Strict mode now re-executes the CLI inside a Bubblewrap supervisor with user/mount/PID/net/UTS/IPC namespaces, no-new-privs, all capabilities dropped, a read-only /project, private /proc and /dev, rlimits, output capture and wall-clock process-group cleanup. The child verifies PID 1, NoNewPrivs, empty CapEff, an unshared uid map and loopback-only networking before project code. - PlatformCapabilities::detect runs a real bwrap probe; no probe, no strict - strict L1 supports pure Marqdo + Math; Foreign/ABI/worker/kernel/grants/trace are rejected with exit 2 before sandboxing - forged MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE is rejected; missing bwrap fails closed - add adversarial helper, 7-test escape/resource matrix, seeded security lane script and self-hosted security workflow - executed G-C lane as uid 1000 in a disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM: 7/7 PASS plus positive CLI and refusal matrix; evidence in docs/evidence - ADR-0021, spec/security.md, STATUS/COMPATIBILITY/README/CHANGELOG updated; ADR-0019 remains for non-Linux/fail-closed rules
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ADR-0019: Strict-mode availability gate
Status: Accepted; Linux availability superseded by ADR-0021 Date: 2026-11-20 Relates to: ADR-0004 (strict mode refuses without isolation), blueprint §9
Context
strict is the only mode that may claim isolation for untrusted documents.
The project must never advertise strict execution merely because an isolated
worker process or a cooperative path check exists. At the time of this ADR no
platform adapter has passed the required OS-level escape and resource tests.
The environment used for this stabilization work cannot create namespaces
(unshare/bwrap return "Operation not permitted"), so a real Linux adapter
cannot be built and verified here. Landlock is present but covers filesystem
rules only; it does not by itself satisfy the network/process/resource and
child-tree requirements in docs/CORE_STABILIZATION_AND_ECOSYSTEM_GATE.md
§13.
Superseding note (2026-11-20)
The fail-closed principle and the per-platform, test-gated availability rule in
this ADR remain in force. A concrete Linux adapter has since passed the
security matrix in a disposable Ubuntu VM and is specified by ADR-0021:
strict becomes Available only when the Bubblewrap probe succeeds at runtime.
This ADR remains authoritative for every other platform and for the rule that
availability must never be assumed.
Decision
1. Strict stays unavailable until the gate passes
PlatformCapabilities::detect reports StrictIsolation::Unavailable with a
platform-specific reason on every platform. enforce refuses strict before any
host or plugin is constructed. There is no fallback to project, no "warn and
continue", and no opt-in flag that silently disables the refusal.
This state is deliberate design output, not an incomplete branch: G-B does not depend on it, and every unsupported platform must fail closed.
2. Availability is a per-platform, test-gated decision
A platform may report Available { mechanism } only when all of the following
hold on that platform and are covered by CI on a dedicated security lane:
- filesystem visibility restricted to the project and explicit grants;
escapes via
.., absolute paths, symlinks and TOCTOU are denied; - network socket creation/connection denied unless explicitly granted;
- process creation denied unless explicitly granted; the child tree is reaped and leaves no orphans;
- resource limits for CPU, memory, file descriptors, process count, output and wall clock are enforced;
- plugin workers and foreign kernels inherit the same restrictions, or strict refuses to load them;
- the adapter is probed at runtime; failure to obtain the mechanisms leaves
strict
Unavailablewith the real reason; --trust-native-pluginand in-process native loading are rejected in strict, since C ABI code shares the host address space;- a probe/escape test suite demonstrates denial of reading
/etc/..., writing outside the project, connecting to the network and spawning a process.
Until then, strict must refuse even when other flags (--allow-foreign,
--plugin, --trust-native-plugin, read/write grants) are present.
3. Capability execution is not isolation
The broker executing fs.read for native and worker plugins (ADR-0018) is a
cooperative API contract with audit; it does not prevent a plugin from issuing
direct syscalls. It is not evidence for strict availability.
4. Observability
marqdo inspect --platform --json exposes the state and reason. The CLI test
suite asserts that the state is unavailable and that a strict run exits 1 with
a refusal message. Changing this contract requires this ADR to be superseded
together with the security test suite.
Consequences
- No G-C claim is made. Documentation and CI must not describe worker processes, Landlock-only filesystems or in-process brokers as a sandbox.
- A future adapter must add a new ADR, runtime probe, security lane and negative
tests before flipping
UnavailabletoAvailable. - Platform-specific reasons remain actionable but do not leak secrets or host layout details.
Tests
strict_mode_refuses_without_isolation(CLI): refusal, exit 1, no stdout, JSON error envelope.platform_reports_strict_unavailable(CLI):inspect --platform --jsonreportsstate: unavailablewith a non-empty reason.- Existing worker tests remain explicitly labelled crash isolation, not OS isolation.