# \(V_{\mathsf{safe}}\) JSON integer contract (host ↔ Lean) Canonical Lean model: `MarqdoThesis/PLDI/proofs/MarqdoProof/MarqdoProof/ForeignJSON.lean`. Host mapper: `src/host/json.rs` (`json_to_value` / `value_to_json`). This document freezes **runtime conformance** of the Marqdo JSON bridge to the mechanized \(V_{\mathsf{safe}}\) integer domain. It is **not** a verified compilation of the Rust interpreter. ## Domain ``` MAX_SAFE = 9007199254740991 # 2^53 - 1 ``` \(V_{\mathsf{safe}}\) values (mechanized): | JSON | Marqdo | |---|---| | `null` | `None` | | `bool` | `Bool` | | integer with `\|n\| ≤ MAX_SAFE` | `Int` | | `string` | `Text` | | `array` | `List` | | `object` | `Map` | **Host extension (not in Lean `SafeVal`):** JSON non-integer numbers → `Value::Num(f64)`. Non-finite numbers (NaN/Inf) are refused on encode and in Python/Node oracle responses, including nested payloads. Floats are documented host behavior; they are **not** claimed as mechanized \(V_{\mathsf{safe}}\) fidelity. ## Encode (`value_to_json`) - `Value::Int(n)` with `|n| ≤ MAX_SAFE` → JSON number. - `Value::Int(n)` with `|n| > MAX_SAFE` → **refuse** (error). - `Value::Handle(_)` → **refuse** (`json: session handle cannot be serialized`). - Column-table `Map` whose fields are all `List` with **unequal lengths** → **refuse** (`json: table column arity mismatch`). - Nested `List` / `Map`: any child refuse fails the whole tree. - GFM table **parse** also refuses unequal row width (`table row arity mismatch`) before a value is built. - Wide integers that must cross a language boundary: author converts to a **decimal string** (∈ \(V_{\mathsf{safe}}\)); the foreign program may use `BigInt` / Python `int` on that string. ## Foreign oracle (`session_eval` / `session_get`) Python/Node session bootstraps sanitize results with the same integer gate before JSON emission. An Ω response containing an OOD integer is a **fault** (host `Err`), not a soft `ok:false` cell record. Stdout text that authors `json.parse` themselves is still gated by host `json_to_value`. ## Decode (`json_to_value`) - JSON integer with `|n| ≤ MAX_SAFE` → `Int`. - JSON integer with `|n| > MAX_SAFE` → **refuse**. - JSON unsigned integer `> i64::MAX` → **refuse** (do **not** coerce via `f64` or `Text`). - Nested array/object: any child refuse fails the whole tree. - Decimal-string encodings of wide integers → `Text` (in domain). ## Error prefix All refuse messages use a fixed prefix for probes and diagnostics: ``` json: integer outside V_safe (±(2^53-1)): ``` ## In-domain roundtrip `±MAX_SAFE`, bool, null, string, array, and object roundtrips through `encode → decode` must succeed. Integers `MAX_SAFE+1`, `-MAX_SAFE-1`, `2^53`, `2^60`, `2^60+1` (and nested forms) must refuse. ## Non-claims - Not verified Rust ↔ Lean compilation. - Not arbitrary host-object fidelity (DataFrame, functions, heap sharing). - Not automatic BigInt promotion inside Node/Python bootstraps. - Document-level `Value::Int` may still hold i64 values that are OOD for JSON; the gate fires when those values enter JSON encode/decode. ## Strict request boundary update The numeric gate applies to the represented value, including integer-valued floats and exponent notation. `9007199254740992.0` and `9.007199254740992e15` are refused; fractions such as `1.5` remain in the host extension. `serde_json` uses `float_roundtrip` to avoid endpoint decoding loss. The strict text decoder rejects duplicate object keys and unequal column maps before information is lost. One-shot, call_many and persistent input paths use recursive domain admission; code, handle and secret values are not copied implicitly. Auto-detection may leave non-JSON output as text, but valid JSON outside the domain is a refusal, including in batch results.