# ADR-0019: Strict-mode availability gate Status: **Accepted; Linux availability superseded by ADR-0021** Date: 2026-11-20 Relates to: ADR-0004 (strict mode refuses without isolation), blueprint §9 ## Context `strict` is the only mode that may claim isolation for untrusted documents. The project must never advertise strict execution merely because an isolated worker process or a cooperative path check exists. At the time of this ADR no platform adapter has passed the required OS-level escape and resource tests. The environment used for this stabilization work cannot create namespaces (`unshare`/`bwrap` return "Operation not permitted"), so a real Linux adapter cannot be built *and verified* here. Landlock is present but covers filesystem rules only; it does not by itself satisfy the network/process/resource and child-tree requirements in `docs/CORE_STABILIZATION_AND_ECOSYSTEM_GATE.md` §13. ## Superseding note (2026-11-20) The fail-closed principle and the per-platform, test-gated availability rule in this ADR remain in force. A concrete Linux adapter has since passed the security matrix in a disposable Ubuntu VM and is specified by **ADR-0021**: strict becomes `Available` only when the Bubblewrap probe succeeds at runtime. This ADR remains authoritative for every other platform and for the rule that availability must never be assumed. ## Decision ### 1. Strict stays unavailable until the gate passes `PlatformCapabilities::detect` reports `StrictIsolation::Unavailable` with a platform-specific reason on every platform. `enforce` refuses strict before any host or plugin is constructed. There is no fallback to `project`, no "warn and continue", and no opt-in flag that silently disables the refusal. This state is deliberate design output, not an incomplete branch: G-B does not depend on it, and every unsupported platform must fail closed. ### 2. Availability is a per-platform, test-gated decision A platform may report `Available { mechanism }` only when all of the following hold on that platform and are covered by CI on a dedicated security lane: * filesystem visibility restricted to the project and explicit grants; escapes via `..`, absolute paths, symlinks and TOCTOU are denied; * network socket creation/connection denied unless explicitly granted; * process creation denied unless explicitly granted; the child tree is reaped and leaves no orphans; * resource limits for CPU, memory, file descriptors, process count, output and wall clock are enforced; * plugin workers and foreign kernels inherit the same restrictions, or strict refuses to load them; * the adapter is probed at runtime; failure to obtain the mechanisms leaves strict `Unavailable` with the real reason; * `--trust-native-plugin` and in-process native loading are rejected in strict, since C ABI code shares the host address space; * a probe/escape test suite demonstrates denial of reading `/etc/...`, writing outside the project, connecting to the network and spawning a process. Until then, `strict` must refuse even when other flags (`--allow-foreign`, `--plugin`, `--trust-native-plugin`, read/write grants) are present. ### 3. Capability execution is not isolation The broker executing `fs.read` for native and worker plugins (ADR-0018) is a cooperative API contract with audit; it does not prevent a plugin from issuing direct syscalls. It is not evidence for strict availability. ### 4. Observability `marqdo inspect --platform --json` exposes the state and reason. The CLI test suite asserts that the state is `unavailable` and that a strict run exits 1 with a refusal message. Changing this contract requires this ADR to be superseded together with the security test suite. ## Consequences * No G-C claim is made. Documentation and CI must not describe worker processes, Landlock-only filesystems or in-process brokers as a sandbox. * A future adapter must add a new ADR, runtime probe, security lane and negative tests before flipping `Unavailable` to `Available`. * Platform-specific reasons remain actionable but do not leak secrets or host layout details. ## Tests * `strict_mode_refuses_without_isolation` (CLI): refusal, exit 1, no stdout, JSON error envelope. * `platform_reports_strict_unavailable` (CLI): `inspect --platform --json` reports `state: unavailable` with a non-empty reason. * Existing worker tests remain explicitly labelled crash isolation, not OS isolation.