The convergence evidence was first recorded againstf075c96. The completed tree is8af7262(docs/workflow on top of the same code), and the G-C lane and workspace suite were re-run from a clean `git archive 8af7262`. Rename the evidence and RC reports to the final SHA and update their archive/checksum hashes. Source under test:8af72620f1G-C: 7/7 + positive CLI + forged-marker rejection PASS (ordinary user, VM) Workspace: 47 test binaries, 0 failed RC: marqdo-0.1.0-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz, sha256 5a42d83737c9715986f36b105feb7419a677d98f913f00e84ac19f1d4847733d CI_URL: none from this host; remote gates remain the blockers.
4.7 KiB
G-C strict-isolation evidence — source archive 8af7262 (2026-11-20)
Source SHA: 8af72620f12e2494a59830a23abb393768b610e9
Source archive: git archive --format=tar.gz --prefix=marqdo-8af7262/ 8af7262
SHA-256 ad8fca0b5e114b0c74d6265e5e374373a50bccd6a58aa12f821855cf2c9ed7ea.
Status: G-C local VM lane PASS, run as ordinary user dev (uid 1000) in a
disposable Ubuntu 26.04 QEMU/TCG VM. No self-hosted GitHub Actions security
URL exists for this SHA, so this is not yet a CI-signed G-C.
Full logs:
2026-11-20-strict-gc-8af7262.log,
2026-11-20-workspace-tests-8af7262.log.
Environment
id: uid=1000(dev) gid=1000(dev) groups=1000(dev),27(sudo)
uname: Linux marqdo-security 7.0.0-43-generic #43-Ubuntu SMP ... x86_64
virt: systemd-detect-virt --container -> none (QEMU/TCG guest)
bwrap: bubblewrap 0.11.1 (bwrap-userns-restrict)
cc: cc (Ubuntu 15.2.0-16ubuntu1) 15.2.0
node: v22.22.1
python: Python 3.14.4
rustc: rustc 1.100.0 (0ef1bc386 2026-11-09)
uid_map: 0 0 4294967295
cgroup2: rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,nsdelegate,...
The lane was extracted from git archive, not run from the development
container. CARGO_TARGET_DIR pointed at the cached VM target directory; the
lane was fixed to honour that variable rather than hard-coding target/debug.
Lane command
cd ~/marqdo-8af7262
export PATH=$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH
export CARGO_TARGET_DIR=$HOME/marqdo-src/target
MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY=1 ./tests/security/run-lane.sh
Result
== adversarial helper matrix ==
running 7 tests
test strict_child_cannot_escape_via_proc_or_privileges ... ok
test strict_child_cannot_reach_the_network ... ok
test strict_child_cannot_read_host_files_but_reads_the_project ... ok
test strict_child_cannot_write_outside_or_into_the_project ... ok
test strict_child_identity_is_unprivileged_and_namespaced ... ok
test strict_supervisor_enforces_fd_and_process_limits ... ok
test strict_supervisor_enforces_memory_cpu_and_output_limits ... ok
test result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored
strict mechanism: bubblewrap 0.11.1 (user/mount/PID/net/UTS/IPC namespaces + no-new-privs + rlimits)
== positive CLI contract ==
== external-execution surfaces are refused ==
== forged active marker is rejected ==
G-C security lane: PASS
The same archive ran cargo test --workspace --locked: 47 test binaries,
0 failed, including the seven security cases in parallel (the parallel
scratch-path collision is fixed in this SHA).
Case-level observations
| Attack/surface | Observed inside sandbox |
|---|---|
| identity | uid=1000, pid=1, NoNewPrivs: 1, CapEff: 0 |
/etc/shadow, /root, $HOME |
DENIED |
/project/allowed.txt |
OK |
write outside project / into /project |
DENIED; no host file created |
write /tmp |
allowed in private tmpfs, host unaffected |
/proc/1/root/etc/shadow |
DENIED |
| inherited fds above stdio | none |
setuid(0), mount, nested unshare |
DENIED |
| IPv4 connect / raw socket | DENIED |
| fd loop | EMFILE <= 64 |
| fork loop | bounded below 200 |
| 768 MiB allocation | denied/killed by 512 MiB RLIMIT_AS |
| infinite CPU loop | stopped by wall-clock/CPU budget |
| 4 MiB stdout | stopped at the 64 KiB output limit |
CLI behavior in the VM
run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict -> 你好,Marqdo (exit 0)
call examples/factorial.mq.md 数学.阶乘 --arg n=5 --mode strict -> 120
run examples/multi-module/index.mq.md --mode strict -> exit 0
run --mode strict --json -> success: true
run --mode strict --allow-foreign -> exit 2
run --mode strict --allow-read/--allow-write -> exit 2
run --mode strict --trust-native-plugin --plugin ... -> exit 2
run --mode strict --kernel ... -> exit 2
run --mode strict --trace-file ... -> exit 2
MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE=1 run --mode strict -> exit 1 (not PID 1)
Residual risks and non-claims
- Strict L2 (Worker/Foreign/native ABI inheriting the sandbox) is not implemented; those flags are rejected. Native ABI is never allowed in strict.
- rlimits are used instead of cgroup-v2 accounting; no cgroup enforcement is claimed.
- Filesystem TOCTOU is reduced by read-only mounts but not formally proven against a racing host user.
- Network is denied by the network namespace, not a seccomp syscall allowlist.
- A remote self-hosted security-lane CI run is still required before a
release may call G-C CI-verified.
.github/workflows/security-linux.ymldefines that lane;MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY=1makes a missing mechanism fail instead of skip.