WHY
- macOS/Windows failed to compile because `cfg!` left `linux::probe()` in the
type-checked branch (E0433).
- GitHub-hosted Linux can pass the strict probe and then fail the real launch
with EAGAIN; the CLI test treated the inspect snapshot as a permanent promise.
- The security matrix shared process-id-based scratch paths, so parallel
`cargo test --workspace` made its own tests clobber each other.
- Condition paragraphs silently ignored executable `Strong`/`Emph`, and
condition parse spans included the code-span backticks.
- The corpus had no native power/control-flow/inert fixtures and no independent
generic Tool consumers.
WHAT
- Dispatch strict detection through `#[cfg]` functions; add a non-Linux
compile/fail-closed regression test.
- Split `linux::run` into an injectable probe/spawn seam; test probe-OK ->
launch-EAGAIN returns LaunchFailed and never executes unrestricted.
- Make the Linux CLI contract accept only (a) successful isolated run or
(b) non-zero, diagnosed, fail-closed refusal with no project stdout.
- Give each security test a unique project/outside path and compile the helper
once.
- Reject executable roles in a condition paragraph; map condition expressions
from the literal bytes inside the backticks.
- Add 10 AST, 8 semantic, 4 compile-negative and 2 runtime-negative fixtures
for power, branch/loop conditions, source spans, inert prose/code fences and
error boundaries.
- Add `sample-view`/`sample-knowledge`/`sample-proof` independent Tool v1
packages and an end-to-end Analysis/Trace consumer test.
- Add a locked path-dependency content-tamper test.
TESTS
- cargo fmt --all -- --check
- cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
- cargo test --workspace --locked
- G-C VM lane (separate evidence commit/run)
CI_URL
- none from this host: the checkout has a Gitee remote and no GitHub
credentials. Windows/macOS CI remains UNVERIFIED.
BREAKING_CHANGE
- An executable node in a list-item condition paragraph is now a hard
`markdown.invalid_construct` error instead of being silently ignored.
SECURITY_SCOPE
- strict remains fail-closed; no downgrade, no new capability, L2 still
rejected. G-C still requires the dedicated self-hosted lane for CI-signed
evidence.
The macOS job failed with no_matching_artifact because the integration test
copied the Linux-only example manifest and built a Linux-named .so. Tests now
generate a manifest for the actual host triple, use the platform dynamic
library name and compiler flags, and never rewrite the tracked example
manifest.
- add a cross-platform no_matching_artifact test that runs without a C compiler
- add real tamper and ABI-major-mismatch rejection tests
- make worker fixtures platform-native; Windows remains explicitly unsupported
(no cc) rather than counted as a pass
- example build scripts emit host-specific build/ fixtures (gitignored)
- CI smoke points at the generated fixtures
- add environment_id/environment_digest/interpreter_version to KernelDescriptor
- require external CLI descriptors to pin an absolute executable and a full
provider digest
- verify the digest at registration and immediately before every spawn;
tampering after registration fails with ForeignError::Integrity before spawn
- validate digest formats and reject relative external entrypoints
- pin the example provider digest and add an integrity test
- document that uv/npm environment materialization and lock integration remain
open; strict isolation is unchanged and still refused
- lock the full transitive closure with per-instance alias edges, root
manifest digest, full content digests and structured path/git sources
- reject v1/v2 locks; validate ids, digests, edges, reachability and sources
- resolve every locked edge by (parent instance, alias) and fail closed on
missing locks/edges/records, digest or source drift and root drift
- require a lock for run/check/inspect when dependencies exist and map lock
errors to exit 1
- make sync strict in both modes, never rewrite the lock, and materialize the
whole closure with env.json schema 2
- verify Git cache markers, require full commit hashes and confirm HEAD
- stop add/remove from patching the lock; regenerate example locks
- update package-format.md and STATUS for S1
- add a hidden __plugin-worker mode that loads one native library in a child
process and serves length-prefixed JSON invoke frames
- add host WorkerPlugin with ready handshake, export cross-check, per-call
timeout and crash/EOF propagation
- route kind: worker without in-process trust; native still requires explicit
trust; wasm is rejected explicitly
- report worker_processes=true while keeping strict OS isolation unavailable
- test successful worker calls and worker crash isolation
- update plugin ABI spec and R2 status
- add runnable examples for an unknown-name Tool, multi-export plugin,
external kernel provider and same-name multi-version packages
- add JSON Schemas for Analysis v1, Trace v1 and Tool v1 and validate them in CI
- extend CI with protocol/consumer smoke tests and a Windows/macOS cargo check
- add --kernel provider descriptors and R6 example integration tests
- document the examples and update M0.6 status
- register every plugin export by its complete dotted name; reject conflicting
loads atomically instead of overwriting the first namespace
- route plugin calls by full export name and expose loaded descriptors to the
runtime
- add CapabilityBroker for core grants and vendor policy, with audit records
- accept syntactically valid vendor capability requests in manifests while
still denying them until a trusted policy exists
- add check --plugin static signature validation without dlopen
- test multi-export C plugin routing, conflict rollback, broker decisions and
static arity rejection
Blueprint section 10: a first-class plugin ABI independent of the legacy
MARQDO_ABI_VERSION=2, with a C ABI that is explicitly not a sandbox.
- include/marqdo_plugin_abi_v1.h: frozen stable-layout C contract with
documented buffer ownership/lifetimes, size limits, NULL/zero-length
semantics, single-threaded invocation, no hot-unload policy, version
negotiation and target-triple requirements.
- marqdo-plugin-abi (host side): repr(C) mirrors with compile-time layout
assertions, major/minor negotiation (wrong major fails, minor clamps),
plugin.yaml parsing/validation, target selection and sha256 artifact
verification, wire_version 1 typed JSON request/response envelopes,
structured PluginError, and a libloading-based loader with host alloc/free,
export registration and runtime ABI re-negotiation.
- marqdo-plugin-sdk (plugin side): mq_plugin_entry! macro, panic containment,
safe byte-buffer wrappers, capability/logging context and JSON helpers; it
depends only on the shared ABI crate.
- examples/plugin-demo: dependency-free C plugin (solver.add), manifest,
build.sh that refreshes the artifact hash, README explaining that install,
inspect and load are three different trust decisions.
- Tests: C plugin cross-compiled with cc and loaded, plus wrong ABI major,
missing symbol/artifact, hash mismatch and malformed manifest cases.