fix: close release-gate defects in platform cfg, strict launch, and semantics

WHY
- macOS/Windows failed to compile because `cfg!` left `linux::probe()` in the
  type-checked branch (E0433).
- GitHub-hosted Linux can pass the strict probe and then fail the real launch
  with EAGAIN; the CLI test treated the inspect snapshot as a permanent promise.
- The security matrix shared process-id-based scratch paths, so parallel
  `cargo test --workspace` made its own tests clobber each other.
- Condition paragraphs silently ignored executable `Strong`/`Emph`, and
  condition parse spans included the code-span backticks.
- The corpus had no native power/control-flow/inert fixtures and no independent
  generic Tool consumers.

WHAT
- Dispatch strict detection through `#[cfg]` functions; add a non-Linux
  compile/fail-closed regression test.
- Split `linux::run` into an injectable probe/spawn seam; test probe-OK ->
  launch-EAGAIN returns LaunchFailed and never executes unrestricted.
- Make the Linux CLI contract accept only (a) successful isolated run or
  (b) non-zero, diagnosed, fail-closed refusal with no project stdout.
- Give each security test a unique project/outside path and compile the helper
  once.
- Reject executable roles in a condition paragraph; map condition expressions
  from the literal bytes inside the backticks.
- Add 10 AST, 8 semantic, 4 compile-negative and 2 runtime-negative fixtures
  for power, branch/loop conditions, source spans, inert prose/code fences and
  error boundaries.
- Add `sample-view`/`sample-knowledge`/`sample-proof` independent Tool v1
  packages and an end-to-end Analysis/Trace consumer test.
- Add a locked path-dependency content-tamper test.

TESTS
- cargo fmt --all -- --check
- cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
- cargo test --workspace --locked
- G-C VM lane (separate evidence commit/run)

CI_URL
- none from this host: the checkout has a Gitee remote and no GitHub
  credentials. Windows/macOS CI remains UNVERIFIED.

BREAKING_CHANGE
- An executable node in a list-item condition paragraph is now a hard
  `markdown.invalid_construct` error instead of being silently ignored.

SECURITY_SCOPE
- strict remains fail-closed; no downgrade, no new capability, L2 still
  rejected. G-C still requires the dedicated self-hosted lane for CI-signed
  evidence.
This commit is contained in:
cflmy committed 2026-11-20 15:40:17 +08:00
1 parent c9f01aa8fb
commit d05f36fd26
65 files changed
+2134 -87

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+128 -14
View File
@@ -350,21 +350,77 @@ fn strict_mode_enforces_isolation_or_refuses_closed() {
let hello = root.join("examples").join("hello.mq.md");
let output = cli(&root, &["run", hello.to_str().unwrap(), "--mode", "strict"]);
if strict_is_available(&root) {
assert_exit(&output, 0, "strict mode must succeed when the gate passes");
assert_eq!(stdout_text(&output), "你好,Marqdo\n");
// External execution surfaces are rejected at the strict L1 boundary.
let foreign = cli(
&root,
&[
"run",
hello.to_str().unwrap(),
"--mode",
"strict",
"--allow-foreign",
],
if output.status.success() {
assert_eq!(stdout_text(&output), "你好,Marqdo\n");
// External execution surfaces are rejected at the strict L1 boundary.
let foreign = cli(
&root,
&[
"run",
hello.to_str().unwrap(),
"--mode",
"strict",
"--allow-foreign",
],
);
assert_exit(&foreign, 2, "strict must reject foreign grants");
assert!(stderr_text(&foreign).contains("strict mode currently supports"));
return;
}
// The snapshot from `inspect --platform` is not a permanent promise:
// the host can lose namespace capability or resources between the
// probe and the real launch. GitHub-hosted runners have produced
// `bwrap: Creating new namespace failed: Resource temporarily
// unavailable` here. The only acceptable outcome is a fail-closed
// refusal: non-zero exit, diagnostic, and no project output.
assert_exit(
&output,
1,
"strict launch failure must fail closed, not fall back",
);
assert_exit(&foreign, 2, "strict must reject foreign grants");
assert!(stderr_text(&foreign).contains("strict mode currently supports"));
let stderr = stderr_text(&output);
assert!(!stderr.is_empty(), "strict failure had no diagnostic");
assert!(
stderr.contains("strict isolation failed")
|| stderr.contains("refusing to run in strict mode")
|| stderr.contains("bubblewrap")
|| stderr.contains("bwrap"),
"strict failure diagnostic does not identify isolation: {stderr}"
);
assert!(
stderr.contains("namespace")
|| stderr.contains("Resource temporarily unavailable")
|| stderr.contains("os error 11"),
"strict failure diagnostic does not identify the launch failure: {stderr}"
);
assert!(
stdout_text(&output).is_empty(),
"project output appeared although strict launch failed: {}",
stdout_text(&output)
);
let json = cli(
&root,
&["run", hello.to_str().unwrap(), "--mode", "strict", "--json"],
);
if json.status.success() {
let value = json_stdout(&json);
assert_eq!(value["success"], true);
assert_eq!(value["value"]["type"], "none");
} else {
assert_exit(
&json,
1,
"strict launch failure keeps exit code 1 in JSON mode",
);
let value = json_stdout(&json);
assert_eq!(value["success"], false);
assert!(value["error"]
.as_str()
.expect("error string")
.contains("strict"));
}
return;
}
assert_exit(
@@ -989,3 +1045,61 @@ fn check_never_spawns_a_foreign_kernel() {
"run did not execute the provider; the no-execution assertion is vacuous"
);
}
#[test]
fn power_branch_loop_and_inert_code_end_to_end() {
let dir = TempDir::new("power");
dir.write(
"branch.mq.md",
"## main\n\n**n = 2**\n\n1. `n ** 2 == 4`,正确分支。\n\n > print(\"乘方正确\")\n\n2. `n ** 2 != 4`,另一分支。\n\n > print(\"乘方错误\")\n",
);
let branch = cli(dir.path(), &["run", "branch.mq.md", "--json"]);
assert_exit(&branch, 0, "power branch run");
let value = json_stdout(&branch);
assert_eq!(value["success"], true);
assert_eq!(value["stdout"], "乘方正确\n");
assert_eq!(value["value"]["type"], "unit");
dir.write(
"loop.mq.md",
"## main\n\n**n = 0**\n\n**limit = 100**\n\n- `n ** 2 < limit`\n\n **n = n + 1**\n\n*n*\n",
);
let looped = cli(dir.path(), &["run", "loop.mq.md", "--json"]);
assert_exit(&looped, 0, "power loop run");
let value = json_stdout(&looped);
assert_eq!(value["value"]["type"], "int");
assert_eq!(value["value"]["decimal"], "10");
// A code fence containing power syntax is an inert value: it produces no
// diagnostics and never changes the returned value.
dir.write(
"inert.mq.md",
"## main\n\n```text\n**n = 2 ** 3**\n```\n\n正文里的 `2 ** 3` 不执行。\n\n**x = 1**\n\n*x*\n",
);
let inert = cli(dir.path(), &["run", "inert.mq.md", "--json"]);
assert_exit(&inert, 0, "inert code run");
let value = json_stdout(&inert);
assert_eq!(value["value"]["decimal"], "1");
}
#[test]
fn condition_parse_diagnostic_points_inside_the_code_span() {
let dir = TempDir::new("condition-span");
let source = "## main\n\n**n = 2**\n\n1. `n ** 2 ==`\n\n > print(1)\n";
dir.write("bad.mq.md", source);
let output = cli(dir.path(), &["check", "bad.mq.md", "--json"]);
assert_exit(&output, 1, "condition parse error");
let value = json_stdout(&output);
let diagnostic = value["diagnostics"]
.as_array()
.expect("diagnostics array")
.iter()
.find(|diagnostic| diagnostic["code"] == "expr.parse")
.expect("expr.parse diagnostic");
assert_eq!(diagnostic["line"], 5);
// 1-based column 14 is the closing backtick: the empty end-of-input span
// must not be shifted by the delimiter.
assert_eq!(diagnostic["column"], 14);
let line = source.lines().nth(4).expect("line 5");
assert_eq!(&line[13..14], "`");
}
+58
View File
@@ -349,3 +349,61 @@ fn deleted_lock_edge_fails_check_and_run() {
);
}
}
#[test]
fn tampered_path_dependency_content_is_rejected_by_locked_sync() {
let dir = TempDir::new("path-tamper");
let root = dir.path();
write(
&root.join("marqdo.yaml"),
"project:\n name: root\n version: 0.1.0\ndependencies:\n dep:\n path: ./dep\n",
);
write(
&root.join("dep/marqdo.yaml"),
"project:\n name: dep\n version: 0.1.0\n",
);
write(&root.join("dep/index.mq.md"), "## value\n\n*1*\n");
write(
&root.join("index.mq.md"),
"---\nimport:\n dep: \"@dep\"\n---\n\n## main\n\n*1*\n",
);
assert_eq!(cli(root, &["lock"]).status.code(), Some(0));
let lock_before = std::fs::read(root.join("marqdo.lock")).unwrap();
assert_eq!(cli(root, &["sync", "--locked"]).status.code(), Some(0));
let env_before = std::fs::read(root.join(".marqdo/env/env.json")).unwrap();
// Content change after the lock is a tamper/staleness signal. `run` and
// `check` must never silently accept it, re-lock, or materialize a new
// environment.
write(&root.join("dep/index.mq.md"), "## value\n\n*2*\n");
for args in [
vec!["sync", "--locked"],
vec!["run", "index.mq.md"],
vec!["check", "index.mq.md"],
] {
let output = cli(root, &args);
assert_eq!(
output.status.code(),
Some(1),
"{args:?}: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)
);
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
assert!(
stderr.contains("out of date")
|| stderr.contains("digest")
|| stderr.contains("integrity"),
"{args:?}: {stderr}"
);
}
assert_eq!(
std::fs::read(root.join("marqdo.lock")).unwrap(),
lock_before,
"a failed locked operation must not rewrite the lock"
);
assert_eq!(
std::fs::read(root.join(".marqdo/env/env.json")).unwrap(),
env_before,
"a failed locked operation must not replace the materialized environment"
);
}
+128
View File
@@ -110,6 +110,134 @@ fn stdout(output: &Output) -> String {
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).to_string()
}
fn repo_root() -> PathBuf {
Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"))
.parent()
.expect("crates/cli has a parent")
.parent()
.expect("crates has a parent")
.to_path_buf()
}
/// Compile one of the checked-in independent consumer samples and package it
/// as a Tool Protocol v1 bundle. Sources live in `examples/tool-samples/` so
/// they are reviewable software, not hidden test strings.
fn write_sample_from_source(dir: &Path, command: &str) -> PathBuf {
let root = repo_root();
let source = root.join(format!("examples/tool-samples/{command}/src/main.rs"));
let package = dir.join(format!("{command}-pkg"));
std::fs::create_dir_all(package.join("bin")).unwrap();
let entry = package
.join("bin")
.join(format!("{command}{}", std::env::consts::EXE_SUFFIX));
let status = Command::new("rustc")
.args(["--edition", "2021", "-o"])
.arg(&entry)
.arg(&source)
.status()
.expect("run rustc for the sample tool");
assert!(status.success(), "rustc failed for {command}");
let entrypoint = format!("bin/{command}{}", std::env::consts::EXE_SUFFIX);
let manifest = package.join("tool.json");
std::fs::write(
&manifest,
format!(
r#"{{"schema":"marqdo.cli-tool","schema_version":1,"name":"demo.{command}","version":"0.1.0","command":"{command}","entrypoint":"{entrypoint}","compatibility":{{"marqdo":">=0.1,<1","analysis":[2],"trace":[2]}}}}"#
),
)
.unwrap();
manifest
}
#[test]
fn independent_sample_tools_consume_public_analysis_and_trace() {
let dir = TempDir::new("samples");
let home = dir.path().join("home");
let analysis = dir.path().join("analysis.json");
let trace = dir.path().join("trace.json");
let root = repo_root();
let check = Command::new(binary())
.args([
"check",
"examples/multi-module/index.mq.md",
"--refs",
"--emit",
])
.arg(&analysis)
.current_dir(&root)
.output()
.expect("run check");
assert!(check.status.success(), "check failed: {}", stderr(&check));
let run = Command::new(binary())
.args(["run", "examples/multi-module/index.mq.md", "--trace-file"])
.arg(&trace)
.current_dir(&root)
.output()
.expect("run");
assert!(run.status.success(), "run failed: {}", stderr(&run));
// None of these names exists in the CLI: dispatch must come from the
// installed generic tool registry.
for command in ["sample-view", "sample-knowledge", "sample-proof"] {
let unknown = cli(&home, &[command]);
assert_eq!(unknown.status.code(), Some(2), "{command} must be unknown");
assert!(stderr(&unknown).contains("unknown command"));
let manifest = write_sample_from_source(dir.path(), command);
let install = cli(&home, &["tool", "install", manifest.to_str().unwrap()]);
assert_eq!(
install.status.code(),
Some(0),
"{command}: {}",
stderr(&install)
);
}
let view = cli(
&home,
&["sample-view", "--analysis", analysis.to_str().unwrap()],
);
assert_eq!(view.status.code(), Some(0), "{}", stderr(&view));
let text = stdout(&view);
assert!(
text.contains("sample-view schema=marqdo.analysis version=2"),
"{text}"
);
assert!(text.contains("modules="), "{text}");
let knowledge = cli(
&home,
&["sample-knowledge", "--trace", trace.to_str().unwrap()],
);
assert_eq!(knowledge.status.code(), Some(0), "{}", stderr(&knowledge));
let text = stdout(&knowledge);
assert!(
text.contains("sample-knowledge schema=marqdo.trace version=2"),
"{text}"
);
assert!(text.contains("status=ok"), "{text}");
let proof = cli(
&home,
&[
"sample-proof",
"--analysis",
analysis.to_str().unwrap(),
"--trace",
trace.to_str().unwrap(),
],
);
assert_eq!(proof.status.code(), Some(0), "{}", stderr(&proof));
let text = stdout(&proof);
assert!(text.contains("sample-proof bound=true"), "{text}");
assert!(text.contains("digest=sha256:"), "{text}");
for command in ["sample-view", "sample-knowledge", "sample-proof"] {
let removed = cli(&home, &["tool", "remove", command]);
assert_eq!(removed.status.code(), Some(0), "{}", stderr(&removed));
}
}
#[test]
fn install_dispatch_list_remove_without_core_knowledge_of_the_name() {
let dir = TempDir::new("roundtrip");
+30 -1
View File
@@ -294,8 +294,37 @@ impl<'a> Mapper<'a> {
);
return None;
}
// The remainder of the condition paragraph is description only. The
// semantic mapper does not descend into it, so an executable `Strong`
// or `Emph` there would otherwise be silently swallowed. Reject it as
// a hard shape error instead of guessing the author's intent.
for tail in first.children.iter().skip(1) {
if matches!(tail.kind, MdKind::Strong | MdKind::Emph) {
self.error_with_hint(
codes::MARKDOWN_INVALID_CONSTRUCT,
Some(tail.span),
format!(
"`{}` inside a list-item condition paragraph is not executed and cannot be silently ignored",
tail.kind.tag()
),
"put executable statements in their own paragraph after the condition line",
);
return None;
}
}
let literal = condition_node.literal.clone().unwrap_or_default();
let segments = PayloadSegments::single(&literal, condition_node.span);
// `condition_node.span` includes the backtick delimiters. The payload
// map must start at the first literal byte so parse diagnostics and
// expression spans point at the expression, not at a delimiter.
let ticks = match condition_node.kind {
MdKind::Code { ticks } => ticks,
_ => 0,
};
let literal_span = Span::new(
condition_node.span.start.saturating_add(ticks),
condition_node.span.end.saturating_sub(ticks),
);
let segments = PayloadSegments::single(&literal, literal_span);
match parse_expression(&literal) {
Ok(mut expr) => {
segments.rewrite_expr(&mut expr);
+97
View File
@@ -259,3 +259,100 @@ mod tests {
assert!(error.reason.contains("emph"));
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod extra_span_tests {
use super::*;
use marqdo_markdown::parse;
fn first_strong(source: &str) -> MdNode {
let doc = parse(source);
let mut found = None;
doc.root.walk(&mut |node| {
if found.is_none() && node.kind == MdKind::Strong {
found = Some(node.clone());
}
});
found.expect("strong node")
}
#[test]
fn double_backtick_code_span_maps_inside_both_delimiters() {
let source = "**``n = 2 ** 3``**";
let node = first_strong(source);
let (payload, segments) = PayloadSegments::of(&node).unwrap();
assert_eq!(payload, "n = 2 ** 3");
let two = payload.find('2').expect("literal 2");
let span = segments.map_span(Span::new(two, two + 1));
assert_eq!(&source[span.start..span.end], "2");
assert_eq!(&source[2..4], "``");
assert_eq!(&source[span.start..span.start + 6], "2 ** 3");
}
#[test]
fn utf8_prefix_and_multiline_payload_map_to_original_bytes() {
let source = "**中文 = `2 ** 3`**";
let node = first_strong(source);
let (payload, segments) = PayloadSegments::of(&node).unwrap();
assert_eq!(payload, "中文 = 2 ** 3");
let chinese = payload.find("中文").expect("chinese");
let span = segments.map_span(Span::new(chinese, chinese + "中文".len()));
assert_eq!(&source[span.start..span.end], "中文");
let power = payload.find("2 ** 3").expect("power");
let span = segments.map_span(Span::new(power, power + "2 ** 3".len()));
assert_eq!(&source[span.start..span.end], "2 ** 3");
}
#[test]
fn condition_literal_span_excludes_backticks_for_one_and_two_ticks() {
for source in ["## f\n\n1. `n ** 2 ==`\n", "## f\n\n1. ``n ** 2 ==``\n"] {
let result = crate::analyze_source("index.mq.md", source);
let diagnostic = result
.diagnostics
.iter()
.find(|diagnostic| diagnostic.code == marqdo_value::codes::EXPR_PARSE)
.unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("no expr.parse diagnostic for {source:?}"));
let span = diagnostic
.span
.expect("condition parse error has a source span");
assert_eq!(
source.as_bytes()[span.start],
b'`',
"span must stop before the closing backtick: {span:?} in {source:?}"
);
assert_eq!(
&source[span.start.saturating_sub(2)..span.start],
"==",
"span must point at the missing operand"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn condition_description_rejects_executable_roles() {
for tail in ["**print(1)**", "*1*"] {
let source = format!("## f\n\n1. `n > 0` {tail}\n\n > print(1)\n");
let result = crate::analyze_source("index.mq.md", &source);
assert!(
result
.diagnostics
.iter()
.any(|diagnostic| diagnostic.code
== marqdo_value::codes::MARKDOWN_INVALID_CONSTRUCT),
"executable tail `{tail}` was not rejected: {:#?}",
result.diagnostics
);
}
}
#[test]
fn condition_description_allows_inert_inline_content() {
let source = "## f\n\n**n = 1**\n\n1. `n > 0` 普通说明、`惰性代码` 与 [链接](#f)。\n\n > print(1)\n";
let result = crate::analyze_source("index.mq.md", source);
assert!(
!result.has_errors(),
"inert description was rejected: {:#?}",
result.diagnostics
);
}
}
+57 -20
View File
@@ -111,34 +111,55 @@ impl PlatformCapabilities {
/// security contract. The isolated worker transport is implemented, but a
/// plain child process is not an OS sandbox.
pub fn detect() -> Self {
let strict = if cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
match linux::probe() {
Ok(mechanism) => StrictIsolation::Available { mechanism },
Err(reason) => StrictIsolation::Unavailable { reason },
}
} else if cfg!(target_os = "macos") {
StrictIsolation::Unavailable {
reason: "no verified macOS sandbox adapter is implemented in this build"
.to_string(),
}
} else if cfg!(target_os = "windows") {
StrictIsolation::Unavailable {
reason: "no verified Windows job-object/appcontainer adapter is implemented in this build".to_string(),
}
} else {
StrictIsolation::Unavailable {
reason: "platform isolation is not implemented for this target".to_string(),
}
};
Self {
os: std::env::consts::OS.to_string(),
arch: std::env::consts::ARCH.to_string(),
strict,
strict: detect_strict(),
worker_processes: true,
}
}
}
/// Detect strict isolation using only code that is compiled for the current
/// platform.
///
/// `cfg!` is a boolean constant and does **not** remove the other branch from
/// type checking. Using it around `linux::probe()` made macOS/Windows builds
/// reference a module that is not compiled there (`E0433`). The platform
/// dispatch therefore lives in dedicated `#[cfg]` functions.
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
fn detect_strict() -> StrictIsolation {
match linux::probe() {
Ok(mechanism) => StrictIsolation::Available { mechanism },
Err(reason) => StrictIsolation::Unavailable { reason },
}
}
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
fn detect_strict() -> StrictIsolation {
StrictIsolation::Unavailable {
reason: "no verified macOS sandbox adapter is implemented in this build".to_string(),
}
}
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
fn detect_strict() -> StrictIsolation {
StrictIsolation::Unavailable {
reason: "no verified Windows job-object/appcontainer adapter is implemented in this build"
.to_string(),
}
}
#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "macos", target_os = "windows")))]
fn detect_strict() -> StrictIsolation {
StrictIsolation::Unavailable {
reason: format!(
"platform isolation is not implemented for `{}`",
std::env::consts::OS
),
}
}
/// Failure to apply the requested sandbox mode.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum SandboxError {
@@ -263,4 +284,20 @@ mod tests {
assert!(enforce(SandboxMode::Pure, &platform).is_ok());
assert!(enforce(SandboxMode::Project, &platform).is_ok());
}
/// macOS and Windows must compile without the Linux-only `linux` module,
/// report strict as unavailable, and still refuse strict execution. This
/// is the regression guard for the `E0433` platform-detection defect.
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
#[test]
fn non_linux_detection_is_compiled_and_fails_closed() {
let platform = PlatformCapabilities::detect();
assert!(matches!(
platform.strict,
StrictIsolation::Unavailable { .. }
));
let error = enforce(SandboxMode::Strict, &platform).expect_err("strict must refuse");
assert!(matches!(error, SandboxError::StrictUnavailable { .. }));
assert!(!platform.strict.describe().contains("available via"));
}
}
+150 -29
View File
@@ -254,7 +254,28 @@ fn finish(outcome: StrictOutcome) -> Result<i32, SandboxError> {
Err(SandboxError::LaunchFailed { message })
}
/// Probe function used by [`run`]. A function pointer keeps the production
/// path free of runtime hooks while allowing a unit test to model
/// `probe succeeds → launch fails`.
type ProbeFn = fn() -> Result<String, String>;
/// Supervisor spawn function used by [`run`]. See [`ProbeFn`].
type SpawnFn = fn(&Path, &[OsString], Stdio, Stdio, u64, u64) -> io::Result<Child>;
fn run(command: &StrictHostCommand<'_>) -> Result<StrictOutcome, SandboxError> {
run_with(command, probe, spawn_supervisor)
}
/// Run one supervised command with injectable probe/spawn steps.
///
/// The separation is a test seam, not a bypass: any spawn error after a
/// successful probe is returned as [`SandboxError::LaunchFailed`] and the
/// caller never executes the project without the supervisor.
fn run_with(
command: &StrictHostCommand<'_>,
probe_fn: ProbeFn,
spawn_fn: SpawnFn,
) -> Result<StrictOutcome, SandboxError> {
if command.project_root == Path::new("/") {
return Err(SandboxError::LaunchFailed {
message: "strict mode refuses to expose the host root as the project".to_string(),
@@ -290,7 +311,7 @@ fn run(command: &StrictHostCommand<'_>) -> Result<StrictOutcome, SandboxError> {
}
None => None,
};
probe().map_err(|reason| SandboxError::LaunchFailed { message: reason })?;
probe_fn().map_err(|reason| SandboxError::LaunchFailed { message: reason })?;
let bwrap = bwrap_path().ok_or_else(|| SandboxError::LaunchFailed {
message: "bubblewrap disappeared after the probe".to_string(),
})?;
@@ -336,34 +357,17 @@ fn run(command: &StrictHostCommand<'_>) -> Result<StrictOutcome, SandboxError> {
let limit = command.output_limit.max(1024) as u64;
let timeout = command.timeout;
let cpu_limit = timeout.as_secs().saturating_add(2).max(1);
let mut supervisor = Command::new(&bwrap);
supervisor
.args(&args)
.stdin(Stdio::null())
.stdout(Stdio::from(stdout.reopen()?))
.stderr(Stdio::from(stderr.reopen()?));
// SAFETY: the closure only calls async-signal-safe libc functions
// (`setpgid`, `setrlimit`) between fork and exec.
unsafe {
supervisor.pre_exec(move || {
if libc::setpgid(0, 0) != 0 {
return Err(io::Error::last_os_error());
}
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_CPU, cpu_limit, cpu_limit)?;
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_AS, MAX_ADDRESS_SPACE, MAX_ADDRESS_SPACE)?;
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_NOFILE, MAX_OPEN_FILES, MAX_OPEN_FILES)?;
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_NPROC, MAX_PROCESSES, MAX_PROCESSES)?;
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_FSIZE, limit, limit)?;
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_STACK, MAX_STACK_BYTES, MAX_STACK_BYTES)?;
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_CORE, 0, 0)?;
Ok(())
});
}
let mut child = supervisor
.spawn()
.map_err(|error| SandboxError::LaunchFailed {
message: format!("cannot start the strict supervisor: {error}"),
})?;
let mut child = spawn_fn(
&bwrap,
&args,
Stdio::from(stdout.reopen()?),
Stdio::from(stderr.reopen()?),
limit,
cpu_limit,
)
.map_err(|error| SandboxError::LaunchFailed {
message: format!("cannot start the strict supervisor: {error}"),
})?;
let status = match wait_with_deadline(&mut child, timeout) {
Ok(status) => status,
@@ -385,6 +389,42 @@ fn run(command: &StrictHostCommand<'_>) -> Result<StrictOutcome, SandboxError> {
})
}
/// Spawn Bubblewrap with the supervisor's rlimits installed in the child
/// before `exec`.
fn spawn_supervisor(
bwrap: &Path,
args: &[OsString],
stdout: Stdio,
stderr: Stdio,
fsize_limit: u64,
cpu_limit: u64,
) -> io::Result<Child> {
let mut supervisor = Command::new(bwrap);
supervisor
.args(args)
.stdin(Stdio::null())
.stdout(stdout)
.stderr(stderr);
// SAFETY: the closure only calls async-signal-safe libc functions
// (`setpgid`, `setrlimit`) between fork and exec.
unsafe {
supervisor.pre_exec(move || {
if libc::setpgid(0, 0) != 0 {
return Err(io::Error::last_os_error());
}
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_CPU, cpu_limit, cpu_limit)?;
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_AS, MAX_ADDRESS_SPACE, MAX_ADDRESS_SPACE)?;
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_NOFILE, MAX_OPEN_FILES, MAX_OPEN_FILES)?;
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_NPROC, MAX_PROCESSES, MAX_PROCESSES)?;
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_FSIZE, fsize_limit, fsize_limit)?;
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_STACK, MAX_STACK_BYTES, MAX_STACK_BYTES)?;
set_limit(libc::RLIMIT_CORE, 0, 0)?;
Ok(())
});
}
supervisor.spawn()
}
fn set_limit(resource: libc::__rlimit_resource_t, soft: u64, hard: u64) -> io::Result<()> {
let limit = libc::rlimit {
rlim_cur: soft as libc::rlim_t,
@@ -475,3 +515,84 @@ impl Drop for CaptureFile {
let _ = fs::remove_file(&self.path);
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// Model the GitHub-hosted Linux runner failure: the first probe reports
/// that Bubblewrap works, but the real supervisor spawn immediately fails
/// with `EAGAIN` (resource/namespace pressure). The contract is fail-closed:
/// propagate `LaunchFailed`, never execute the project without isolation.
#[test]
fn probe_success_then_launch_eagain_is_fail_closed() {
if bwrap_path().is_none() {
// The seam is about the launch path after a successful probe; a
// host without bwrap is covered by the ordinary refusal tests.
eprintln!("skipping launch seam test: bubblewrap is not installed");
return;
}
let nanos = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.map(|duration| duration.as_nanos())
.unwrap_or(0);
let project =
std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("marqdo-launch-seam-{}-{nanos}", std::process::id()));
fs::create_dir_all(&project).expect("create seam project");
let command = StrictHostCommand {
program: Path::new("/bin/true"),
args: &[],
project_root: &project,
document: None,
original_document: None,
output_limit: 4096,
timeout: Duration::from_secs(1),
};
let error = run_with(
&command,
|| Ok("test probe succeeded".to_string()),
|_, _, _, _, _, _| Err(io::Error::from_raw_os_error(libc::EAGAIN)),
)
.expect_err("a spawn failure after a successful probe must not run the project");
let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&project);
match &error {
SandboxError::LaunchFailed { message } => {
assert!(
message.contains("cannot start the strict supervisor"),
"unexpected launch diagnostic: {message}"
);
assert!(
message.contains("Resource temporarily unavailable")
|| message.contains("os error 11"),
"EAGAIN was not preserved in the diagnostic: {message}"
);
}
other => panic!("expected LaunchFailed, got {other:?}"),
}
}
/// Every non-zero/abnormal child termination is surfaced, never converted
/// into a successful unrestricted run.
#[test]
fn launch_failure_never_falls_back_to_unrestricted_execution() {
let command = StrictHostCommand {
program: Path::new("/bin/true"),
args: &[],
project_root: Path::new("/"),
document: None,
original_document: None,
output_limit: 4096,
timeout: Duration::from_secs(1),
};
let error = run_with(
&command,
|| Ok("probe".into()),
|_, _, _, _, _, _| unreachable!("host root must be rejected before spawning"),
)
.expect_err("host root must be rejected");
assert!(matches!(error, SandboxError::LaunchFailed { .. }));
assert!(error.to_string().contains("host root"));
}
}
+38 -23
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ use std::ffi::OsString;
use std::fs;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::process::Command;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::sync::OnceLock;
use std::time::Duration;
use marqdo_sandbox::{launch_strict_capture, probe, StrictHostCommand, StrictOutcome};
@@ -30,28 +32,36 @@ fn required() -> bool {
== Some("1")
}
/// Compile the escape helper exactly once even when the test binary runs its
/// tests in parallel.
fn helper() -> Option<PathBuf> {
if let Ok(path) = std::env::var("MARQDO_SECURITY_HELPER") {
let path = PathBuf::from(path);
assert!(path.is_file(), "MARQDO_SECURITY_HELPER does not exist");
return Some(path);
}
let source = Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")).join("../../tests/security/escape_helper.c");
let output = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
"marqdo-escape-helper-{}{}",
std::process::id(),
std::env::consts::EXE_SUFFIX
));
let status = Command::new("cc")
.args(["-O2", "-o"])
.arg(&output)
.arg(&source)
.status()
.ok()?;
if !status.success() {
return None;
}
Some(output)
static HELPER: OnceLock<Option<PathBuf>> = OnceLock::new();
HELPER
.get_or_init(|| {
if let Ok(path) = std::env::var("MARQDO_SECURITY_HELPER") {
let path = PathBuf::from(path);
assert!(path.is_file(), "MARQDO_SECURITY_HELPER does not exist");
return Some(path);
}
let source =
Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")).join("../../tests/security/escape_helper.c");
let output = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
"marqdo-escape-helper-{}{}",
std::process::id(),
std::env::consts::EXE_SUFFIX
));
let status = Command::new("cc")
.args(["-O2", "-o"])
.arg(&output)
.arg(&source)
.status()
.ok()?;
if !status.success() {
return None;
}
Some(output)
})
.clone()
}
fn setup() -> Option<(PathBuf, PathBuf, PathBuf)> {
@@ -72,7 +82,12 @@ fn setup() -> Option<(PathBuf, PathBuf, PathBuf)> {
return None;
}
};
let project = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("marqdo-security-{}", std::process::id()));
// `cargo test` runs these tests in parallel. The project and outside
// paths must be unique per test or two tests can remove each other's
// project between the supervisor mount and the assertion.
static NEXT: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0);
let id = NEXT.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
let project = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("marqdo-security-{}-{id}", std::process::id()));
let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&project);
fs::create_dir_all(&project).expect("create security project");
fs::write(project.join("allowed.txt"), "allowed\n").expect("write allowed file");
@@ -81,7 +96,7 @@ fn setup() -> Option<(PathBuf, PathBuf, PathBuf)> {
let home = std::env::var_os("HOME")
.map(PathBuf::from)
.unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("/home"));
let outside = home.join(format!("marqdo-escape-{}", std::process::id()));
let outside = home.join(format!("marqdo-escape-{}-{id}", std::process::id()));
let _ = fs::remove_file(&outside);
Some((helper, project, outside))
}