fix(strict): bind the bundled stdlib and verify strict resources
- Strict child now gets the verified stdlib tree read-only at /run/marqdo-stdlib with MARQDO_STDLIB_DIR set, so Compat-C 打印 works under strict without exposing a host path (ADR-0021 update). - Add a strict-lane negative: resource.open(file) is refused with permission.denied; hello/factorial/multi-module and --json still pass. - StrictHostCommand gains stdlib_dir; CLI discovers the bundle and sandbox binds it; sandbox tests constructors updated. Evidence: G-C lane PASS on the disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM (7/7 adversarial matrix, positive CLI, strict language-resource refusal, forged marker), plus fmt/clippy/423 local tests.
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@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Normative implementation:
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| `pure` | No external I/O; memory computation and budgets only. | **Enforced.** `Capabilities::pure()` = `console`, `math` only; every FS/foreign/plugin grant flag makes the CLI exit 2 with "pure mode prohibits external I/O grants". |
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| `project` | Operator-approved project resources under `CapabilityHost` + bounded resources. | **Enforced for the implemented operations.** Defaults equal `pure`; `--allow-read`, `--allow-write`, `--allow-foreign`, `--allow-plugin` add grants. `resource.open` supports stdout write, granted project-file read/write (ADR-0025/0026) and granted in-process provider kinds (ADR-0033); network/process remain unsupported. Sandboxing is cooperative (in-process checks), not OS isolation; in-process providers are trusted, not sandboxed. |
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| `strict` | Untrusted documents under real OS isolation. | **Linux: enforced when the runtime probe passes (ADR-0021).** `resource.open` is **refused** in strict except for the existing `stdio/stdout` console channel (console grant); file/network/process resources remain refused until a provider passes the isolation lane (CM-A11, ADR-0030). `PlatformCapabilities::detect()` runs a real Bubblewrap smoke test; success reports `Available { mechanism }`, failure reports `Unavailable { reason }`. Strict L1 supports the interpreter, console and native Math only; `--allow-read/--allow-write/--allow-foreign/--allow-plugin/--plugin/--trust-native-plugin/--kernel/--trace-file` are rejected with exit 2. macOS/Windows and Linux hosts without the mechanisms remain `Unavailable`; there is **no fallback** to an unrestricted process. |
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| `strict` | Untrusted documents under real OS isolation. | **Linux: enforced when the runtime probe passes (ADR-0021).** `resource.open` is **refused** in strict except for the existing `stdio/stdout` console channel (console grant); file/network/process resources remain refused until a provider passes the isolation lane (CM-A11, ADR-0030). `PlatformCapabilities::detect()` runs a real Bubblewrap smoke test; success reports `Available { mechanism }`, failure reports `Unavailable { reason }`. Strict L1 supports the interpreter, console, native Math and the read-only bundled stdlib (published at `/run/marqdo-stdlib` for the Compat-C print chain); `--allow-read/--allow-write/--allow-foreign/--allow-plugin/--plugin/--trust-native-plugin/--kernel/--trace-file` are rejected with exit 2. macOS/Windows and Linux hosts without the mechanisms remain `Unavailable`; there is **no fallback** to an unrestricted process. |
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`marqdo inspect <file> --platform` prints the detection report, for example:
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