WHY - The code fixes existed locally without same-SHA release material; the G0..G12 gate matrix, G-C VM evidence, RC artifact and explicit non-claims must be reviewable together. - The release-candidate workflow packaged no consumers and did not verify its own checksum in the clean-install directory. WHAT - Record the current Linux/VM evidence atf075c96and keep remote CI/G-C as UNVERIFIED; overall decision DO NOT RELEASE. - Add G-C evidence (7/7 + positive CLI + 47-binary workspace run), RC report with gate matrix, clean-install and checksum result. - Update STATUS, COMPATIBILITY, CHANGELOG, README, tests/README, mapping spec and releasing procedure for the new condition/span/power/Tool behavior. - Harden release-candidate packaging: include tests/consumers, SOURCE_SHA, rustc -vV, verify the checksum before extraction, and run independent Analysis/Trace validation from the extracted archive. - Record the local convergence note in NEXT_RELEASE_CI_CONVERGENCE.md. TESTS - Local fmt/clippy/workspace PASS; G-C VM PASS atf075c96. - Linux RC: sha256 -c OK and clean-install smoke PASS. CI_URL - none: Gitee remote, no GitHub credentials. Windows/macOS and same-SHA G-C CI remain the blocking gates. BREAKING_CHANGE - none in this docs/workflow commit. SECURITY_SCOPE - strict remains fail-closed; no new capability or platform claim. G-C is local-VM evidence, not a CI-signed security URL.
6.3 KiB
Linux strict-isolation security gate (G-C) — evidence
Status: PASSED in a disposable Ubuntu VM; Linux strict is enabled only when
the runtime probe succeeds. Current convergence evidence is for source
archive f075c96 (see
evidence/2026-11-20-strict-gc-f075c96.md);
the earlier b6fc182 run is retained below as history. No remote
self-hosted security-lane CI URL exists yet.
Snapshot: workspace 0.1.0, 2026-11-20. See ADR-0021.
This report separates three things that are often conflated:
- the mechanism (Bubblewrap namespaces + rlimits + supervisor),
- the runtime probe that decides whether
strictis available, and - the adversarial evidence that the boundary actually holds.
1. Why the earlier host could not pass
The first development host was a root-in-container environment:
virt: container-other
capsh: Current: = (no effective capabilities), no-new-privs=1
unshare --user/--mount/--pid/--net -> Operation not permitted
bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net -> No permissions to create a new namespace
cgroup2 -> ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec
That environment cannot verify G-C. Strict stayed Unavailable there; no
adapter was faked.
2. Disposable test VM
A QEMU/TCG Ubuntu 26.04 VM was created from the cloud image (no KVM available on the outer host). Inside the VM:
OS: Ubuntu 26.04.1 LTS, kernel 7.0.0-43-generic x86_64
systemd-detect-virt --container: none
user: dev (uid 1000), passwordless sudo for test setup only
cgroup2: rw, nsdelegate, controllers: cpuset cpu io memory hugetlb pids rdma misc dmem
sysctl: apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns = 1
bubblewrap: 0.11.1 with the packaged `bwrap-userns-restrict` profile
unprivileged: bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net --ro-bind / / true -> exit 0
Root can create namespaces, and the packaged Bubblewrap AppArmor profile
allows the ordinary user to run bwrap without disabling AppArmor
globally. The released strict mode runs as this ordinary user.
3. Implemented boundary (ADR-0021)
marqdo run --mode strict:
- probes Bubblewrap at runtime; failure =>
Unavailable, run exits 1, no project code executes; - re-executes the CLI under
bwrap --unshare-all --as-pid-1 --die-with-parent --new-session --cap-drop ALL --clearenv; - mounts only runtime libraries,
/etc/ld.so.cache, the program and the project tree read-only at/project; private/proc, minimal/dev, tmpfs/tmp; - applies hard rlimits: CPU, 512 MiB address space, 64 fds, 64 processes, 8 MiB stack, 0 core, output-byte file size;
- supervises wall-clock time and kills the process group;
- the child verifies
PID 1,NoNewPrivs: 1, emptyCapEff, a non-initial uid map and no non-loopback interface before running project code; - rejects Foreign, native/worker plugins, kernels, read/write grants and trace files with exit 2 (strict L1 = pure language + native Math).
4. Adversarial evidence
The helper is tests/security/escape_helper.c, launched through the same
marqdo-sandbox supervisor, not through a separate ad-hoc bwrap command. The
lane is tests/security/run-lane.sh and the test is
crates/marqdo-sandbox/tests/security_linux.rs.
At f075c96 the same lane was re-run from a clean git archive in the
disposable VM as dev uid 1000: 7/7 adversarial tests, positive CLI contract,
external-surface refusals, and forged-marker rejection all PASS. The command
now honours CARGO_TARGET_DIR; the parallel workspace run also passes all
seven security tests.
7/7 tests PASS:
strict_child_identity_is_unprivileged_and_namespaced
strict_child_cannot_read_host_files_but_reads_the_project
strict_child_cannot_write_outside_or_into_the_project
strict_child_cannot_escape_via_proc_or_privileges
strict_child_cannot_reach_the_network
strict_supervisor_enforces_fd_and_process_limits
strict_supervisor_enforces_memory_cpu_and_output_limits
Observed results inside the sandbox (ordinary user dev):
| Case | Observation |
|---|---|
| identity | uid=1000, pid=1, NoNewPrivs: 1, CapEff: 0 |
/etc/shadow, /root, /home/dev |
DENIED |
/project/allowed.txt |
OK |
write /home/dev/..., /project/... |
DENIED (read-only) |
write /tmp |
allowed (private tmpfs; host unaffected) |
/proc/1/root/etc/shadow |
DENIED; no inherited fds above stdio |
setuid(0), mount, unshare |
DENIED |
IPv4 connect 1.1.1.1:80, raw socket |
DENIED |
open /dev/null loop |
EMFILE at <= 64 fds |
| fork loop | bounded below 200 (user process rlimit) |
| 768 MiB allocation | denied/killed by 512 MiB RLIMIT_AS |
| infinite CPU loop | stopped by wall-clock/CPU budget |
| 4 MiB stdout | stopped at the 64 KiB output limit |
CLI evidence (dev, VM):
run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict -> 你好,Marqdo (exit 0)
call factorial 阶乘 --arg n=5 --mode strict -> 120 (exit 0)
run examples/multi-module/index.mq.md --mode strict -> 12.566... (exit 0)
run --mode strict --json -> success=true
run --mode strict --allow-foreign -> exit 2
run --mode strict --trust-native-plugin ... -> exit 2
run --mode strict --kernel ... -> exit 2
run --mode strict --trace-file ... -> exit 2
MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE=1 run --mode strict -> exit 1 (not PID 1)
hide /usr/bin/bwrap; run --mode strict -> exit 1 (not installed)
5. Explicit non-goals / remaining work
- Strict L2 (Worker/Foreign inheriting the sandbox) is not implemented; those flags are refused in strict. Native ABI is never allowed in strict.
- rlimits are used instead of cgroup-v2 accounting; the adapter does not claim cgroup enforcement.
- Filesystem TOCTOU is reduced by read-only mounts but not formally proven against a racing host user.
- Network is denied by a network namespace, not a seccomp allowlist.
- The disposable VM is reproducible from
security-vm.md; that document also explains how to register it as a dedicated self-hosted runner. - A remote security-lane CI URL is still required before a release calls
G-C CI-verified.
.github/workflows/security-linux.ymltargets a dedicated self-hosted runner;MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY=1makes missing mechanisms fail instead of skip.