
"output limit was not enforced: signal={:?} exit={:?}",
|
||||||
|
output_limit.signal,
|
||||||
|
output_limit.exit_code
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
assert!(
|
||||||
|
output_limit.stdout.len() <= 64 * 1024,
|
||||||
|
"captured {} bytes beyond the limit",
|
||||||
|
output_limit.stdout.len()
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
// The helper cannot always report after the file hits RLIMIT_FSIZE: the
|
||||||
|
// report itself would exceed the limit. A non-zero exit, a terminating
|
||||||
|
// signal, and a bounded capture are the observable contract.
|
||||||
|
let written = output_limit
|
||||||
|
.stdout
|
||||||
|
.windows(b"output_4m=WRITTEN".len())
|
||||||
|
.any(|window| window == b"output_4m=WRITTEN");
|
||||||
|
assert!(!written, "the helper reported writing 4 MiB");
|
||||||
|
let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&project);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
+12
-10
@@ -65,9 +65,9 @@ runs.
|
|||||||
| 4 | Analysis/Trace/Tool protocol | **Implemented; consumers PASS locally** | schemas + `tests/consumers/*.py`, `analysis_trace`/`tool_protocol` PASS; `check_never_spawns_a_foreign_kernel` PASS |
|
| 4 | Analysis/Trace/Tool protocol | **Implemented; consumers PASS locally** | schemas + `tests/consumers/*.py`, `analysis_trace`/`tool_protocol` PASS; `check_never_spawns_a_foreign_kernel` PASS |
|
||||||
| 5 | Foreign pinned environment | **Done (ADR-0020)** | provider tests PASS; env binds interpreter; version drift rejected |
|
| 5 | Foreign pinned environment | **Done (ADR-0020)** | provider tests PASS; env binds interpreter; version drift rejected |
|
||||||
| 6 | ABI session/broker hardening | **Partial** | `fs.read` bridge + budgets + handle tests PASS; Windows ABI unsupported; broader services still `capability.unavailable` |
|
| 6 | ABI session/broker hardening | **Partial** | `fs.read` bridge + budgets + handle tests PASS; Windows ABI unsupported; broader services still `capability.unavailable` |
|
||||||
| 7 | Linux strict probe | **Done as fail-closed evidence** | `docs/security-gate.md`; userns/bwrap EPERM, cgroup ro, sudo blocked |
|
| 7 | Linux strict probe | **Done** | runtime Bubblewrap probe; unavailable host reports the real reason |
|
||||||
| 8 | Linux strict pure (L1) | **BLOCKED** | no namespace creation on this host; no adapter implemented or verified |
|
| 8 | Linux strict pure (L1) | **DONE (VM-verified)** | ADR-0021; 7/7 adversarial tests + CLI matrix PASS in disposable Ubuntu VM |
|
||||||
| 9 | Linux strict extensions (L2) | **BLOCKED** | depends on L1 |
|
| 9 | Linux strict extensions (L2) | **NOT IMPLEMENTED** | strict rejects Worker/Foreign/native ABI; future ADR needed |
|
||||||
| 10 | Native platform matrix | **Partial** | Linux PASS; macOS/Windows source fixes, remote lanes absent |
|
| 10 | Native platform matrix | **Partial** | Linux PASS; macOS/Windows source fixes, remote lanes absent |
|
||||||
| 11 | Independent ecosystem consumers | **Partial** | Analysis/Trace Python consumers PASS; three Tool fixtures not added |
|
| 11 | Independent ecosystem consumers | **Partial** | Analysis/Trace Python consumers PASS; three Tool fixtures not added |
|
||||||
| 12 | RC/docs/artifacts | **Candidate build only** | release docs, checksummed artifact, clean-install smoke; NOT released |
|
| 12 | RC/docs/artifacts | **Candidate build only** | release docs, checksummed artifact, clean-install smoke; NOT released |
|
||||||
@@ -97,10 +97,11 @@ runs.
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
1. **No remote CI evidence for this commit.** The repository remote is Gitee;
|
1. **No remote CI evidence for this commit.** The repository remote is Gitee;
|
||||||
no GitHub workflow was executed. Windows/macOS fixes are UNVERIFIED there.
|
no GitHub workflow was executed. Windows/macOS fixes are UNVERIFIED there.
|
||||||
2. **G-C is not passed.** `strict` remains `Unavailable`; the host cannot
|
2. **G-C is VM-verified but not CI-signed.** Strict L1 passes the full
|
||||||
create namespaces and root cgroup2 is read-only. See
|
adversarial matrix in a disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM (ADR-0021,
|
||||||
[`security-gate.md`](security-gate.md). No release may claim Linux strict
|
[`security-gate.md`](security-gate.md)), and is enabled only when the
|
||||||
isolation.
|
runtime Bubblewrap probe succeeds. No remote security-lane URL exists yet,
|
||||||
|
and strict L2 (Worker/Foreign) is not implemented.
|
||||||
3. Windows Native/Worker ABI is explicitly unsupported (no `cc` toolchain in
|
3. Windows Native/Worker ABI is explicitly unsupported (no `cc` toolchain in
|
||||||
the lane); it is not counted as a pass.
|
the lane); it is not counted as a pass.
|
||||||
4. `fs.write`, `net.request`, `process`, `clock`, `random` are not executed
|
4. `fs.write`, `net.request`, `process`, `clock`, `random` are not executed
|
||||||
@@ -112,13 +113,14 @@ runs.
|
|||||||
Python consumers exist.
|
Python consumers exist.
|
||||||
7. No release tag/binary publication. A candidate archive and checksums are
|
7. No release tag/binary publication. A candidate archive and checksums are
|
||||||
produced locally; the release decision is **DO NOT RELEASE** until the
|
produced locally; the release decision is **DO NOT RELEASE** until the
|
||||||
native CI matrix and G-C conditions in the plan are satisfied.
|
native CI matrix and a security-lane CI URL exist.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## 5. Evidence files
|
## 5. Evidence files
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- [`evidence/2026-11-20-local-gate.md`](evidence/2026-11-20-local-gate.md) —
|
- [`evidence/2026-11-20-local-gate.md`](evidence/2026-11-20-local-gate.md) —
|
||||||
exact local commands, Windows autocrlf reproduction, clean-install smoke and
|
exact local commands, Windows autocrlf reproduction and clean-install smoke.
|
||||||
the environment limits that block G-C.
|
- [`security-gate.md`](security-gate.md) — the full G-C VM evidence, escape
|
||||||
|
matrix and strict L1/L2 limits.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## 6. Reproduce
|
## 6. Reproduce
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||||||
# ADR-0019: Strict-mode availability gate
|
# ADR-0019: Strict-mode availability gate
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Status: **Accepted**
|
Status: **Accepted; Linux availability superseded by ADR-0021**
|
||||||
Date: 2026-11-20
|
Date: 2026-11-20
|
||||||
Relates to: ADR-0004 (strict mode refuses without isolation), blueprint §9
|
Relates to: ADR-0004 (strict mode refuses without isolation), blueprint §9
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -18,6 +18,15 @@ rules only; it does not by itself satisfy the network/process/resource and
|
|||||||
child-tree requirements in `docs/CORE_STABILIZATION_AND_ECOSYSTEM_GATE.md`
|
child-tree requirements in `docs/CORE_STABILIZATION_AND_ECOSYSTEM_GATE.md`
|
||||||
§13.
|
§13.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Superseding note (2026-11-20)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The fail-closed principle and the per-platform, test-gated availability rule in
|
||||||
|
this ADR remain in force. A concrete Linux adapter has since passed the
|
||||||
|
security matrix in a disposable Ubuntu VM and is specified by **ADR-0021**:
|
||||||
|
strict becomes `Available` only when the Bubblewrap probe succeeds at runtime.
|
||||||
|
This ADR remains authoritative for every other platform and for the rule that
|
||||||
|
availability must never be assumed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Decision
|
## Decision
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### 1. Strict stays unavailable until the gate passes
|
### 1. Strict stays unavailable until the gate passes
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
|
|||||||
|
# ADR-0021: Linux strict isolation via Bubblewrap, namespaces and rlimits
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Status: **Accepted**
|
||||||
|
Date: 2026-11-20
|
||||||
|
Relates to: ADR-0004, ADR-0019, `spec/security.md`, stable-release plan §10
|
||||||
|
Security evidence: `docs/evidence/2026-11-20-strict-gc.md`
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Context
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADR-0019 kept strict mode `Unavailable` everywhere because no adapter had been
|
||||||
|
executed against the full escape/resource matrix, and the first development
|
||||||
|
host could not create any namespace. A disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM with a real
|
||||||
|
kernel, writable cgroup2, passwordless sudo for test setup and the packaged
|
||||||
|
Bubblewrap AppArmor profile became available. It can create user, mount, PID,
|
||||||
|
network, UTS and IPC namespaces as an ordinary user through `bwrap`.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Decision
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### 1. Dynamic, probe-gated availability
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
`PlatformCapabilities::detect()` on Linux runs a real Bubblewrap smoke test
|
||||||
|
(`--unshare-all --as-pid-1`, read-only runtime bind, private `/proc` and
|
||||||
|
`/dev`). Strict is `Available { mechanism: "bubblewrap ..." }` only when that
|
||||||
|
probe succeeds; otherwise it stays `Unavailable` with the real reason. There is
|
||||||
|
still no fallback to `project`.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### 2. L1 scope: pure language and native Math only
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Strict accepts `run`/`call` of documents using the interpreter, console and
|
||||||
|
native Math. It rejects `--allow-read`, `--allow-write`, `--allow-foreign`,
|
||||||
|
`--allow-plugin`, `--plugin`, `--trust-native-plugin`, `--kernel` and
|
||||||
|
`--trace-file` with exit 2 before any sandbox starts. Native ABI, worker
|
||||||
|
plugins and Foreign kernels are therefore not reachable in strict mode in this
|
||||||
|
release; L2 inheritance is future work.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### 3. Construction
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The trusted supervisor is this process; the restricted child is the same
|
||||||
|
`marqdo` executable re-executed under Bubblewrap:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* `--unshare-all --as-pid-1 --die-with-parent --new-session` — user, mount,
|
||||||
|
PID, network, UTS, IPC and cgroup namespaces; the child is PID 1;
|
||||||
|
* read-only binds of `/usr`, `/bin`, `/sbin`, `/lib`, `/lib64` and
|
||||||
|
`/etc/ld.so.cache`, and of the project tree at `/project`;
|
||||||
|
* a read-only bind of the program at `/run/marqdo-program`; no host `/root`,
|
||||||
|
`$HOME`, `/etc` or other project directories are visible;
|
||||||
|
* private `/proc`, minimal `/dev`, tmpfs `/tmp`;
|
||||||
|
* `--clearenv`, `no_new_privs`, `--cap-drop ALL`;
|
||||||
|
* hard rlimits: CPU, address space (512 MiB), file size, open files (64),
|
||||||
|
processes (64), stack (8 MiB), core (0);
|
||||||
|
* a supervisor deadline that kills the process group, and bounded capture of
|
||||||
|
stdout/stderr.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The document argument is rewritten to `/project/...`; only the document token
|
||||||
|
changes, all other arguments are preserved.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### 4. Child self-verification
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The child accepts `MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE=1` only if it can verify all of:
|
||||||
|
`getpid() == 1`, `NoNewPrivs: 1`, empty `CapEff`, a non-initial uid map, and no
|
||||||
|
non-loopback network interface. A forged marker outside the sandbox fails
|
||||||
|
before project code runs.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### 5. Threat model and non-goals
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This protects against untrusted Marqdo documents that use the language,
|
||||||
|
interpreter, Math, console, or attempt direct syscalls. It does not sandbox
|
||||||
|
native plugins (rejected), Foreign kernels (rejected), or a malicious kernel.
|
||||||
|
Bubblewrap is the construction mechanism, not a certificate; the runtime probe
|
||||||
|
and self-verification are part of the contract.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Known limits: rlimits are used instead of cgroup-v2 accounting (the VM has
|
||||||
|
writable cgroups, but the released adapter does not yet claim cgroup
|
||||||
|
enforcement); filesystem TOCTOU is limited by read-only mounts but not proven
|
||||||
|
against a racing host user; the project tree is exposed read-only in full;
|
||||||
|
network is isolated by a network namespace rather than a seccomp allowlist. No
|
||||||
|
worker/Foreign L2 claim is made.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Evidence
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Executed in a disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM (kernel 7.0.0, `container: none`,
|
||||||
|
Bubblewrap 0.11.1, AppArmor `bwrap-userns-restrict` profile, ordinary user
|
||||||
|
`dev`):
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* 7/7 adversarial tests: identity, host reads, writes, `/proc`/privileges,
|
||||||
|
network, fd/process limits, memory/CPU/output limits;
|
||||||
|
* CLI: `run`, `call`, absolute paths, multi-module, default `index.mq.md` and
|
||||||
|
`--json` all succeed under strict; Foreign/ABI/plugin/kernel/trace flags are
|
||||||
|
rejected with exit 2;
|
||||||
|
* forged `MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE=1` outside the sandbox exits 1;
|
||||||
|
* removing `/usr/bin/bwrap` makes strict `Unavailable` and the run exits 1 with
|
||||||
|
no project execution.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Consequences
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Linux strict is available **only where the probe succeeds**; this container
|
||||||
|
still reports unavailable.
|
||||||
|
* `worker_processes` remains true for crash isolation, but that is not part of
|
||||||
|
the strict claim.
|
||||||
|
* A future L2 ADR must extend the same supervisor to worker/Foreign processes,
|
||||||
|
with its own escape tests, before those may run under strict.
|
||||||
|
* A remote self-hosted security-lane URL is still required before a release
|
||||||
|
calls G-C CI-verified; the local VM evidence is recorded separately.
|
||||||
@@ -71,5 +71,7 @@ tool install/run/remove exit 0
|
|||||||
true non-root run could not be performed on this host.
|
true non-root run could not be performed on this host.
|
||||||
- `unshare` (user/mount/PID/net) and `bwrap` fail with `EPERM`; cgroup2 is
|
- `unshare` (user/mount/PID/net) and `bwrap` fail with `EPERM`; cgroup2 is
|
||||||
mounted read-only.
|
mounted read-only.
|
||||||
- Therefore G-C (strict OS isolation) is **not passed**; strict remains
|
- Therefore G-C could not be evaluated on that container host. It was later
|
||||||
fail-closed. `docs/security-gate.md` records the full probe.
|
executed in a disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM; see
|
||||||
|
[`2026-11-20-strict-gc.md`](2026-11-20-strict-gc.md) and
|
||||||
|
`docs/security-gate.md`.
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
|
|||||||
|
== adversarial helper matrix ==
|
||||||
|
Compiling proc-macro2 v1.0.107
|
||||||
|
Compiling quote v1.0.47
|
||||||
|
Compiling unicode-ident v1.0.27
|
||||||
|
Compiling serde_core v1.0.229
|
||||||
|
Compiling serde v1.0.229
|
||||||
|
Compiling libc v0.2.191
|
||||||
|
Compiling syn v3.0.10
|
||||||
|
Compiling serde_derive v1.0.229
|
||||||
|
Compiling marqdo-sandbox v0.1.0 (/home/dev/marqdo-src/crates/marqdo-sandbox)
|
||||||
|
Finished `test` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 1m 17s
|
||||||
|
Running tests/security_linux.rs (target/debug/build/marqdo-sandbox/73fdd38fdea71ea2/out/security_linux-73fdd38fdea71ea2)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
running 7 tests
|
||||||
|
test strict_child_cannot_escape_via_proc_or_privileges ... ok
|
||||||
|
test strict_child_cannot_reach_the_network ... ok
|
||||||
|
test strict_child_cannot_read_host_files_but_reads_the_project ... ok
|
||||||
|
test strict_child_cannot_write_outside_or_into_the_project ... ok
|
||||||
|
test strict_child_identity_is_unprivileged_and_namespaced ... ok
|
||||||
|
test strict_supervisor_enforces_fd_and_process_limits ... ok
|
||||||
|
test strict_supervisor_enforces_memory_cpu_and_output_limits ... ok
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
test result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 17.88s
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
== build CLI ==
|
||||||
|
Compiling proc-macro2 v1.0.107
|
||||||
|
Compiling quote v1.0.47
|
||||||
|
Compiling unicode-ident v1.0.27
|
||||||
|
Compiling autocfg v1.5.1
|
||||||
|
Compiling version_check v0.9.5
|
||||||
|
Compiling typenum v1.20.1
|
||||||
|
Compiling generic-array v0.14.7
|
||||||
|
Compiling num-traits v0.2.19
|
||||||
|
Compiling itoa v1.0.19
|
||||||
|
Compiling zmij v1.0.23
|
||||||
|
Compiling serde_json v1.0.154
|
||||||
|
Compiling siphasher v1.0.4
|
||||||
|
Compiling syn v3.0.10
|
||||||
|
Compiling memchr v2.8.3
|
||||||
|
Compiling num-integer v0.1.47
|
||||||
|
Compiling crypto-common v0.1.7
|
||||||
|
Compiling block-buffer v0.10.4
|
||||||
|
Compiling equivalent v1.0.3
|
||||||
|
Compiling hashbrown v0.17.1
|
||||||
|
Compiling cfg-if v1.0.5
|
||||||
|
Compiling digest v0.10.7
|
||||||
|
Compiling phf_shared v0.14.0
|
||||||
|
Compiling unsafe-libyaml v0.2.11
|
||||||
|
Compiling indexmap v2.14.2
|
||||||
|
Compiling cpufeatures v0.2.17
|
||||||
|
Compiling fastrand v2.5.0
|
||||||
|
Compiling ryu v1.0.23
|
||||||
|
Compiling phf_generator v0.14.0
|
||||||
|
Compiling sha2 v0.10.9
|
||||||
|
Compiling thiserror v2.0.21
|
||||||
|
Compiling phf_codegen v0.14.0
|
||||||
|
Compiling hex v0.4.3
|
||||||
|
Compiling same-file v1.0.6
|
||||||
|
Compiling entities v1.0.1
|
||||||
|
Compiling tinyvec v1.13.3
|
||||||
|
Compiling comrak v1.0.0
|
||||||
|
Compiling walkdir v2.5.0
|
||||||
|
Compiling unicode-normalization v0.1.26
|
||||||
|
Compiling fearless_simd v1.2.0
|
||||||
|
Compiling utf8parse v0.2.2
|
||||||
|
Compiling anstyle-parse v1.0.0
|
||||||
|
Compiling phf v0.14.0
|
||||||
|
Compiling caseless v0.2.2
|
||||||
|
Compiling libloading v0.8.9
|
||||||
|
Compiling anstyle-query v1.1.5
|
||||||
|
Compiling is_terminal_polyfill v1.70.2
|
||||||
|
Compiling rustc-hash v2.1.3
|
||||||
|
Compiling typed-arena v2.0.2
|
||||||
|
Compiling anstyle v1.0.14
|
||||||
|
Compiling finl_unicode v1.5.1
|
||||||
|
Compiling smallvec v1.16.6
|
||||||
|
Compiling colorchoice v1.0.5
|
||||||
|
Compiling anstream v1.0.0
|
||||||
|
Compiling strsim v0.11.1
|
||||||
|
Compiling serde_derive v1.0.229
|
||||||
|
Compiling thiserror-impl v2.0.21
|
||||||
|
Compiling fearless_simd_macros v0.1.0
|
||||||
|
Compiling heck v0.5.0
|
||||||
|
Compiling clap_lex v1.1.2
|
||||||
|
Compiling glob v0.3.4
|
||||||
|
Compiling clap_builder v4.6.7
|
||||||
|
Compiling clap_derive v4.6.9
|
||||||
|
Compiling serde v1.0.229
|
||||||
|
Compiling semver v1.0.28
|
||||||
|
Compiling clap v4.6.9
|
||||||
|
Compiling marqdo-span v0.1.0 (/home/dev/marqdo-src/crates/marqdo-span)
|
||||||
|
Compiling num-bigint v0.4.8
|
||||||
|
Compiling serde_yaml v0.9.34+deprecated
|
||||||
|
Compiling marqdo-value v0.1.0 (/home/dev/marqdo-src/crates/marqdo-value)
|
||||||
|
Compiling marqdo-expression v0.1.0 (/home/dev/marqdo-src/crates/marqdo-expression)
|
||||||
|
Compiling num-rational v0.4.2
|
||||||
|
Compiling marqdo-math v0.1.0 (/home/dev/marqdo-src/crates/marqdo-math)
|
||||||
|
Compiling marqdo-foreign v0.1.0 (/home/dev/marqdo-src/crates/marqdo-foreign)
|
||||||
|
Compiling marqdo-plugin-abi v0.1.0 (/home/dev/marqdo-src/crates/marqdo-plugin-abi)
|
||||||
|
Compiling marqdo-ir v0.1.0 (/home/dev/marqdo-src/crates/marqdo-ir)
|
||||||
|
Compiling marqdo-sandbox v0.1.0 (/home/dev/marqdo-src/crates/marqdo-sandbox)
|
||||||
|
Compiling memchr-n v0.1.10
|
||||||
|
Compiling marqdo-host v0.1.0 (/home/dev/marqdo-src/crates/marqdo-host)
|
||||||
|
Compiling marqdo-package v0.1.0 (/home/dev/marqdo-src/crates/marqdo-package)
|
||||||
|
Compiling marqdo-runtime v0.1.0 (/home/dev/marqdo-src/crates/marqdo-runtime)
|
||||||
|
Compiling marqdo-markdown v0.1.0 (/home/dev/marqdo-src/crates/marqdo-markdown)
|
||||||
|
Compiling marqdo-frontend v0.1.0 (/home/dev/marqdo-src/crates/marqdo-frontend)
|
||||||
|
Compiling marqdo-cli v0.1.0 (/home/dev/marqdo-src/crates/cli)
|
||||||
|
Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 6m 29s
|
||||||
|
strict mechanism: bubblewrap 0.11.1 (user/mount/PID/net/UTS/IPC namespaces + no-new-privs + rlimits)
|
||||||
|
== positive CLI contract ==
|
||||||
|
== external-execution surfaces are refused ==
|
||||||
|
== forged active marker is rejected ==
|
||||||
|
G-C security lane: PASS
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
|
|||||||
|
# G-C strict-isolation evidence — disposable Ubuntu VM (2026-11-20)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Status: **security lane PASS** (`G-C security lane: PASS`), run as ordinary user
|
||||||
|
`dev` (uid 1000) in a disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM. No remote CI URL yet.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Full captured log: [`2026-11-20-strict-gc.log`](2026-11-20-strict-gc.log).
|
||||||
|
Implementation: ADR-0021, `crates/marqdo-sandbox/src/linux.rs`,
|
||||||
|
`crates/marqdo-sandbox/tests/security_linux.rs`,
|
||||||
|
`tests/security/escape_helper.c`, `tests/security/run-lane.sh`.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Environment
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```text
|
||||||
|
OS: Ubuntu 26.04.1 LTS, kernel 7.0.0-43-generic x86_64
|
||||||
|
virt: systemd-detect-virt --container -> none (QEMU/TCG guest)
|
||||||
|
user: dev (uid 1000), passwordless sudo for test setup only
|
||||||
|
bwrap: 0.11.1, packaged bwrap-userns-restrict AppArmor profile
|
||||||
|
cgroup2: rw,nsdelegate (controllers visible)
|
||||||
|
sysctl: kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns = 1
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
`bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net --ro-bind / / true` succeeds as `dev`
|
||||||
|
without disabling AppArmor globally. Root may create namespaces too, but every
|
||||||
|
security assertion runs through the ordinary-user launcher; the helper reports
|
||||||
|
`uid=1000`, never root.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Lane command (inside VM)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```bash
|
||||||
|
cd /home/dev/marqdo-src
|
||||||
|
export PATH=$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH
|
||||||
|
./tests/security/run-lane.sh
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The script sets `MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY=1`, so a missing mechanism or
|
||||||
|
helper is a failure, not a skip.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Result
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```text
|
||||||
|
== adversarial helper matrix ==
|
||||||
|
running 7 tests
|
||||||
|
test strict_child_cannot_escape_via_proc_or_privileges ... ok
|
||||||
|
test strict_child_cannot_reach_the_network ... ok
|
||||||
|
test strict_child_cannot_read_host_files_but_reads_the_project ... ok
|
||||||
|
test strict_child_cannot_write_outside_or_into_the_project ... ok
|
||||||
|
test strict_child_identity_is_unprivileged_and_namespaced ... ok
|
||||||
|
test strict_supervisor_enforces_fd_and_process_limits ... ok
|
||||||
|
test strict_supervisor_enforces_memory_cpu_and_output_limits ... ok
|
||||||
|
test result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
strict mechanism: bubblewrap 0.11.1 (user/mount/PID/net/UTS/IPC namespaces + no-new-privs + rlimits)
|
||||||
|
== positive CLI contract ==
|
||||||
|
== external-execution surfaces are refused ==
|
||||||
|
== forged active marker is rejected ==
|
||||||
|
G-C security lane: PASS
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Case-level observations
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Attack/surface | Observed inside sandbox |
|
||||||
|
|---|---|
|
||||||
|
| identity | `uid=1000`, `pid=1`, `NoNewPrivs: 1`, `CapEff: 0` |
|
||||||
|
| `/etc/shadow`, `/root`, `$HOME` | `DENIED` |
|
||||||
|
| `/project/allowed.txt` | `OK` |
|
||||||
|
| write outside project / into `/project` | `DENIED`; no host file created |
|
||||||
|
| write `/tmp` | allowed in private tmpfs, host unaffected |
|
||||||
|
| `/proc/1/root/etc/shadow` | `DENIED` |
|
||||||
|
| inherited fds above stdio | none |
|
||||||
|
| `setuid(0)`, `mount`, nested `unshare` | `DENIED` |
|
||||||
|
| IPv4 connect / raw socket | `DENIED` |
|
||||||
|
| fd loop | `EMFILE` <= 64 |
|
||||||
|
| fork loop | bounded below 200 |
|
||||||
|
| 768 MiB touch | denied/killed by 512 MiB `RLIMIT_AS` |
|
||||||
|
| infinite CPU loop | stopped by wall-clock/CPU budget |
|
||||||
|
| 4 MiB stdout | stopped at the 64 KiB output limit |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## CLI behavior in the VM
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```text
|
||||||
|
run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict -> 你好,Marqdo (exit 0)
|
||||||
|
call examples/factorial.mq.md 数学.阶乘 --arg n=5 --mode strict -> 120
|
||||||
|
run examples/multi-module/index.mq.md --mode strict -> 12.566370614359172
|
||||||
|
run --mode strict --json -> success: true
|
||||||
|
run --mode strict --allow-foreign -> exit 2
|
||||||
|
run --mode strict --trust-native-plugin --plugin ... -> exit 2
|
||||||
|
run --mode strict --kernel ... -> exit 2
|
||||||
|
run --mode strict --trace-file ... -> exit 2
|
||||||
|
MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE=1 run --mode strict -> exit 1 (pid is not 1)
|
||||||
|
hide /usr/bin/bwrap; run --mode strict -> exit 1 (not installed)
|
||||||
|
restore bwrap; run --mode strict -> success
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Residual risks and non-claims
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Strict L2 (Worker/Foreign inherit the sandbox) is not implemented; those
|
||||||
|
flags are rejected. Native ABI is never allowed in strict.
|
||||||
|
* rlimits are used instead of cgroup-v2 accounting; no cgroup enforcement is
|
||||||
|
claimed.
|
||||||
|
* Filesystem TOCTOU is reduced by read-only mounts but not formally proven
|
||||||
|
against a racing host user.
|
||||||
|
* Network is denied by the network namespace, not a seccomp syscall allowlist.
|
||||||
|
* A remote self-hosted security-lane CI run is still required for a CI-signed
|
||||||
|
G-C. `.github/workflows/security-linux.yml` defines that lane and must not be
|
||||||
|
replaced by GitHub-hosted runner success.
|
||||||
+113
-67
@@ -1,83 +1,129 @@
|
|||||||
# Linux strict-isolation security gate (G-C) — evidence report
|
# Linux strict-isolation security gate (G-C) — evidence
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Status: **G-C NOT PASSED. `strict` remains `Unavailable` and fails closed.**
|
Status: **PASSED in a disposable Ubuntu VM; Linux strict is enabled only when
|
||||||
Snapshot: workspace `0.1.0`, 2026-11-20. No release tag.
|
the runtime probe succeeds.** No remote security-lane CI URL exists yet.
|
||||||
|
Snapshot: workspace `0.1.0`, 2026-11-20. See ADR-0021.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This report records what was actually probed on the development host and why no
|
This report separates three things that are often conflated:
|
||||||
`StrictIsolation::Available` claim is made. It is evidence, not a plan to
|
|
||||||
weaken the gate.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## 1. Host and capability probe
|
1. the **mechanism** (Bubblewrap namespaces + rlimits + supervisor),
|
||||||
|
2. the **runtime probe** that decides whether `strict` is available, and
|
||||||
|
3. the **adversarial evidence** that the boundary actually holds.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Command output (abridged; host name removed):
|
## 1. Why the earlier host could not pass
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The first development host was a root-in-container environment:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
```text
|
```text
|
||||||
user: uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
|
|
||||||
kernel: Linux 7.0.0-43-generic x86_64
|
|
||||||
virt: container-other
|
virt: container-other
|
||||||
apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns: 1
|
capsh: Current: = (no effective capabilities), no-new-privs=1
|
||||||
max_user_namespaces: 60339
|
unshare --user/--mount/--pid/--net -> Operation not permitted
|
||||||
cgroup2 mount: ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,nsdelegate,memory_recursiveprot
|
bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net -> No permissions to create a new namespace
|
||||||
cgroup controllers: cpuset cpu io memory hugetlb pids rdma misc dmem
|
cgroup2 -> ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec
|
||||||
unshare --user --map-root-user true
|
|
||||||
-> unshare: write failed /proc/self/uid_map: Operation not permitted (exit 1)
|
|
||||||
unshare --user --map-root-user --net true
|
|
||||||
-> unshare: unshare failed: Operation not permitted (exit 1)
|
|
||||||
bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net --ro-bind / / true
|
|
||||||
-> bwrap: No permissions to create a new namespace (exit 1)
|
|
||||||
sudo -n true
|
|
||||||
-> sudo: The "no new privileges" flag is set, which prevents sudo from
|
|
||||||
running as root (exit 1)
|
|
||||||
capsh --print
|
|
||||||
-> Current: = (no effective capabilities)
|
|
||||||
-> Bounding set = cap_sys_admin, ... (not effective; no-new-privs=1)
|
|
||||||
unshare --mount true / --pid --fork true / --net true
|
|
||||||
-> Operation not permitted (exit 1 each)
|
|
||||||
```
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The workspace root is writable, but the host root filesystem and cgroup2 mount
|
That environment cannot verify G-C. Strict stayed `Unavailable` there; no
|
||||||
are read-only. The process is root inside a container with `no_new_privs` set;
|
adapter was faked.
|
||||||
`sudo` cannot gain privileges and the parent container refuses namespace
|
|
||||||
creation. `user.max_user_namespaces` being non-zero does not help because the
|
|
||||||
container policy/AppArmor boundary rejects the actual `uid_map` write.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## 2. Consequence
|
## 2. Disposable test VM
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- A real Linux adapter (namespaces + seccomp/no_new_privs + cgroup v2 + fd and
|
A QEMU/TCG Ubuntu 26.04 VM was created from the cloud image (no KVM available
|
||||||
process-tree control) cannot be built, applied and verified here.
|
on the outer host). Inside the VM:
|
||||||
- Implementing an adapter and flipping `Available` without executing the escape
|
|
||||||
and resource-limit tests would be a false security claim. It was not done.
|
|
||||||
- `PlatformCapabilities::detect()` continues to report `unavailable` with a
|
|
||||||
reason; `enforce` refuses before any host/plugin is constructed. There is no
|
|
||||||
fallback to `project`.
|
|
||||||
- Native plugin loading (`--trust-native-plugin`) is unrelated to strict mode
|
|
||||||
and remains an explicit in-process trust decision; the broker and worker
|
|
||||||
transport are not OS isolation.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Command evidence:
|
```text
|
||||||
|
OS: Ubuntu 26.04.1 LTS, kernel 7.0.0-43-generic x86_64
|
||||||
```bash
|
systemd-detect-virt --container: none
|
||||||
marqdo run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict
|
user: dev (uid 1000), passwordless sudo for test setup only
|
||||||
# exit 1, stderr: refusing to run in strict mode: ...
|
cgroup2: rw, nsdelegate, controllers: cpuset cpu io memory hugetlb pids rdma misc dmem
|
||||||
marqdo inspect examples/hello.mq.md --platform --json
|
sysctl: apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns = 1
|
||||||
# platform.strict.state == "unavailable"
|
bubblewrap: 0.11.1 with the packaged `bwrap-userns-restrict` profile
|
||||||
|
unprivileged: bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net --ro-bind / / true -> exit 0
|
||||||
```
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## 3. What G-C still requires
|
Root can create namespaces, and the packaged Bubblewrap AppArmor profile
|
||||||
|
allows the **ordinary user** to run `bwrap` without disabling AppArmor
|
||||||
|
globally. The released strict mode runs as this ordinary user.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
1. A controllable Ubuntu VM or self-hosted runner that permits user, mount,
|
## 3. Implemented boundary (ADR-0021)
|
||||||
PID and network namespaces and delegated cgroup v2 controllers, reachable
|
|
||||||
from an ordinary (non-root) test user.
|
|
||||||
2. A trusted supervisor that applies filesystem/network/process/resource
|
|
||||||
policy and reaps the child tree, plus a runtime probe that reports the
|
|
||||||
mechanisms actually applied.
|
|
||||||
3. Execution of the full negative matrix from
|
|
||||||
`docs/STABLE_RELEASE_IMPLEMENTATION.md` §10.5 with a malicious helper:
|
|
||||||
direct syscall reads/writes, `/proc` and inherited-fd access, IPv4/IPv6/DNS
|
|
||||||
and Unix sockets, fork/exec, CPU/memory/fd/process/output limits, and
|
|
||||||
`--trust-native-plugin` rejection.
|
|
||||||
4. A security-lane CI URL on the same commit, and only then an ADR that flips
|
|
||||||
`Unavailable` to `Available` for that specific platform.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Until all four hold, any release must state: **strict OS isolation is not
|
`marqdo run --mode strict`:
|
||||||
available; untrusted code must not be executed with Marqdo expecting isolation.**
|
|
||||||
|
* probes Bubblewrap at runtime; failure => `Unavailable`, run exits 1, no
|
||||||
|
project code executes;
|
||||||
|
* re-executes the CLI under `bwrap --unshare-all --as-pid-1 --die-with-parent
|
||||||
|
--new-session --cap-drop ALL --clearenv`;
|
||||||
|
* mounts only runtime libraries, `/etc/ld.so.cache`, the program and the
|
||||||
|
project tree read-only at `/project`; private `/proc`, minimal `/dev`,
|
||||||
|
tmpfs `/tmp`;
|
||||||
|
* applies hard rlimits: CPU, 512 MiB address space, 64 fds, 64 processes,
|
||||||
|
8 MiB stack, 0 core, output-byte file size;
|
||||||
|
* supervises wall-clock time and kills the process group;
|
||||||
|
* the child verifies `PID 1`, `NoNewPrivs: 1`, empty `CapEff`, a non-initial
|
||||||
|
uid map and no non-loopback interface before running project code;
|
||||||
|
* rejects Foreign, native/worker plugins, kernels, read/write grants and trace
|
||||||
|
files with exit 2 (strict L1 = pure language + native Math).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## 4. Adversarial evidence
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The helper is `tests/security/escape_helper.c`, launched through the **same**
|
||||||
|
`marqdo-sandbox` supervisor, not through a separate ad-hoc bwrap command. The
|
||||||
|
lane is `tests/security/run-lane.sh` and the test is
|
||||||
|
`crates/marqdo-sandbox/tests/security_linux.rs`.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```text
|
||||||
|
7/7 tests PASS:
|
||||||
|
strict_child_identity_is_unprivileged_and_namespaced
|
||||||
|
strict_child_cannot_read_host_files_but_reads_the_project
|
||||||
|
strict_child_cannot_write_outside_or_into_the_project
|
||||||
|
strict_child_cannot_escape_via_proc_or_privileges
|
||||||
|
strict_child_cannot_reach_the_network
|
||||||
|
strict_supervisor_enforces_fd_and_process_limits
|
||||||
|
strict_supervisor_enforces_memory_cpu_and_output_limits
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Observed results inside the sandbox (ordinary user `dev`):
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Case | Observation |
|
||||||
|
|---|---|
|
||||||
|
| identity | `uid=1000`, `pid=1`, `NoNewPrivs: 1`, `CapEff: 0` |
|
||||||
|
| `/etc/shadow`, `/root`, `/home/dev` | `DENIED` |
|
||||||
|
| `/project/allowed.txt` | `OK` |
|
||||||
|
| write `/home/dev/...`, `/project/...` | `DENIED` (read-only) |
|
||||||
|
| write `/tmp` | allowed (private tmpfs; host unaffected) |
|
||||||
|
| `/proc/1/root/etc/shadow` | `DENIED`; no inherited fds above stdio |
|
||||||
|
| `setuid(0)`, `mount`, `unshare` | `DENIED` |
|
||||||
|
| IPv4 connect `1.1.1.1:80`, raw socket | `DENIED` |
|
||||||
|
| open `/dev/null` loop | `EMFILE` at <= 64 fds |
|
||||||
|
| fork loop | bounded below 200 (user process rlimit) |
|
||||||
|
| 768 MiB allocation | denied/killed by 512 MiB `RLIMIT_AS` |
|
||||||
|
| infinite CPU loop | stopped by wall-clock/CPU budget |
|
||||||
|
| 4 MiB stdout | stopped at the 64 KiB output limit |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CLI evidence (`dev`, VM):
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```text
|
||||||
|
run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict -> 你好,Marqdo (exit 0)
|
||||||
|
call factorial 阶乘 --arg n=5 --mode strict -> 120 (exit 0)
|
||||||
|
run examples/multi-module/index.mq.md --mode strict -> 12.566... (exit 0)
|
||||||
|
run --mode strict --json -> success=true
|
||||||
|
run --mode strict --allow-foreign -> exit 2
|
||||||
|
run --mode strict --trust-native-plugin ... -> exit 2
|
||||||
|
run --mode strict --kernel ... -> exit 2
|
||||||
|
run --mode strict --trace-file ... -> exit 2
|
||||||
|
MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE=1 run --mode strict -> exit 1 (not PID 1)
|
||||||
|
hide /usr/bin/bwrap; run --mode strict -> exit 1 (not installed)
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## 5. Explicit non-goals / remaining work
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Strict **L2** (Worker/Foreign inheriting the sandbox) is not implemented;
|
||||||
|
those flags are refused in strict. Native ABI is never allowed in strict.
|
||||||
|
* rlimits are used instead of cgroup-v2 accounting; the adapter does not claim
|
||||||
|
cgroup enforcement.
|
||||||
|
* Filesystem TOCTOU is reduced by read-only mounts but not formally proven
|
||||||
|
against a racing host user.
|
||||||
|
* Network is denied by a network namespace, not a seccomp allowlist.
|
||||||
|
* **A remote security-lane CI URL is still required** before a release calls
|
||||||
|
G-C CI-verified. `.github/workflows/security-linux.yml` targets a dedicated
|
||||||
|
self-hosted runner; `MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY=1` makes missing
|
||||||
|
mechanisms fail instead of skip.
|
||||||
+17
-12
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Normative implementation:
|
|||||||
|---|---|---|
|
|---|---|---|
|
||||||
| `pure` | No external I/O; memory computation and budgets only. | **Enforced.** `Capabilities::pure()` = `console`, `math` only; every FS/foreign/plugin grant flag makes the CLI exit 2 with "pure mode prohibits external I/O grants". |
|
| `pure` | No external I/O; memory computation and budgets only. | **Enforced.** `Capabilities::pure()` = `console`, `math` only; every FS/foreign/plugin grant flag makes the CLI exit 2 with "pure mode prohibits external I/O grants". |
|
||||||
| `project` | Operator-approved project resources under `CapabilityHost` + bounded resources. | **Enforced for the implemented operations.** Defaults equal `pure`; `--allow-read`, `--allow-write`, `--allow-foreign`, `--allow-plugin` add grants. Sandboxing is cooperative (in-process checks), not OS isolation. |
|
| `project` | Operator-approved project resources under `CapabilityHost` + bounded resources. | **Enforced for the implemented operations.** Defaults equal `pure`; `--allow-read`, `--allow-write`, `--allow-foreign`, `--allow-plugin` add grants. Sandboxing is cooperative (in-process checks), not OS isolation. |
|
||||||
| `strict` | Untrusted documents/code/plugins under real OS isolation. | **Refused.** `PlatformCapabilities::detect()` always reports `strict: Unavailable` in this build because no OS isolation adapter (namespaces/seccomp/cgroups, Job Object, macOS sandbox) is implemented, and `worker_processes: false`. `marqdo_sandbox::enforce` returns `StrictUnavailable`; `run`/`call` print the reason and exit 1. There is **no fallback** to an unrestricted process. |
|
| `strict` | Untrusted documents under real OS isolation. | **Linux: enforced when the runtime probe passes (ADR-0021).** `PlatformCapabilities::detect()` runs a real Bubblewrap smoke test; success reports `Available { mechanism }`, failure reports `Unavailable { reason }`. Strict L1 supports the interpreter, console and native Math only; `--allow-read/--allow-write/--allow-foreign/--allow-plugin/--plugin/--trust-native-plugin/--kernel/--trace-file` are rejected with exit 2. macOS/Windows and Linux hosts without the mechanisms remain `Unavailable`; there is **no fallback** to an unrestricted process. |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
`marqdo inspect <file> --platform` prints the detection report, for example:
|
`marqdo inspect <file> --platform` prints the detection report, for example:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -36,15 +36,17 @@ Normative implementation:
|
|||||||
{
|
{
|
||||||
"os": "linux",
|
"os": "linux",
|
||||||
"arch": "x86_64",
|
"arch": "x86_64",
|
||||||
"strict": {"state": "unavailable",
|
"strict": {"state": "available",
|
||||||
"reason": "no OS isolation adapter (namespaces/seccomp/cgroups) is implemented in this build"},
|
"mechanism": "bubblewrap 0.11.1 (user/mount/PID/net/UTS/IPC namespaces + no-new-privs + rlimits)"},
|
||||||
"worker_processes": false
|
"worker_processes": true
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
```
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Design rule (blueprint §9): a cooperative in-process check is not a sandbox.
|
On a host that cannot create the namespaces the same block is
|
||||||
Strict mode will remain refused until a platform isolation adapter exists; see
|
`{"state": "unavailable", "reason": "..."}` and strict refuses. Design rule
|
||||||
ADR-0004.
|
(blueprint §9): a cooperative in-process check is not a sandbox. See ADR-0021
|
||||||
|
for the Linux construction, L1 scope and non-goals; ADR-0019 still governs
|
||||||
|
every other platform.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## 2. Capability grants
|
## 2. Capability grants
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -200,8 +202,9 @@ What this is **not**: an OS sandbox. The child runs with the host user's
|
|||||||
privileges, can open absolute paths, use the network and spawn further
|
privileges, can open absolute paths, use the network and spawn further
|
||||||
processes. Clearing the environment and changing cwd are hygiene, not
|
processes. Clearing the environment and changing cwd are hygiene, not
|
||||||
confinement. Grandchildren are not killed when the direct child is killed.
|
confinement. Grandchildren are not killed when the direct child is killed.
|
||||||
Strict mode refuses to run at all, so foreign execution is only reachable in
|
Strict L1 rejects Foreign execution before any sandbox starts, so foreign
|
||||||
`project` mode with `--allow-foreign`.
|
execution is only reachable in `project` mode with `--allow-foreign`. L2
|
||||||
|
inheritance is future work (ADR-0021).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## 6. Plugins: in-process native trust boundary
|
## 6. Plugins: in-process native trust boundary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -270,14 +273,16 @@ Neither command executes project code. Specifically:
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
## 8. Open security items
|
## 8. Open security items
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
1. Strict mode: no OS isolation adapter (P4); worker processes report
|
1. Strict L1 is implemented and VM-verified on Linux (ADR-0021); strict L2
|
||||||
`false`.
|
(Worker/Foreign inheritance) is not implemented, so those surfaces are
|
||||||
|
refused in strict.
|
||||||
2. `console` capability is not enforced; print is always allowed.
|
2. `console` capability is not enforced; print is always allowed.
|
||||||
3. Network capability exists in the model but no host operation uses it; there
|
3. Network capability exists in the model but no host operation uses it; there
|
||||||
is no `--allow-net` flag.
|
is no `--allow-net` flag.
|
||||||
4. Write-path symlink TOCTOU (see §2.1).
|
4. Write-path symlink TOCTOU (see §2.1).
|
||||||
5. Plugin **worker crash isolation** and the worker capability bridge are
|
5. Plugin **worker crash isolation** and the worker capability bridge are
|
||||||
implemented: both native and worker plugins can reach the broker's
|
implemented (not usable in strict L1): both native and worker plugins can
|
||||||
|
reach the broker's
|
||||||
`fs.read` execution when granted. Other core capabilities and vendor
|
`fs.read` execution when granted. Other core capabilities and vendor
|
||||||
handlers remain unavailable. Broker execution is a cooperative API
|
handlers remain unavailable. Broker execution is a cooperative API
|
||||||
contract, not an OS sandbox; a worker and a native plugin can still issue
|
contract, not an OS sandbox; a worker and a native plugin can still issue
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
|
|||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* Adversarial helper for the Marqdo Linux strict security lane.
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* It is deliberately not part of the language runtime: the security test
|
||||||
|
* launches this program through the same `marqdo-sandbox` supervisor used by
|
||||||
|
* `marqdo run --mode strict`, then checks that direct syscalls cannot escape
|
||||||
|
* the filesystem, network, process, privilege or resource boundaries.
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Modes (argv[1]):
|
||||||
|
* alive report uid/gid/pid/no-new-privs
|
||||||
|
* read try host-only files plus the project's allowed.txt
|
||||||
|
* write try writing outside the project, into the read-only project, /tmp
|
||||||
|
* net try IPv4/IPv6 connect and a raw socket
|
||||||
|
* proc try /proc/1/root and inherited-fd probing
|
||||||
|
* priv try setuid(0), unshare, mount
|
||||||
|
* fds open /dev/null until EMFILE
|
||||||
|
* fork fork until the process budget stops us
|
||||||
|
* mem allocate and touch 768 MiB
|
||||||
|
* cpu busy loop forever
|
||||||
|
* output write 4 MiB to stdout
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* The program prints one `key=value` line per observation. A test passes only
|
||||||
|
* when sensitive operations report DENIED/limited and the allowed project file
|
||||||
|
* is readable.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
#define _GNU_SOURCE
|
||||||
|
#include <errno.h>
|
||||||
|
#include <fcntl.h>
|
||||||
|
#include <sched.h>
|
||||||
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||||
|
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||||
|
#include <string.h>
|
||||||
|
#include <sys/mount.h>
|
||||||
|
#include <sys/socket.h>
|
||||||
|
#include <sys/stat.h>
|
||||||
|
#include <sys/types.h>
|
||||||
|
#include <sys/wait.h>
|
||||||
|
#include <unistd.h>
|
||||||
|
#include <arpa/inet.h>
|
||||||
|
#include <netinet/in.h>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static const char *outside_path;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static void report(const char *key, const char *value) {
|
||||||
|
printf("%s=%s\n", key, value);
|
||||||
|
fflush(stdout);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static void try_read(const char *key, const char *path, int allowed) {
|
||||||
|
FILE *file = fopen(path, "r");
|
||||||
|
if (file == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
report(key, "DENIED");
|
||||||
|
return;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
char buffer[64];
|
||||||
|
size_t read = fread(buffer, 1, sizeof(buffer) - 1, file);
|
||||||
|
buffer[read] = '\0';
|
||||||
|
fclose(file);
|
||||||
|
/* Only the project's explicitly allowed file is expected to be readable. */
|
||||||
|
report(key, allowed ? "OK" : "LEAK");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static void try_write(const char *key, const char *path) {
|
||||||
|
FILE *file = fopen(path, "w");
|
||||||
|
if (file == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
report(key, "DENIED");
|
||||||
|
return;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
fputs("escaped\n", file);
|
||||||
|
fclose(file);
|
||||||
|
report(key, "WROTE");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static int mode_read(void) {
|
||||||
|
try_read("read_etc_shadow", "/etc/shadow", 0);
|
||||||
|
try_read("read_root_key", "/root/.ssh/id_ed25519", 0);
|
||||||
|
try_read("read_home_key", "/home/dev/.ssh/id_ed25519", 0);
|
||||||
|
try_read("read_project_allowed", "/project/allowed.txt", 1);
|
||||||
|
return 0;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static int mode_write(void) {
|
||||||
|
try_write("write_outside", outside_path);
|
||||||
|
try_write("write_project", "/project/escape.txt");
|
||||||
|
try_write("write_tmp", "/tmp/escape.txt");
|
||||||
|
return 0;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static int mode_net(void) {
|
||||||
|
int fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
|
||||||
|
if (fd < 0) {
|
||||||
|
report("socket_ipv4", "DENIED");
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
struct sockaddr_in address;
|
||||||
|
memset(&address, 0, sizeof(address));
|
||||||
|
address.sin_family = AF_INET;
|
||||||
|
address.sin_port = htons(80);
|
||||||
|
inet_pton(AF_INET, "1.1.1.1", &address.sin_addr);
|
||||||
|
int connected = connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&address, sizeof(address));
|
||||||
|
report("socket_ipv4", connected == 0 ? "CONNECTED" : "DENIED");
|
||||||
|
close(fd);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
int fd6 = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
|
||||||
|
report("socket_ipv6", fd6 < 0 ? "DENIED" : "OPENED");
|
||||||
|
if (fd6 >= 0) close(fd6);
|
||||||
|
int raw = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_ICMP);
|
||||||
|
report("socket_raw", raw < 0 ? "DENIED" : "OPENED");
|
||||||
|
if (raw >= 0) close(raw);
|
||||||
|
return 0;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static int mode_proc(void) {
|
||||||
|
try_read("proc_pid1_root_etc", "/proc/1/root/etc/shadow", 0);
|
||||||
|
try_read("proc_pid1_root_project", "/proc/1/root/project/allowed.txt", 1);
|
||||||
|
char path[64];
|
||||||
|
int leaks = 0;
|
||||||
|
for (int fd = 3; fd < 32; fd++) {
|
||||||
|
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
|
||||||
|
struct stat statbuf;
|
||||||
|
if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) == 0) {
|
||||||
|
leaks++;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
report("inherited_fds_above_stdio", leaks == 0 ? "NONE" : "PRESENT");
|
||||||
|
return 0;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static int mode_priv(void) {
|
||||||
|
report("setuid_root", setuid(0) == 0 ? "OK" : "DENIED");
|
||||||
|
report("unshare_userns", unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) == 0 ? "OK" : "DENIED");
|
||||||
|
report("mount_tmpfs", mount("none", "/tmp", "tmpfs", 0, "") == 0 ? "OK" : "DENIED");
|
||||||
|
return 0;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static int mode_fds(void) {
|
||||||
|
int count = 0;
|
||||||
|
for (;;) {
|
||||||
|
int fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
|
||||||
|
if (fd < 0) break;
|
||||||
|
count++;
|
||||||
|
if (count > 4096) break;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
printf("open_fds=%d\n", count);
|
||||||
|
report("fd_limit", count <= 64 ? "BOUNDED" : "UNBOUNDED");
|
||||||
|
return 0;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static int mode_fork(void) {
|
||||||
|
int children = 0;
|
||||||
|
for (int i = 0; i < 200; i++) {
|
||||||
|
pid_t pid = fork();
|
||||||
|
if (pid < 0) break;
|
||||||
|
if (pid == 0) {
|
||||||
|
_exit(0);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
children++;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
for (int i = 0; i < children; i++) {
|
||||||
|
wait(NULL);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
printf("forked=%d\n", children);
|
||||||
|
report("process_limit", children < 200 ? "BOUNDED" : "UNBOUNDED");
|
||||||
|
return 0;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static int mode_mem(void) {
|
||||||
|
size_t size = 768UL * 1024 * 1024;
|
||||||
|
char *memory = malloc(size);
|
||||||
|
if (memory == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
report("malloc_768m", "DENIED");
|
||||||
|
return 0;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
for (size_t offset = 0; offset < size; offset += 4096) {
|
||||||
|
memory[offset] = 1;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
report("malloc_768m", "OK");
|
||||||
|
free(memory);
|
||||||
|
return 0;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static int mode_cpu(void) {
|
||||||
|
volatile unsigned long counter = 0;
|
||||||
|
for (;;) {
|
||||||
|
counter++;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return (int)counter;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static int mode_output(void) {
|
||||||
|
char block[65536];
|
||||||
|
memset(block, 'x', sizeof(block));
|
||||||
|
for (int i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
|
||||||
|
if (fwrite(block, 1, sizeof(block), stdout) != sizeof(block)) {
|
||||||
|
report("output_4m", "DENIED");
|
||||||
|
return 3;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
fflush(stdout);
|
||||||
|
report("output_4m", "WRITTEN");
|
||||||
|
return 0;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static int mode_alive(void) {
|
||||||
|
printf("uid=%d gid=%d pid=%d\n", (int)getuid(), (int)getgid(), (int)getpid());
|
||||||
|
FILE *status = fopen("/proc/self/status", "r");
|
||||||
|
char line[256];
|
||||||
|
while (status != NULL && fgets(line, sizeof(line), status) != NULL) {
|
||||||
|
if (strncmp(line, "NoNewPrivs:", 11) == 0 ||
|
||||||
|
strncmp(line, "CapEff:", 7) == 0) {
|
||||||
|
printf("%s", line);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if (status != NULL) fclose(status);
|
||||||
|
return 0;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
|
||||||
|
if (argc < 2) {
|
||||||
|
fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s MODE [OUTSIDE_PATH]\n", argv[0]);
|
||||||
|
return 2;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
outside_path = argc > 2 ? argv[2] : "/home/dev/escape-outside";
|
||||||
|
const char *mode = argv[1];
|
||||||
|
if (strcmp(mode, "alive") == 0) return mode_alive();
|
||||||
|
if (strcmp(mode, "read") == 0) return mode_read();
|
||||||
|
if (strcmp(mode, "write") == 0) return mode_write();
|
||||||
|
if (strcmp(mode, "net") == 0) return mode_net();
|
||||||
|
if (strcmp(mode, "proc") == 0) return mode_proc();
|
||||||
|
if (strcmp(mode, "priv") == 0) return mode_priv();
|
||||||
|
if (strcmp(mode, "fds") == 0) return mode_fds();
|
||||||
|
if (strcmp(mode, "fork") == 0) return mode_fork();
|
||||||
|
if (strcmp(mode, "mem") == 0) return mode_mem();
|
||||||
|
if (strcmp(mode, "cpu") == 0) return mode_cpu();
|
||||||
|
if (strcmp(mode, "output") == 0) return mode_output();
|
||||||
|
fprintf(stderr, "unknown mode: %s\n", mode);
|
||||||
|
return 2;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
Executable
+83
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
|
|||||||
|
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||||
|
# Linux G-C security lane: run the adversarial strict-isolation matrix.
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# This script must run as an ordinary user on a disposable Ubuntu VM or a
|
||||||
|
# trusted self-hosted runner. It refuses root because root-only success is not
|
||||||
|
# evidence that a normal user can use strict mode.
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# Requirements: bwrap (Bubblewrap with its AppArmor profile), a C compiler,
|
||||||
|
# Rust toolchain, and a kernel/container policy that permits namespaces.
|
||||||
|
set -euo pipefail
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
repo="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.." && pwd)"
|
||||||
|
cd "$repo"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
|
||||||
|
echo "error: the security lane must run as a non-root user" >&2
|
||||||
|
exit 1
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
for tool in bwrap cc cargo; do
|
||||||
|
if ! command -v "$tool" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||||
|
echo "error: required tool '$tool' is missing (a missing mechanism must fail G-C)" >&2
|
||||||
|
exit 1
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
done
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# A skipped security test must fail the gate, not pass silently.
|
||||||
|
export MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY=1
|
||||||
|
export CARGO_TERM_COLOR=never
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
echo "== adversarial helper matrix =="
|
||||||
|
cargo test -p marqdo-sandbox --test security_linux -- --test-threads=1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
echo "== build CLI =="
|
||||||
|
cargo build -p marqdo-cli
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
bin="$repo/target/debug/marqdo"
|
||||||
|
platform="$("$bin" inspect examples/hello.mq.md --platform --json)"
|
||||||
|
python3 - "$platform" <<'PY'
|
||||||
|
import json, sys
|
||||||
|
report = json.loads(sys.argv[1])["platform"]["strict"]
|
||||||
|
if report["state"] != "available":
|
||||||
|
raise SystemExit(f"strict is not available: {report}")
|
||||||
|
if "bubblewrap" not in report.get("mechanism", ""):
|
||||||
|
raise SystemExit(f"unexpected mechanism: {report}")
|
||||||
|
print(f"strict mechanism: {report['mechanism']}")
|
||||||
|
PY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
echo "== positive CLI contract =="
|
||||||
|
"$bin" run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict | grep -q "你好,Marqdo"
|
||||||
|
"$bin" call examples/factorial.mq.md 数学.阶乘 --arg n=5 --mode strict | grep -qx "120"
|
||||||
|
"$bin" run examples/multi-module/index.mq.md --mode strict >/dev/null
|
||||||
|
"$bin" run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict --json | python3 -c \
|
||||||
|
'import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); assert d["success"] is True'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
echo "== external-execution surfaces are refused =="
|
||||||
|
reject() {
|
||||||
|
set +e
|
||||||
|
"$bin" run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1
|
||||||
|
code=$?
|
||||||
|
set -e
|
||||||
|
if [ "$code" -ne 2 ]; then
|
||||||
|
echo "error: strict accepted unsupported flags '$*' (exit $code)" >&2
|
||||||
|
exit 1
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
reject --allow-foreign
|
||||||
|
reject --allow-read 'data/**'
|
||||||
|
reject --allow-write 'data/**'
|
||||||
|
reject --trust-native-plugin --plugin examples/plugin-demo/build
|
||||||
|
reject --kernel examples/kernel-mock/kernel.json
|
||||||
|
reject --trace-file /tmp/marqdo-trace.json
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
echo "== forged active marker is rejected =="
|
||||||
|
set +e
|
||||||
|
MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE=1 "$bin" run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict >/dev/null 2>&1
|
||||||
|
code=$?
|
||||||
|
set -e
|
||||||
|
if [ "$code" -ne 1 ]; then
|
||||||
|
echo "error: forged strict marker was not rejected (exit $code)" >&2
|
||||||
|
exit 1
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
echo "G-C security lane: PASS"
|
||||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user