# Reproducing the disposable strict-security VM The G-C lane was executed in a throw-away Ubuntu 26.04 VM because the primary development host is a container that cannot create namespaces. This document records how that VM was built so the result can be reproduced and so the VM can be registered as a dedicated self-hosted security runner. > **Language-syntax migration note.** The lane fixtures are `.mq.md` sources and > are migrated to RFC-LANG-0002 > ([`architecture/RFC-LANG-0002-unified-semantics.md`](architecture/RFC-LANG-0002-unified-semantics.md)). > The lane has not been re-run at `ffd1cc9`; run `tests/security/run-lane.sh` on > the migrated tree before using this VM as evidence for the current syntax. The > VM/OS-isolation procedure itself is unchanged. See [`STATUS.md`](STATUS.md). **Do not run this on a daily host with valuable data.** The VM is disposable; the commands below do not disable AppArmor or any global host protection. ## 1. Host prerequisites - QEMU with TCG (`/dev/kvm` is not required; the reference run had no KVM). - Network access to `cloud-images.ubuntu.com`, Ubuntu archives and crates.io. - ~10 GiB free disk and ~3 GiB RAM for the guest. On an ordinary Ubuntu host, `sudo apt install qemu-system-x86 qemu-utils genisoimage` is sufficient. In the reference environment QEMU was unpacked under `.tools/` because the host root was read-only; that directory is gitignored and is not part of the repository. ## 2. Cloud image and seed ```bash mkdir -p .tools/vm && cd .tools/vm curl -L -o resolute.img \ https://cloud-images.ubuntu.com/resolute/current/resolute-server-cloudimg-amd64.img qemu-img create -f qcow2 -b resolute.img -F qcow2 disk.qcow2 20G ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N '' -f marqdo_vm_key ``` Create `user-data` with an ordinary `dev` user (passwordless sudo only for test setup), `meta-data` with a unique instance id, and wrap both into a NoCloud ISO with volume label `cidata`. Any ISO builder works; the reference run used the pure-Python `pycdlib` wheel extracted under `.tools/py`: ```bash python3 - <<'PY' import pycdlib iso = pycdlib.PyCdlib() iso.new(interchange_level=3, vol_ident='cidata', joliet=3, rock_ridge='1.09') for name, iso_name in {'user-data': 'USER_DATA.;1', 'meta-data': 'META_DATA.;1'}.items(): iso.add_file(name, f'/{iso_name}', rr_name=name, joliet_path=f'/{name}') iso.write('seed.iso') iso.close() PY ``` `user-data` must contain the public key: ```yaml #cloud-config users: - name: dev sudo: ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL shell: /bin/bash groups: [sudo] ssh_authorized_keys: - ssh-ed25519 AAAA... your-key ssh_pwauth: false package_update: false package_upgrade: false ``` ## 3. Boot and connect ```bash qemu-system-x86_64 -accel tcg,thread=multi -cpu max -smp 4 -m 3072 \ -L /usr/share/qemu \ -drive file=disk.qcow2,if=virtio,format=qcow2 \ -drive file=seed.iso,if=virtio,format=raw,readonly=on \ -netdev user,id=n0,hostfwd=tcp:127.0.0.1:2222-:22 \ -device virtio-net-pci,netdev=n0 \ -display none -serial file:console.log -monitor none -no-reboot ``` Wait for SSH, then: ```bash ssh -p 2222 -i marqdo_vm_key dev@127.0.0.1 ``` ## 4. Guest setup ```bash sudo apt-get update sudo apt-get install -y bubblewrap build-essential curl python3 bwrap --version # install Rust (minimal profile) curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y --profile minimal export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH" ``` Check the mechanisms **before** running the lane: ```bash systemd-detect-virt --container # must be "none" unshare --user --map-root-user true # root may need sudo; ordinary user uses bwrap bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net --ro-bind / / true; echo $? cat /proc/self/uid_map findmnt -t cgroup2 ``` Ubuntu 26.04 keeps `kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1`. The packaged `bwrap-userns-restrict` AppArmor profile is what allows the ordinary user to run Bubblewrap; the lane does **not** require disabling AppArmor globally. ## 5. Copy the source and run the lane From the host repository root (or from `git archive `): ```bash tar --exclude=.git --exclude=.tools --exclude=.cache --exclude=.cargo-home \ --exclude=target --exclude=dist -czf /tmp/marqdo-src.tgz . scp -P 2222 -i .tools/vm/marqdo_vm_key /tmp/marqdo-src.tgz dev@127.0.0.1:/home/dev/ ssh -p 2222 -i .tools/vm/marqdo_vm_key dev@127.0.0.1 ``` Inside the guest: ```bash mkdir -p ~/marqdo-src && tar -C ~/marqdo-src -xzf ~/marqdo-src.tgz cd ~/marqdo-src export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH" ./tests/security/run-lane.sh ``` Expected final line: `G-C security lane: PASS`. The lane also checks that the read-only bundled stdlib works for `打印` and that a project-file `resource.open` is refused in strict mode. The script exports `MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY=1`; a missing bubblewrap, compiler or helper is a failure, never a skip. ## 6. Registering as a security runner Register this VM (not the development container) as a GitHub self-hosted runner with labels `linux` and `marqdo-security`. The workflow `.github/workflows/security-linux.yml` targets `runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, marqdo-security]`. Keep the runner disposable and recreate it from this document; do not give the runner access to secrets or the primary workspace. A CI URL from that runner is still required before a release may call G-C CI-verified. ## Reference environment ```text Ubuntu 26.04.1 LTS, kernel 7.0.0-43-generic x86_64 QEMU/TCG guest, systemd-detect-virt --container -> none bubblewrap 0.11.1 (bwrap-userns-restrict) dev uid 1000, passwordless sudo for setup only ```