test(cli): prove check never spawns a Foreign kernel

A document with an executable foreign.call is statically checked without a
marker side effect, then run to show the same provider does execute. This
guards the 'check/inspect cannot execute untrusted code' contract.
This commit is contained in:
cflmy committed 2026-11-20 13:59:12 +08:00
1 parent 18d9f39562
commit 2cf9ecedd5
4 files changed
+72 -2

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+2
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@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ currently `0.1.0`; no release tag has been cut. Dates use ISO 8601.
`PATH`, and `interpreter_version` is verified before execution.
- Release documentation (`COMPATIBILITY.md`, `docs/releasing.md`) and the
Linux security-gate evidence report (`docs/security-gate.md`).
- `check_never_spawns_a_foreign_kernel`: proves static `check` does not spawn a
declared Foreign provider, while `run` on the same document does.
### Changed
+63
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@@ -885,3 +885,66 @@ fn plugin_abi_major_mismatch_is_rejected_before_execution() {
"plugin export must not run after an ABI mismatch"
);
}
/// `check` is static: a document that would run a Foreign kernel must not spawn
/// it or perform its side effect. The same document is then executed to prove
/// the marker would appear if check were executing code.
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn check_never_spawns_a_foreign_kernel() {
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
let dir = TempDir::new("check-no-exec");
let marker = dir.path().join("spawned.marker");
let provider = dir.path().join("mocklang");
fs::write(
&provider,
format!(
"#!/bin/sh\n: > '{}'\ncat >/dev/null\nprintf '%s' '{{\"type\":\"int\",\"decimal\":\"1\"}}'\n",
marker.display()
),
)
.expect("write mock provider");
let mut permissions = fs::metadata(&provider)
.expect("provider metadata")
.permissions();
permissions.set_mode(0o700);
fs::set_permissions(&provider, permissions).expect("chmod provider");
let digest = hex::encode(sha2::Sha256::digest(
fs::read(&provider).expect("read provider"),
));
dir.write(
"kernel.json",
&format!(
"{{\"provider_id\":\"mocklang\",\"languages\":[\"mocklang\"],\"wire_version\":1,\"entrypoint\":\"{}\",\"digest\":\"{digest}\"}}",
provider.display()
),
);
dir.write(
"doc.mq.md",
"## 代码\n\n```mocklang\nignored\n```\n\n## main\n\n**值 = foreign.call(ref(\"#代码\"), {})**\n\n> 打印(值)\n",
);
let checked = cli(dir.path(), &["check", "doc.mq.md"]);
assert_exit(&checked, 0, "check must accept the static document");
assert!(
!marker.exists(),
"check spawned the Foreign kernel and produced a side effect"
);
let ran = cli(
dir.path(),
&[
"run",
"doc.mq.md",
"--kernel",
"kernel.json",
"--allow-foreign",
],
);
assert_exit(&ran, 0, "run must execute the Foreign kernel");
assert!(
marker.exists(),
"run did not execute the provider; the no-execution assertion is vacuous"
);
}
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@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ cargo fmt --all -- --check PASS
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings PASS
cargo test --workspace PASS
cargo test -p marqdo-cli --test conformance_ast PASS (4 tests)
cargo test -p marqdo-cli --test integration_cli PASS (22 tests)
cargo test -p marqdo-cli --test integration_cli PASS (23 tests)
cargo test -p marqdo-cli --test plugin_worker PASS (4 tests)
cargo test -p marqdo-foreign --test provider PASS (8 tests)
```
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ runs.
| 1 | macOS native plugin fixtures | **Fixed locally, macOS CI UNVERIFIED** | host-target manifest + dylib flags, foreign-target/tamper/ABI tests PASS |
| 2 | Status/docs reconcile | **Done** | this file, `COMPATIBILITY.md`, `CHANGELOG.md`, `docs/releasing.md`, `docs/security-gate.md` |
| 3 | Package lock v3 reproducibility | **Implemented; targeted audit pending** | ADR-0016, `cargo test -p marqdo-cli --test package_env` PASS |
| 4 | Analysis/Trace/Tool protocol | **Implemented; consumers PASS locally** | schemas + `tests/consumers/*.py`, `analysis_trace`/`tool_protocol` PASS |
| 4 | Analysis/Trace/Tool protocol | **Implemented; consumers PASS locally** | schemas + `tests/consumers/*.py`, `analysis_trace`/`tool_protocol` PASS; `check_never_spawns_a_foreign_kernel` PASS |
| 5 | Foreign pinned environment | **Done (ADR-0020)** | provider tests PASS; env binds interpreter; version drift rejected |
| 6 | ABI session/broker hardening | **Partial** | `fs.read` bridge + budgets + handle tests PASS; Windows ABI unsupported; broader services still `capability.unavailable` |
| 7 | Linux strict probe | **Done as fail-closed evidence** | `docs/security-gate.md`; userns/bwrap EPERM, cgroup ro, sudo blocked |
+5
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@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net --ro-bind / / true
sudo -n true
-> sudo: The "no new privileges" flag is set, which prevents sudo from
running as root (exit 1)
capsh --print
-> Current: = (no effective capabilities)
-> Bounding set = cap_sys_admin, ... (not effective; no-new-privs=1)
unshare --mount true / --pid --fork true / --net true
-> Operation not permitted (exit 1 each)
```
The workspace root is writable, but the host root filesystem and cgroup2 mount