fix(strict): bind the bundled stdlib and verify strict resources

- Strict child now gets the verified stdlib tree read-only at
  /run/marqdo-stdlib with MARQDO_STDLIB_DIR set, so Compat-C 打印 works under
  strict without exposing a host path (ADR-0021 update).
- Add a strict-lane negative: resource.open(file) is refused with
  permission.denied; hello/factorial/multi-module and --json still pass.
- StrictHostCommand gains stdlib_dir; CLI discovers the bundle and sandbox
  binds it; sandbox tests constructors updated.

Evidence: G-C lane PASS on the disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM (7/7 adversarial
matrix, positive CLI, strict language-resource refusal, forged marker), plus
fmt/clippy/423 local tests.
This commit is contained in:
cflmy committed 2026-11-20 22:57:49 +08:00
1 parent 1be4662049
commit 1d87f98539
9 files changed
+65 -4

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+5
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@@ -682,6 +682,10 @@ fn launch_strict_process(
.unwrap_or(1024 * 1024)
.min(64 * 1024 * 1024);
let timeout = Duration::from_secs(settings.timeout.unwrap_or(30));
let stdlib_dir = crate::stdlib::StdlibBundle::discover()
.ok()
.flatten()
.map(|bundle| bundle.root().to_path_buf());
let command = marqdo_sandbox::StrictHostCommand {
program: &program,
args: &args,
@@ -690,6 +694,7 @@ fn launch_strict_process(
original_document: document,
output_limit,
timeout,
stdlib_dir: stdlib_dir.as_deref(),
};
match marqdo_sandbox::launch_strict(&command) {
Ok(code) => code,
+5
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@@ -89,6 +89,11 @@ impl StdlibBundle {
})
}
/// Bundle root.
pub fn root(&self) -> &Path {
&self.root
}
/// Declared stdlib version.
pub fn version(&self) -> &str {
&self.version
+2
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@@ -232,6 +232,8 @@ pub struct StrictHostCommand<'a> {
pub output_limit: usize,
/// Wall-clock budget for the supervised process tree.
pub timeout: Duration,
/// Verified bundled stdlib directory to bind read-only when present.
pub stdlib_dir: Option<&'a Path>,
}
/// Launch a command inside the strict sandbox (Linux only).
+12
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@@ -317,6 +317,16 @@ fn run_with(
})?;
let mut args = common_args();
if let Some(stdlib) = command.stdlib_dir {
args.extend([
OsString::from("--ro-bind"),
stdlib.as_os_str().to_os_string(),
OsString::from("/run/marqdo-stdlib"),
OsString::from("--setenv"),
OsString::from("MARQDO_STDLIB_DIR"),
OsString::from("/run/marqdo-stdlib"),
]);
}
args.extend([
OsString::from("--ro-bind"),
project_root.as_os_str().to_os_string(),
@@ -548,6 +558,7 @@ mod tests {
original_document: None,
output_limit: 4096,
timeout: Duration::from_secs(1),
stdlib_dir: None,
};
let error = run_with(
&command,
@@ -585,6 +596,7 @@ mod tests {
original_document: None,
output_limit: 4096,
timeout: Duration::from_secs(1),
stdlib_dir: None,
};
let error = run_with(
&command,
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ fn run(helper: &Path, project: &Path, outside: &Path, mode: &str) -> StrictOutco
original_document: None,
output_limit: 64 * 1024,
timeout: Duration::from_secs(3),
stdlib_dir: None,
};
launch_strict_capture(&command).unwrap_or_else(|error| panic!("{mode}: {error}"))
}
@@ -267,6 +268,7 @@ fn strict_supervisor_enforces_memory_cpu_and_output_limits() {
original_document: None,
output_limit: 64 * 1024,
timeout: Duration::from_secs(2),
stdlib_dir: None,
};
let cpu = launch_strict_capture(&command).expect_err("CPU loop must be stopped");
let message = cpu.to_string();
@@ -283,6 +285,7 @@ fn strict_supervisor_enforces_memory_cpu_and_output_limits() {
original_document: None,
output_limit: 64 * 1024,
timeout: Duration::from_secs(3),
stdlib_dir: None,
})
.expect("output helper should be captured, not spawn-failed");
assert!(
+11 -2
View File
@@ -54,14 +54,23 @@ The trusted supervisor is this process; the restricted child is the same
The document argument is rewritten to `/project/...`; only the document token
changes, all other arguments are preserved.
### 4. Child self-verification
### 4. Bundled stdlib mount
After CM-A07 Compat-C, `打印` is implemented by the bundled `.mq.md` stdlib.
Strict therefore bind-mounts the verified `stdlib/` tree read-only at
`/run/marqdo-stdlib` and sets `MARQDO_STDLIB_DIR` for the child, just like the
program itself. The tree contains only Markdown/read-only data; it grants no
new OS capability, and the loader still verifies its digest in the child. File,
network, process and provider resources remain refused.
### 5. Child self-verification
The child accepts `MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE=1` only if it can verify all of:
`getpid() == 1`, `NoNewPrivs: 1`, empty `CapEff`, a non-initial uid map, and no
non-loopback network interface. A forged marker outside the sandbox fails
before project code runs.
### 5. Threat model and non-goals
### 6. Threat model and non-goals
This protects against untrusted Marqdo documents that use the language,
interpreter, Math, console, or attempt direct syscalls. It does not sandbox
+1 -1
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@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"
./tests/security/run-lane.sh
```
Expected final line: `G-C security lane: PASS`. The script exports
Expected final line: `G-C security lane: PASS`. The lane also checks that the read-only bundled stdlib works for `打印` and that a project-file `resource.open` is refused in strict mode. The script exports
`MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY=1`; a missing bubblewrap, compiler or helper is
a failure, never a skip.
+1 -1
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@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Normative implementation:
|---|---|---|
| `pure` | No external I/O; memory computation and budgets only. | **Enforced.** `Capabilities::pure()` = `console`, `math` only; every FS/foreign/plugin grant flag makes the CLI exit 2 with "pure mode prohibits external I/O grants". |
| `project` | Operator-approved project resources under `CapabilityHost` + bounded resources. | **Enforced for the implemented operations.** Defaults equal `pure`; `--allow-read`, `--allow-write`, `--allow-foreign`, `--allow-plugin` add grants. `resource.open` supports stdout write, granted project-file read/write (ADR-0025/0026) and granted in-process provider kinds (ADR-0033); network/process remain unsupported. Sandboxing is cooperative (in-process checks), not OS isolation; in-process providers are trusted, not sandboxed. |
| `strict` | Untrusted documents under real OS isolation. | **Linux: enforced when the runtime probe passes (ADR-0021).** `resource.open` is **refused** in strict except for the existing `stdio/stdout` console channel (console grant); file/network/process resources remain refused until a provider passes the isolation lane (CM-A11, ADR-0030). `PlatformCapabilities::detect()` runs a real Bubblewrap smoke test; success reports `Available { mechanism }`, failure reports `Unavailable { reason }`. Strict L1 supports the interpreter, console and native Math only; `--allow-read/--allow-write/--allow-foreign/--allow-plugin/--plugin/--trust-native-plugin/--kernel/--trace-file` are rejected with exit 2. macOS/Windows and Linux hosts without the mechanisms remain `Unavailable`; there is **no fallback** to an unrestricted process. |
| `strict` | Untrusted documents under real OS isolation. | **Linux: enforced when the runtime probe passes (ADR-0021).** `resource.open` is **refused** in strict except for the existing `stdio/stdout` console channel (console grant); file/network/process resources remain refused until a provider passes the isolation lane (CM-A11, ADR-0030). `PlatformCapabilities::detect()` runs a real Bubblewrap smoke test; success reports `Available { mechanism }`, failure reports `Unavailable { reason }`. Strict L1 supports the interpreter, console, native Math and the read-only bundled stdlib (published at `/run/marqdo-stdlib` for the Compat-C print chain); `--allow-read/--allow-write/--allow-foreign/--allow-plugin/--plugin/--trust-native-plugin/--kernel/--trace-file` are rejected with exit 2. macOS/Windows and Linux hosts without the mechanisms remain `Unavailable`; there is **no fallback** to an unrestricted process. |
`marqdo inspect <file> --platform` prints the detection report, for example:
+25
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@@ -53,6 +53,31 @@ echo "== positive CLI contract =="
"$bin" run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict --json | python3 -c \
'import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); assert d["success"] is True'
echo "== strict language resources are console-only =="
mkdir -p .cache/security
cat > .cache/security/file-resource.mq.md <<'MQ'
## main
**内存 = memory.new(1, 1)**
> resource.open("file", "README.md", ["read"])
*None*
MQ
set +e
"$bin" run .cache/security/file-resource.mq.md --mode strict >/dev/null 2>.cache/security/file-resource.err
code=$?
set -e
if [ "$code" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "error: strict accepted a project file resource" >&2
exit 1
fi
grep -q "permission.denied" .cache/security/file-resource.err || {
echo "error: strict file-resource refusal had no permission.denied diagnostic" >&2
cat .cache/security/file-resource.err >&2
exit 1
}
echo "== external-execution surfaces are refused =="
reject() {
set +e