feat(cli): route print through the bundled stdlib (Compat-B)

- Add Program.print_override and lazy stdlib injection: only programs that
  call 打印/print load std:io and route to io.写值 (ADR-0030).
- Record resource.open/read/write/close as trace effect events so the stdlib
  print path is auditable; HostOp::Print no longer runs on that path.
- Permit only stdio/stdout (existing console) in strict; file/network
  resource opens remain permission.denied.
- Exclude std: modules from the human-readable checked-module count; update
  the Python analysis consumer to accept std: instance ids.
- Add print-routing and strict-console tests, ADR-0030 and evidence.

Gate: fmt, clippy -D warnings, 418 tests passed.
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cflmy committed 2026-11-20 22:10:59 +08:00
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@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Normative implementation:
|---|---|---|
| `pure` | No external I/O; memory computation and budgets only. | **Enforced.** `Capabilities::pure()` = `console`, `math` only; every FS/foreign/plugin grant flag makes the CLI exit 2 with "pure mode prohibits external I/O grants". |
| `project` | Operator-approved project resources under `CapabilityHost` + bounded resources. | **Enforced for the implemented operations.** Defaults equal `pure`; `--allow-read`, `--allow-write`, `--allow-foreign`, `--allow-plugin` add grants. `resource.open` supports stdout write, granted project-file read and granted buffered project-file write (ADR-0025/0026); network/process remain unsupported. Sandboxing is cooperative (in-process checks), not OS isolation. |
| `strict` | Untrusted documents under real OS isolation. | **Linux: enforced when the runtime probe passes (ADR-0021).** `resource.open` is **refused** in strict until a provider passes the isolation lane (CM-A11). `PlatformCapabilities::detect()` runs a real Bubblewrap smoke test; success reports `Available { mechanism }`, failure reports `Unavailable { reason }`. Strict L1 supports the interpreter, console and native Math only; `--allow-read/--allow-write/--allow-foreign/--allow-plugin/--plugin/--trust-native-plugin/--kernel/--trace-file` are rejected with exit 2. macOS/Windows and Linux hosts without the mechanisms remain `Unavailable`; there is **no fallback** to an unrestricted process. |
| `strict` | Untrusted documents under real OS isolation. | **Linux: enforced when the runtime probe passes (ADR-0021).** `resource.open` is **refused** in strict except for the existing `stdio/stdout` console channel (console grant); file/network/process resources remain refused until a provider passes the isolation lane (CM-A11, ADR-0030). `PlatformCapabilities::detect()` runs a real Bubblewrap smoke test; success reports `Available { mechanism }`, failure reports `Unavailable { reason }`. Strict L1 supports the interpreter, console and native Math only; `--allow-read/--allow-write/--allow-foreign/--allow-plugin/--plugin/--trust-native-plugin/--kernel/--trace-file` are rejected with exit 2. macOS/Windows and Linux hosts without the mechanisms remain `Unavailable`; there is **no fallback** to an unrestricted process. |
`marqdo inspect <file> --platform` prints the detection report, for example: