3.0 KiB
RFC-CM CM-A11 evidence: strict resource verification
Date: 2026-11-20 (Asia/Shanghai)
Repository: marqdo-cli
Source under test: git archive 70d916d (current HEAD)
Related: ADR-0021,
ADR-0030,
ADR-0034,
STATUS §1.
Raw lane log: 2026-11-20-strict-resource-cm-a11.log
Environment
Ubuntu 26.04 disposable QEMU/TCG VM, kernel 7.0.0-43-generic, ordinary user
dev (uid 1000), systemd-detect-virt --container = none, bubblewrap
0.11.1 with the packaged bwrap-userns-restrict profile. The dev container
cannot create namespaces, so this is VM-only evidence.
What was verified
./tests/security/run-lane.sh
adversarial helper matrix: 7 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored
positive CLI contract: PASS
strict language resources are console-only: PASS
external-execution surfaces refused: PASS
forged active marker rejected: PASS
G-C security lane: PASS
The 7-test helper matrix covers: no host-file reads beyond /project, no
writes outside or into the project, no network, unprivileged namespaces, no
capability escalation, fd/process limits, and memory/CPU/output limits.
The positive CLI contract runs hello (Compat-C 打印 through the bundled
stdlib), factorial --mode strict, multi-module, and --json.
The strict-resource checks run .mq.md programs that call
resource.open("file", "README.md", ["read"]) and
resource.open("tcp", "127.0.0.1:9", ["read","write"]) under --mode strict;
each run must be non-zero and the diagnostic must contain permission.denied.
The --allow-net flag is also rejected at the strict boundary. The
bundled stdlib is bind-mounted read-only at /run/marqdo-stdlib and its digest
is still verified in the child; this grants no new OS capability.
Policy verified in code/tests
- Strict permits only
stdio/stdoutwith console grant. - Strict refuses project-file, TCP and registered-provider resource kinds;
purerefuses file/TCP/providers too. --allow-read/--allow-write/--allow-foreign/--allow-plugin/--allow-net/ --trace-file/--kernel/--trust-native-pluginare rejected at the strict L1 flag boundary.- Strict permits the read-only bundled stdlib so
打印works; file/network/ process/device remain refused. - TCP is project-only and strict refuses it (host tests), so the new TCP endpoint does not widen strict L1.
Gate
Local container: fmt/clippy/426 tests PASS. VM: 7/7 adversarial + full lane PASS. Log is checked in; this is a local VM lane, not a self-hosted GitHub Actions security URL and not Windows/macOS evidence.
Limits
- No remote CI URL for
70d916d; G-C remains VM-verified, not CI-signed. - Windows/macOS strict behavior is not exercised here.
- Strict L2 (Worker/Foreign/native plugin under real isolation) is still not implemented; L1 refuses those surfaces.
- TCP/HTTP/DNS under strict are refused rather than isolated.