# ADR-0044: Explicitly granted `process.run` resource operation Status: **Accepted** Date: 2026-11-21 Relates to: ADR-0041, ADR-0042, ADR-0043 Specs: `spec/security.md`, `spec/evaluation.md` Evidence: `docs/evidence/2026-11-21-process-product.md` ## Context The audit RFC lists a `std:process` product module. Spawning a process is the most privileged OS operation in the runtime and is **not** contained by the in-process host checks. Without an explicit contract it would silently turn the CLI into an unrestricted command runner. ## Decision Add a project-mode-only `resource.request` operation: ```text resource.request("process.run", [program, args]) -> {ok:true, value:{status, stdout, stderr}} | {ok:false, code:"process.not_found"} | {ok:false, code:"process.timeout"} | {ok:false, code:"process.output_too_large"} ``` * `program` is an exact Text path; `args` is a List of Text values. Wrong arity/types are fatal. There is no shell expansion, no glob and no implicit `PATH` lookup. * A new exact `Capabilities::process_programs: Vec` grant is required (`--allow-process PROGRAM`). Un-granted programs return `permission.denied` before spawning. * The child runs with `env_clear`, stdin `null`, the project root as its working directory, and a 5 second wall-clock limit. On timeout it is killed and the call returns recoverable `process.timeout`. * `stdout`/`stderr` are captured separately, require valid UTF-8 (otherwise fatal type error), and are capped at 1 MiB each; exceeding the cap is recoverable `process.output_too_large`. * `pure`/`strict` refuse the operation. This does **not** make the child an OS sandbox: the in-process host check is cooperative and the child inherits the CLI user's OS privileges. * `stdlib/process.mq.md` is a thin `.mq.md` facade; no Rust builtin or `HostOp` is added. ## Consequences * Process execution is opt-in per exact program path and remains project-mode only. * The operation is not a sandbox. A future strict-mode process provider needs OS isolation evidence and a separate ADR. * `--allow-process` is rejected by strict preflight, like the other external grants.