WHY
- macOS/Windows failed to compile because `cfg!` left `linux::probe()` in the
type-checked branch (E0433).
- GitHub-hosted Linux can pass the strict probe and then fail the real launch
with EAGAIN; the CLI test treated the inspect snapshot as a permanent promise.
- The security matrix shared process-id-based scratch paths, so parallel
`cargo test --workspace` made its own tests clobber each other.
- Condition paragraphs silently ignored executable `Strong`/`Emph`, and
condition parse spans included the code-span backticks.
- The corpus had no native power/control-flow/inert fixtures and no independent
generic Tool consumers.
WHAT
- Dispatch strict detection through `#[cfg]` functions; add a non-Linux
compile/fail-closed regression test.
- Split `linux::run` into an injectable probe/spawn seam; test probe-OK ->
launch-EAGAIN returns LaunchFailed and never executes unrestricted.
- Make the Linux CLI contract accept only (a) successful isolated run or
(b) non-zero, diagnosed, fail-closed refusal with no project stdout.
- Give each security test a unique project/outside path and compile the helper
once.
- Reject executable roles in a condition paragraph; map condition expressions
from the literal bytes inside the backticks.
- Add 10 AST, 8 semantic, 4 compile-negative and 2 runtime-negative fixtures
for power, branch/loop conditions, source spans, inert prose/code fences and
error boundaries.
- Add `sample-view`/`sample-knowledge`/`sample-proof` independent Tool v1
packages and an end-to-end Analysis/Trace consumer test.
- Add a locked path-dependency content-tamper test.
TESTS
- cargo fmt --all -- --check
- cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
- cargo test --workspace --locked
- G-C VM lane (separate evidence commit/run)
CI_URL
- none from this host: the checkout has a Gitee remote and no GitHub
credentials. Windows/macOS CI remains UNVERIFIED.
BREAKING_CHANGE
- An executable node in a list-item condition paragraph is now a hard
`markdown.invalid_construct` error instead of being silently ignored.
SECURITY_SCOPE
- strict remains fail-closed; no downgrade, no new capability, L2 still
rejected. G-C still requires the dedicated self-hosted lane for CI-signed
evidence.
- lock the full transitive closure with per-instance alias edges, root
manifest digest, full content digests and structured path/git sources
- reject v1/v2 locks; validate ids, digests, edges, reachability and sources
- resolve every locked edge by (parent instance, alias) and fail closed on
missing locks/edges/records, digest or source drift and root drift
- require a lock for run/check/inspect when dependencies exist and map lock
errors to exit 1
- make sync strict in both modes, never rewrite the lock, and materialize the
whole closure with env.json schema 2
- verify Git cache markers, require full commit hashes and confirm HEAD
- stop add/remove from patching the lock; regenerate example locks
- update package-format.md and STATUS for S1
- add content-addressed Git checkout cache for exact revisions; no hooks,
submodules or floating branches
- resolve transitive @alias imports from each package's own manifest
- materialize locked path/Git packages into .marqdo/env atomically and prefer
a matching env copy in the resolver
- make sync a real environment sync while keeping lock immutable
- kill Unix foreign-kernel process groups so grandchildren do not survive
- add Git/env/transitive integration tests and update package/security specs