Files
marqdo-cli/COMPATIBILITY.md
T
cflmy b6fc18233d feat(sandbox): implement probe-gated Linux strict isolation (ADR-0021)
Strict mode now re-executes the CLI inside a Bubblewrap supervisor with
user/mount/PID/net/UTS/IPC namespaces, no-new-privs, all capabilities dropped,
a read-only /project, private /proc and /dev, rlimits, output capture and
wall-clock process-group cleanup. The child verifies PID 1, NoNewPrivs, empty
CapEff, an unshared uid map and loopback-only networking before project code.

- PlatformCapabilities::detect runs a real bwrap probe; no probe, no strict
- strict L1 supports pure Marqdo + Math; Foreign/ABI/worker/kernel/grants/trace
  are rejected with exit 2 before sandboxing
- forged MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE is rejected; missing bwrap fails closed
- add adversarial helper, 7-test escape/resource matrix, seeded security lane
  script and self-hosted security workflow
- executed G-C lane as uid 1000 in a disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM: 7/7 PASS
  plus positive CLI and refusal matrix; evidence in docs/evidence
- ADR-0021, spec/security.md, STATUS/COMPATIBILITY/README/CHANGELOG updated;
  ADR-0019 remains for non-Linux/fail-closed rules
2026-11-20 15:01:49 +08:00

3.6 KiB

Compatibility and support matrix

Snapshot: workspace version 0.1.0, no release tag cut. This file records what was actually verified and separates it from what is only implemented.

Public protocol versions

Surface Version Compatibility rule
Markdown profile marqdo.md.v1 Frozen parser/options; semantic change needs an ADR, new goldens and a profile id bump.
Language / CLI workspace 0.1.0 Pre-1.0. CLI flags may change with a changelog note; strict refusal is contractual.
marqdo.lock v3 v1/v2 are rejected with a relock instruction; run/call/check never rewrite or fetch the lock.
Analysis v2 Consumers reject unknown majors; incompatible field changes require v3.
Trace v2 Binds to the exact Analysis bytes; unknown majors rejected.
CLI Tool v1 Manifest schema, SemVer negotiation and whole-bundle digest are stable for v1.
Plugin ABI v1 Struct layout/version negotiation frozen; --trust-native-plugin is required for in-process loading.
Foreign wire v1 One-shot request envelope; provider descriptors are explicit.

Platform / feature evidence

Legend: PASS = executed on this snapshot with logs; UNVERIFIED = code is portable/tested locally but the native platform lane has not run here; UNSUPPORTED = deliberately not claimed; FAIL-CLOSED = request is refused.

Feature Ubuntu Linux x86_64 macOS arm64 Windows x86_64
Markdown profile / AST goldens PASS UNVERIFIED (CRLF fix) UNVERIFIED (CRLF fix)
Rust interpreter / semantics PASS UNVERIFIED UNVERIFIED
run / call / check / inspect / fmt PASS UNVERIFIED UNVERIFIED
lock v3 path/Git graph + sync PASS UNVERIFIED UNVERIFIED
Analysis v2 / Trace v2 + consumers PASS UNVERIFIED UNVERIFIED
Tool Protocol v1 PASS UNVERIFIED UNVERIFIED
Native ABI (plugin inspect, trusted call) PASS (C fixture) UNVERIFIED (host-native fixture) UNSUPPORTED in CI lane (no cc)
Worker ABI + fs.read bridge PASS (Unix) UNVERIFIED UNSUPPORTED (tests are Unix-gated)
Foreign Python/Node PASS (system python3/node) UNVERIFIED UNVERIFIED
Foreign pinned environment binding PASS UNVERIFIED UNVERIFIED
strict OS isolation PASS when runtime probe passes (VM-verified); no CI URL yet FAIL-CLOSED FAIL-CLOSED

The Ubuntu column is from this development host (Ubuntu 26.04 container). It is not a GitHub Actions result: this checkout has no GitHub remote or CI credentials. A fresh local clone with core.autocrlf=true was used to reproduce the Windows checkout byte behavior.

Minimum environment

  • Rust 1.82+ (verified with 1.100.0).
  • Linux/macOS: a C compiler for Native ABI fixtures; Python/Node only for Foreign kernels.
  • strict additionally requires Bubblewrap and a kernel/environment that permits user, mount, PID and network namespaces. It is enabled only when the runtime probe passes; the current development container fails that probe, so strict is refused there. See docs/security-gate.md and ADR-0021.

Explicitly unsupported in this candidate

  • OS-level strict isolation on macOS/Windows (Linux only, probe-gated).
  • Strict L2: Worker/Foreign execution inside strict (refused in L1).
  • Windows Native/Worker ABI runtime support.
  • Automatic uv/npm/venv provisioning; only an explicitly provisioned, pinned directory is verified (and must contain a regular-file executable).
  • Registry/package publishing, JIT, Knowledge/Proof/View built-ins, sessions, and general-purpose CAS.