# ADR-0048: TLS client resource endpoint Status: **Accepted** Date: 2026-11-21 Relates to: ADR-0034, ADR-0047 Specs: `spec/security.md`, `spec/evaluation.md` Evidence: `docs/evidence/2026-11-21-tls-endpoint.md` ## Context ADR-0047 added DNS, UDP and TCP listeners but deliberately left TLS out: a TLS client needs a trust-anchor policy and certificate validation, not just a socket. The audit RFC lists TLS as a P2 provider gap. ## Decision * `resource.open("tls", "host:port", ["read","write"])` connects with TCP, validates the server certificate with `rustls`, and returns an opaque `tls` Resource. `resource.read`/`write`/`close` work like TCP. * The exact host grant (`--allow-net HOST`) is checked before DNS resolution. `pure`/`strict` refuse; only project mode is supported. * Trust roots are the platform native roots plus any DER certificates added by an embedder through `StdHost::with_tls_ca`. There is no CLI flag for a private CA in this build; the API is for embedders/tests. * Server-name verification uses the descriptor host, not the resolved IP. Certificate or handshake failures are fatal `host.error`; a failed handshake closes the connection and does not return a Resource. * TLS is client-only. No server TLS acceptor, mutual TLS, ALPN, session resumption, OCSP or custom root CLI is added. * `rustls` is used instead of `native-tls` so the build does not require system OpenSSL headers; it remains a normal Rust dependency. ## Consequences * `resource.open("tls")` is a real validated TLS client endpoint and is covered by a local self-signed test that adds an explicit DER root. * A future CLI `--tls-ca` or provider-managed trust store needs a separate grant/ADR; this decision does not silently trust unknown certificates. * TLS server sockets and mutual TLS remain open.