# Linux strict-isolation security gate (G-C) — evidence report Status: **G-C NOT PASSED. `strict` remains `Unavailable` and fails closed.** Snapshot: workspace `0.1.0`, 2026-11-20. No release tag. This report records what was actually probed on the development host and why no `StrictIsolation::Available` claim is made. It is evidence, not a plan to weaken the gate. ## 1. Host and capability probe Command output (abridged; host name removed): ```text user: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) kernel: Linux 7.0.0-43-generic x86_64 virt: container-other apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns: 1 max_user_namespaces: 60339 cgroup2 mount: ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,nsdelegate,memory_recursiveprot cgroup controllers: cpuset cpu io memory hugetlb pids rdma misc dmem unshare --user --map-root-user true -> unshare: write failed /proc/self/uid_map: Operation not permitted (exit 1) unshare --user --map-root-user --net true -> unshare: unshare failed: Operation not permitted (exit 1) bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net --ro-bind / / true -> bwrap: No permissions to create a new namespace (exit 1) sudo -n true -> sudo: The "no new privileges" flag is set, which prevents sudo from running as root (exit 1) capsh --print -> Current: = (no effective capabilities) -> Bounding set = cap_sys_admin, ... (not effective; no-new-privs=1) unshare --mount true / --pid --fork true / --net true -> Operation not permitted (exit 1 each) ``` The workspace root is writable, but the host root filesystem and cgroup2 mount are read-only. The process is root inside a container with `no_new_privs` set; `sudo` cannot gain privileges and the parent container refuses namespace creation. `user.max_user_namespaces` being non-zero does not help because the container policy/AppArmor boundary rejects the actual `uid_map` write. ## 2. Consequence - A real Linux adapter (namespaces + seccomp/no_new_privs + cgroup v2 + fd and process-tree control) cannot be built, applied and verified here. - Implementing an adapter and flipping `Available` without executing the escape and resource-limit tests would be a false security claim. It was not done. - `PlatformCapabilities::detect()` continues to report `unavailable` with a reason; `enforce` refuses before any host/plugin is constructed. There is no fallback to `project`. - Native plugin loading (`--trust-native-plugin`) is unrelated to strict mode and remains an explicit in-process trust decision; the broker and worker transport are not OS isolation. Command evidence: ```bash marqdo run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict # exit 1, stderr: refusing to run in strict mode: ... marqdo inspect examples/hello.mq.md --platform --json # platform.strict.state == "unavailable" ``` ## 3. What G-C still requires 1. A controllable Ubuntu VM or self-hosted runner that permits user, mount, PID and network namespaces and delegated cgroup v2 controllers, reachable from an ordinary (non-root) test user. 2. A trusted supervisor that applies filesystem/network/process/resource policy and reaps the child tree, plus a runtime probe that reports the mechanisms actually applied. 3. Execution of the full negative matrix from `docs/STABLE_RELEASE_IMPLEMENTATION.md` §10.5 with a malicious helper: direct syscall reads/writes, `/proc` and inherited-fd access, IPv4/IPv6/DNS and Unix sockets, fork/exec, CPU/memory/fd/process/output limits, and `--trust-native-plugin` rejection. 4. A security-lane CI URL on the same commit, and only then an ADR that flips `Unavailable` to `Available` for that specific platform. Until all four hold, any release must state: **strict OS isolation is not available; untrusted code must not be executed with Marqdo expecting isolation.**