feat(process): add explicitly granted process API

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Marqdo Agent committed 2026-11-21 08:46:02 +08:00
1 parent 9922bfae98
commit 3ef18fb496
17 files changed
+433 -15

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+10 -3
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@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ pub struct SandboxSettings {
pub allow_net: Vec<String>,
/// Environment variable grants (ADR-0043).
pub allow_env: Vec<String>,
/// Process program grants (ADR-0044).
pub allow_process: Vec<String>,
/// Foreign execution grant.
pub allow_foreign: bool,
/// Plugin grants.
@@ -77,6 +79,7 @@ impl SandboxSettings {
|| !self.allow_net.is_empty()
|| !self.allow_write.is_empty()
|| !self.allow_env.is_empty()
|| !self.allow_process.is_empty()
|| !self.allow_plugin.is_empty()
|| !self.plugins.is_empty()
|| self.trust_native_plugin
@@ -85,9 +88,9 @@ impl SandboxSettings {
if requested {
return Err(
"strict mode currently supports pure Marqdo and native Math only; \
--allow-read/--allow-write/--allow-env/--allow-foreign/--allow-plugin/\
--plugin/--trust-native-plugin/--kernel/--trace-file are rejected. Use \
--mode project for those capabilities."
--allow-read/--allow-write/--allow-env/--allow-process/--allow-foreign/\
--allow-plugin/--plugin/--trust-native-plugin/--kernel/--trace-file are
rejected. Use --mode project for those capabilities."
.to_string(),
);
}
@@ -103,6 +106,7 @@ impl SandboxSettings {
|| !self.allow_net.is_empty()
|| !self.allow_write.is_empty()
|| !self.allow_env.is_empty()
|| !self.allow_process.is_empty()
|| self.allow_foreign
|| !self.allow_plugin.is_empty()
{
@@ -126,6 +130,9 @@ impl SandboxSettings {
for name in &self.allow_env {
capabilities = capabilities.allow_env(name.clone());
}
for program in &self.allow_process {
capabilities = capabilities.allow_process(program.clone());
}
if self.allow_foreign {
capabilities = capabilities.allow_foreign();
}
+4
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@@ -95,6 +95,9 @@ struct SandboxArgs {
/// Grant read access to an environment variable (repeatable, ADR-0043).
#[arg(long = "allow-env", value_name = "NAME")]
allow_env: Vec<String>,
/// Grant execution of an exact program path (repeatable, ADR-0044).
#[arg(long = "allow-process", value_name = "PROGRAM")]
allow_process: Vec<String>,
/// Grant explicit foreign kernel execution.
#[arg(long = "allow-foreign")]
allow_foreign: bool,
@@ -147,6 +150,7 @@ impl SandboxArgs {
allow_net: self.allow_net.clone(),
allow_write: self.allow_write.clone(),
allow_env: self.allow_env.clone(),
allow_process: self.allow_process.clone(),
allow_foreign: self.allow_foreign,
allow_plugin: self.allow_plugin.clone(),
fuel: self.fuel,
+18
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@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ fn product_tests() -> Vec<TestFile> {
"--allow-env",
"MARQDO_MISSING_ENV",
][..]
} else if name == "process.mq.md" {
&["--allow-process", "/bin/echo"][..]
} else {
&[][..]
};
@@ -155,6 +157,7 @@ fn every_public_stdlib_module_has_a_product_test() {
"io.mq.md",
"json.mq.md",
"path.mq.md",
"process.mq.md",
"regex.mq.md",
"stream.mq.md",
"table.mq.md",
@@ -344,6 +347,21 @@ fn env_test_reads_only_granted_names() {
assert_eq!(items[5]["value"], "env.not_found");
}
#[test]
fn process_test_runs_an_explicitly_granted_program() {
let report = run_product_test(
product_tests()
.iter()
.find(|file| file.name == "process.mq.md")
.expect("process test"),
);
let items = report["value"]["items"].as_array().expect("list");
assert_eq!(items[0]["value"], true);
assert_eq!(items[1]["decimal"], "0");
assert_eq!(items[2]["value"], "hello\n");
assert_eq!(items[3]["value"], "");
}
#[test]
fn format_test_pins_value_semantics_and_handle_observation() {
let report = run_product_test(
+26
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@@ -319,6 +319,8 @@ pub struct Capabilities {
pub net_hosts: Vec<String>,
/// Allowed environment variable names (empty = no environment).
pub env: Vec<String>,
/// Allowed process program paths (empty = no process execution).
pub process_programs: Vec<String>,
/// May spawn processes (foreign kernels).
pub process: bool,
/// May run foreign kernels (Python/Node).
@@ -339,6 +341,7 @@ impl Capabilities {
fs_write: Vec::new(),
net_hosts: Vec::new(),
env: Vec::new(),
process_programs: Vec::new(),
process: false,
foreign: false,
plugins: Vec::new(),
@@ -383,6 +386,29 @@ impl Capabilities {
}
}
/// Grant execution of one exact program path (ADR-0044).
pub fn allow_process(mut self, program: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
self.process_programs.push(program.into());
self
}
/// Check an exact process-program grant.
pub fn check_process(&self, program: &str, span: Option<Span>) -> Result<(), RuntimeError> {
if self
.process_programs
.iter()
.any(|allowed| allowed == program)
{
Ok(())
} else {
Err(denied(
span,
format!("process `{program}` was not granted"),
format!("grant it with --allow-process {program}"),
))
}
}
/// Grant foreign kernel execution.
pub fn allow_foreign(mut self) -> Self {
self.foreign = true;
+168
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@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet};
use std::net::{SocketAddr, TcpStream};
use std::process::{Command, Stdio};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
@@ -943,6 +944,121 @@ impl StdHost {
}
}
fn process_error(code: &str, message: &str) -> Value {
let mut map = BTreeMap::new();
map.insert("ok".to_string(), Value::Bool(false));
map.insert("code".to_string(), Value::text(code));
map.insert("message".to_string(), Value::text(message));
Value::Map(map)
}
fn run_process(
root: &std::path::Path,
program: &str,
args: &[String],
ctx: &ExecutionContext,
) -> Result<Value, RuntimeError> {
const LIMIT: usize = 1024 * 1024;
let child = Command::new(program)
.args(args)
.current_dir(root)
.env_clear()
.stdin(Stdio::null())
.stdout(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::piped())
.spawn();
let child = match child {
Ok(child) => child,
Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {
return Ok(process_error(
"process.not_found",
&format!("program `{program}` was not found"),
))
}
Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied => {
return Err(RuntimeError::new(
ErrorCategory::PermissionDenied,
ctx.span,
format!("cannot execute `{program}`: {error}"),
))
}
Err(error) => {
return Err(RuntimeError::new(
ErrorCategory::HostError,
ctx.span,
format!("cannot start `{program}`: {error}"),
))
}
};
let mut child = child;
let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5);
let mut timed_out = false;
loop {
match child.try_wait() {
Ok(Some(_)) => break,
Ok(None) if Instant::now() < deadline => {
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(10));
}
Ok(None) => {
timed_out = true;
let _ = child.kill();
break;
}
Err(error) => {
return Err(RuntimeError::new(
ErrorCategory::HostError,
ctx.span,
format!("cannot wait for `{program}`: {error}"),
))
}
}
}
let output = child.wait_with_output().map_err(|error| {
RuntimeError::new(
ErrorCategory::HostError,
ctx.span,
format!("cannot collect `{program}` output: {error}"),
)
})?;
if timed_out {
return Ok(process_error(
"process.timeout",
&format!("program `{program}` exceeded the 5 second limit"),
));
}
if output.stdout.len() > LIMIT || output.stderr.len() > LIMIT {
return Ok(process_error(
"process.output_too_large",
&format!("program `{program}` exceeded the {LIMIT} byte output limit"),
));
}
let stdout = String::from_utf8(output.stdout).map_err(|_| {
RuntimeError::new(
ErrorCategory::Type,
ctx.span,
format!("program `{program}` stdout is not valid UTF-8"),
)
})?;
let stderr = String::from_utf8(output.stderr).map_err(|_| {
RuntimeError::new(
ErrorCategory::Type,
ctx.span,
format!("program `{program}` stderr is not valid UTF-8"),
)
})?;
let mut value = BTreeMap::new();
value.insert(
"status".to_string(),
Value::int(output.status.code().unwrap_or(-1) as i64),
);
value.insert("stdout".to_string(), Value::text(stdout));
value.insert("stderr".to_string(), Value::text(stderr));
let mut map = BTreeMap::new();
map.insert("ok".to_string(), Value::Bool(true));
map.insert("value".to_string(), Value::Map(value));
Ok(Value::Map(map))
}
impl Host for StdHost {
fn invoke(
&mut self,
@@ -1127,6 +1243,58 @@ impl Host for StdHost {
"resource operations accept only Text path arguments",
));
}
if operation == "process.run" {
if args.len() != 2 {
return Err(RuntimeError::new(
ErrorCategory::Arity,
ctx.span,
format!(
"resource operation `process.run` expects 2 arguments, got {}",
args.len()
),
));
}
let program_type = args[0].type_name();
let Value::Text(program) = args[0].clone() else {
return Err(RuntimeError::type_error(
ctx.span,
format!(
"resource operation `process.run` expects a Text program, got {program_type}"
),
));
};
let args_type = args[1].type_name();
let Value::List(values) = args[1].clone() else {
return Err(RuntimeError::type_error(
ctx.span,
format!(
"resource operation `process.run` expects a List of Text arguments, got {args_type}"
),
));
};
let mut program_args = Vec::with_capacity(values.len());
for value in values {
let value_type = value.type_name();
let Value::Text(value) = value else {
return Err(RuntimeError::type_error(
ctx.span,
format!("process arguments must be Text, got {value_type}"),
));
};
program_args.push(value);
}
self.capabilities.check_process(&program, ctx.span)?;
let result = run_process(self.fs.root(), &program, &program_args, ctx)?;
self.record_semantic(
"resource.request",
None,
Some(&ctx.module_id),
ctx.span,
Some("op=process.run"),
);
self.record_resource_effect("resource.request", ctx, started, "process.run");
return Ok(result);
}
if operation == "env.get" {
if args.len() != 1 {
return Err(RuntimeError::new(
@@ -682,3 +682,65 @@ fn env_get_requires_an_exact_grant_and_reports_missing_names() {
.unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(error.category, ErrorCategory::Arity);
}
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn process_run_requires_an_exact_program_grant() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let ctx = context();
let mut denied = StdHost::new(SandboxMode::Project, Capabilities::project(), dir.path());
let error = denied
.resource_request(
"process.run",
vec![
Value::text("/bin/echo"),
Value::List(vec![Value::text("x")]),
],
&ctx,
)
.unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(error.category, ErrorCategory::PermissionDenied);
let mut pure = StdHost::new(SandboxMode::Pure, Capabilities::pure(), dir.path());
let error = pure
.resource_request(
"process.run",
vec![
Value::text("/bin/echo"),
Value::List(vec![Value::text("x")]),
],
&ctx,
)
.unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(error.category, ErrorCategory::PermissionDenied);
let capabilities = Capabilities::project().allow_process("/bin/echo");
let mut host = StdHost::new(SandboxMode::Project, capabilities, dir.path());
let result = host
.resource_request(
"process.run",
vec![
Value::text("/bin/echo"),
Value::List(vec![Value::text("hello")]),
],
&ctx,
)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(field(&result, "ok"), &Value::Bool(true));
let value = field(&result, "value");
assert_eq!(field(value, "status"), &Value::int(0));
assert_eq!(field(value, "stdout"), &Value::text("hello\n"));
assert_eq!(field(value, "stderr"), &Value::text(""));
let missing = host
.resource_request(
"process.run",
vec![
Value::text("/bin/definitely-not-a-program"),
Value::List(Vec::new()),
],
&ctx,
)
.unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(missing.category, ErrorCategory::PermissionDenied);
}
+8 -6
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@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ byte-identical).
cargo fmt --all -- --check PASS
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings PASS
cargo test --workspace --locked PASS
476 passed, 0 failed, 2 ignored; includes 7/7 Linux security tests
478 passed, 0 failed, 2 ignored; includes 7/7 Linux security tests
```
The documentation and test migration is local work; re-run this block after it
@@ -204,11 +204,13 @@ This is still a **local VM lane**, not a self-hosted GitHub Actions security URL
provide recursive JSON and quoted single-row CSV product parsers; `path` and a
`regex` subset are pure `.mq.md`; `datetime` is pure UTC ISO-8601 and
`clock.现在` reads `clock.now` in project mode (ADR-0042); `env.读取` reads
only exact `--allow-env NAME` grants in project mode (ADR-0043). Append/seek/
watch, recursive walk, streaming JSON/CSV, a JSON depth bound, regex groups/
alternation and `process` remain open.
only exact `--allow-env NAME` grants in project mode (ADR-0043); `process.运行`
runs an exact `--allow-process PROGRAM` grant with 5 s timeout and 1 MiB caps
(ADR-0044, not an OS sandbox). Append/seek/watch, recursive walk, streaming
JSON/CSV, a JSON depth bound, regex groups/alternation, secure random and
compression remain open.
- Bundled standard library (CM-A10, ADR-0028): `stdlib/` ships
`format`/`text`/`io`/`fs`/`data`/`path`/`regex`/`datetime`/`clock`/`env`; explicit `std:` imports resolve only inside the bundle;
`format`/`text`/`io`/`fs`/`data`/`path`/`regex`/`datetime`/`clock`/`env`/`process`; explicit `std:` imports resolve only inside the bundle;
a SHA-256 digest over `*.mq.md` is verified before loading; Analysis records
`project.stdlib`; a frozen-binary test asserts the CLI hash is unchanged after
running a `std:io` project and that tampering is rejected. `打印/print` is
@@ -234,7 +236,7 @@ This is still a **local VM lane**, not a self-hosted GitHub Actions security URL
status/index links and SHA-pinned evidence; `crates/cli/tests/architecture_boundaries.rs`
pins the workspace graph, `marqdo-runtime -> marqdo-host`, the bundled stdlib
digest and the stdio/file/TCP endpoints; `crates/cli/tests/stdlib_product.rs`
runs every public stdlib module (`clock/console/csv/datetime/demo/env/format/fs/http/io/json/path/regex/stream/table/text/utf8`)
runs every public stdlib module (`clock/console/csv/datetime/demo/env/format/fs/http/io/json/path/process/regex/stream/table/text/utf8`)
through `std:` imports over `stdlib/tests/*.mq.md`. `tools/pack-stdlib.py`
now sorts `.mq.md` by the same relative path key as the CLI. Source/test baseline
`0d40de7`; later docs-only commits keep code/test bytes identical. Evidence:
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
# ADR-0044: Explicitly granted `process.run` resource operation
Status: **Accepted**
Date: 2026-11-21
Relates to: ADR-0041, ADR-0042, ADR-0043
Specs: `spec/security.md`, `spec/evaluation.md`
Evidence: `docs/evidence/2026-11-21-process-product.md`
## Context
The audit RFC lists a `std:process` product module. Spawning a process is the
most privileged OS operation in the runtime and is **not** contained by the
in-process host checks. Without an explicit contract it would silently turn
the CLI into an unrestricted command runner.
## Decision
Add a project-mode-only `resource.request` operation:
```text
resource.request("process.run", [program, args]) -> {ok:true, value:{status, stdout, stderr}}
| {ok:false, code:"process.not_found"}
| {ok:false, code:"process.timeout"}
| {ok:false, code:"process.output_too_large"}
```
* `program` is an exact Text path; `args` is a List of Text values. Wrong
arity/types are fatal. There is no shell expansion, no glob and no implicit
`PATH` lookup.
* A new exact `Capabilities::process_programs: Vec<String>` grant is required
(`--allow-process PROGRAM`). Un-granted programs return
`permission.denied` before spawning.
* The child runs with `env_clear`, stdin `null`, the project root as its
working directory, and a 5 second wall-clock limit. On timeout it is killed
and the call returns recoverable `process.timeout`.
* `stdout`/`stderr` are captured separately, require valid UTF-8 (otherwise
fatal type error), and are capped at 1 MiB each; exceeding the cap is
recoverable `process.output_too_large`.
* `pure`/`strict` refuse the operation. This does **not** make the child an OS
sandbox: the in-process host check is cooperative and the child inherits the
CLI user's OS privileges.
* `stdlib/process.mq.md` is a thin `.mq.md` facade; no Rust builtin or
`HostOp` is added.
## Consequences
* Process execution is opt-in per exact program path and remains project-mode
only.
* The operation is not a sandbox. A future strict-mode process provider needs
OS isolation evidence and a separate ADR.
* `--allow-process` is rejected by strict preflight, like the other external
grants.
+4 -2
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ platform".
| Dimension | Current state | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Implemented | Rust workspace `0.1.0`: Markdown/frontend/IR, tree-walk runtime, `Memory`, capability host, Tool/Analysis/Trace, Plugin ABI, Foreign kernels, bundled stdlib, CLI composition root | `Cargo.toml`, `crates/`, `stdlib/` |
| Tested locally | `cargo test --workspace --locked`: **476 passed, 0 failed, 2 ignored** on Linux x86_64 at the baseline | `docs/STATUS.md` §3 |
| Tested locally | `cargo test --workspace --locked`: **478 passed, 0 failed, 2 ignored** on Linux x86_64 at the baseline | `docs/STATUS.md` §3 |
| Bundled stdlib released | In-repo bundle `marqdo-stdlib@0.1.0`, SHA-256 digest verified before loading; it is **not** an external registry package | `stdlib/stdlib.json`, `stdlib/README.md` |
| Multi-platform verified | Linux local gate is the only executed lane here; Windows/macOS native lanes are **UNVERIFIED**, and the GitHub security lane remains a **VM-only** gate | `docs/STATUS.md` §1, §4 |
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ review RFC, not a new crate per provider.
| `std:datetime` | `datetime.格式化(毫秒)` / `datetime.解析(文本)`; UTC ISO-8601, pre-1970 supported | implemented (pure) | `stdlib_product` |
| `std:clock` | `clock.现在()` -> `resource.request("clock.now", [])` | implemented (project mode; pure/strict denied) | `resource_streams`, `stdlib_product` |
| `std:env` | `env.读取/存在` -> `resource.request("env.get", [name])`; exact `--allow-env` grant | implemented (project mode; no `env.list`) | `resource_streams`, `stdlib_product` |
| `std:process` | `process.运行(程序, 参数列表)` -> `resource.request("process.run", ...)`; exact `--allow-process` grant, 5 s timeout, 1 MiB caps | implemented (project mode; not an OS sandbox) | `resource_streams`, `stdlib_product` |
| file metadata / directory / rename / remove / mkdir | not part of the current Resource contract | **not implemented**; needs a separate Resource Operation ADR | — |
| TCP | `resource.open("tcp", ip:port, ["read","write"])`; exact IP grant, 5 s timeout | implemented; no DNS/TLS/server socket/UDP | `tcp_endpoint`, `http_over_tcp` |
| HTTP/1.1 | `stdlib/net/http.mq.md`: status/header/chunked-byte parse, request build | implemented over an already-authorized TCP stream; not a DNS/TLS client | `stdlib_http`, `http_over_tcp`, `stdlib_product` |
@@ -126,7 +127,7 @@ that a phase is complete.
| P1 | `crates/cli/src/commands.rs` and `crates/marqdo-host/src/host.rs` still mix multiple responsibilities | open refactor, behavior-preserving |
| P2 | HTTP parsing is Unicode-codepoint oriented; a general byte body is not the only path | open; convert before a general network release |
| P2 | No DNS, TLS, listener or UDP provider | open |
| P2 | `std:path`, a regex subset, `std:datetime`, `std:clock` and `std:env` are implemented; no `std:process`, secure random or compression | open |
| P2 | `std:path`, a regex subset, `std:datetime`, `std:clock`, `std:env` and `std:process` are implemented; no secure random or compression | open |
| P2 | Memory limits: 16 MiB per region, 64 MiB per run | current budget, not a product limit |
| P3 | No concurrency tasks, atomics or cancellable long-running scheduling | open; separate ADR |
| P3 | No native optimizer/JIT or columnar numeric backend | open; benchmark-first |
@@ -159,5 +160,6 @@ that a phase is complete.
- [ADR-0041: non-streaming resource operations](../adr/0041-resource-operation-fs.md) — accepted `resource.request` `fs.*` contract.
- [ADR-0042: `clock.now` resource operation](../adr/0042-clock-resource-operation.md) — accepted project-mode Unix-millis clock.
- [ADR-0043: `env.get` resource operation](../adr/0043-env-resource-operation.md) — accepted exact-name environment grants.
- [ADR-0044: `process.run` resource operation](../adr/0044-process-resource-operation.md) — accepted exact-path process grant; not a sandbox.
- [Compute-machine RFC-0001](../MARQDO_COMPUTE_MACHINE_RFC_0001.md) and [core/stdlib RFC-0002](../MARQDO_COMPUTE_CORE_STDLIB_MIGRATION_RFC_0002.md) — design input.
- [Architecture audit and refactor RFC](Marqdo_CLI_Latest_Architecture_Audit_and_Refactor_RFC.md) — review input for this migration.
+1
View File
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ The implemented first slices of these RFCs are recorded in `CURRENT.md` and
| Non-streaming `resource.request` `fs.*` operations | [0041](../adr/0041-resource-operation-fs.md) | Accepted (project mode, grant-checked, recoverable fs Result) |
| `clock.now` resource operation | [0042](../adr/0042-clock-resource-operation.md) | Accepted (project mode, Unix millis) |
| `env.get` resource operation | [0043](../adr/0043-env-resource-operation.md) | Accepted (exact-name project grant) |
| `process.run` resource operation | [0044](../adr/0044-process-resource-operation.md) | Accepted (exact program grant, project only, not a sandbox) |
| Table physical storage (T1/T2/T3), strict stdin/stderr/file/network resources | — | **Not decided**; do not implement by implication |
## Evidence and status
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
# Evidence: `std:process` and the `process.run` grant
Date: 2026-11-21 (Asia/Shanghai)
Source baseline: `9922bfae98d72f7dbad26f802fd3cc9478272b8e`
Repository: `marqdo-cli`
Decision record: [ADR-0044](../adr/0044-process-resource-operation.md)
RFC item: P2 process product API
## Implemented
`resource.request("process.run", [program, args])` is project-mode only:
- exact Text program path and List-of-Text arguments; no shell/PATH/glob;
- exact `--allow-process PROGRAM` grant checked before spawn;
- child has `env_clear`, stdin null, project-root cwd, 5 s timeout (kill) and
separate 1 MiB stdout/stderr caps;
- recoverable `process.not_found`, `process.timeout`,
`process.output_too_large`; un-granted programs are `permission.denied`;
non-UTF-8 output is a fatal type error.
`stdlib/process.mq.md` is a thin `.mq.md` facade: `运行(程序, 参数列表)`.
The child is **not** an OS sandbox and inherits the CLI user's privileges.
## Tests
`stdlib/tests/process.mq.md` runs `/bin/echo hello` with
`--allow-process /bin/echo`. `crates/marqdo-host/tests/resource_streams.rs`
pins grant denial, pure-mode refusal, exit status/stdout/stderr and the
missing-program grant check.
```text
cargo fmt --all -- --check PASS
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings PASS
cargo test --workspace 478 passed, 0 failed, 2 ignored
cargo test -p marqdo-host --test resource_streams 23 passed
cargo test -p marqdo-cli --test stdlib_product 14 passed
python3 tools/pack-stdlib.py PASS
```
## Not covered
Not a sandbox; no strict-mode process provider, no stdin, no shell operators,
no environment selection, no per-run user/namespace isolation, no output
streaming. A sandboxed process provider needs its own ADR and OS evidence.
+7 -1
View File
@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ resource.request("fs.remove", [path]) -> {ok:true, value:None}
resource.request("fs.rename", [from, to]) -> {ok:true, value:None}
resource.request("clock.now", []) -> {ok:true, value:UnixMillis}
resource.request("env.get", [name]) -> {ok:true, value:Text}
resource.request("process.run", [program, args])-> {ok:true, value:{status, stdout, stderr}}
```
* Arguments are `Text` paths only. `Memory`/`Resource` values are rejected.
@@ -231,6 +232,11 @@ resource.request("env.get", [name]) -> {ok:true, value:Text}
* `env.get` takes one exact variable name and requires an `--allow-env NAME`
grant; un-granted names are `permission.denied`, missing names are recoverable
`env.not_found` and non-UTF-8 values are `env.not_unicode` (ADR-0043).
* `process.run` takes an exact program path and a List of Text arguments,
requires an `--allow-process PROGRAM` grant, runs without a shell with a
cleared environment in the project root, and enforces a 5 second timeout and
1 MiB stdout/stderr caps. It is project-mode only and is **not** an OS
sandbox (ADR-0044).
## 4. Errors
@@ -326,7 +332,7 @@ host boundary. Names are stable; adding one requires a spec update.
| `resource.read` | `(handle, memory: Memory, offset: Int, max_bytes: Int) -> Result` | bounded chunk read into Memory; `{count,eof}` |
| `resource.write` | `(handle, memory: Memory, offset: Int, length: Int) -> Result` | bounded byte write; `{count}` |
| `resource.close` | `(handle) -> Result` | releases the host slot |
| `resource.request` | `(operation: Text, arguments: List) -> Result` | non-streaming `fs.*` operations (ADR-0041) `clock.now` (ADR-0042) and `env.get` (ADR-0043); project-mode and grant-checked |
| `resource.request` | `(operation: Text, arguments: List) -> Result` | non-streaming `fs.*` operations (ADR-0041) `clock.now` (ADR-0042), `env.get` (ADR-0043) and `process.run` (ADR-0044); project-mode and grant-checked |
| `math.parse/eval/substitute` | see `spec/math.md` | P5; `math.simplify`/`math.differentiate` are declared but return `math.unsupported` in this build |
| `foreign.run/call` | see `spec/foreign.md` | P5, capability-gated |
| `fs.read/write` | see `spec/security.md` | capability-gated |
+7 -2
View File
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ Normative implementation:
| Mode | Intended guarantee | Actual status in this build |
|---|---|---|
| `pure` | No external I/O; memory computation and budgets only. | **Enforced.** `Capabilities::pure()` = `console`, `math` only; every FS/foreign/plugin grant flag makes the CLI exit 2 with "pure mode prohibits external I/O grants". |
| `project` | Operator-approved project resources under `CapabilityHost` + bounded resources. | **Enforced for the implemented operations.** Defaults equal `pure`; `--allow-read`, `--allow-write`, `--allow-net`, `--allow-env`, `--allow-foreign`, `--allow-plugin` add grants. `resource.open` supports stdin read, separate stdout/stderr write, granted project-file read/write (ADR-0025/0026/0040), granted in-process provider kinds (ADR-0033) and granted IP-literal TCP streams (ADR-0034); process/device remain unsupported. Sandboxing is cooperative (in-process checks), not OS isolation; in-process providers are trusted, not sandboxed. |
| `strict` | Untrusted documents under real OS isolation. | **Linux: enforced when the runtime probe passes (ADR-0021).** `resource.open` is **refused** in strict except for the existing `stdio/stdout` console channel (console grant); stdin/stderr, file/TCP/provider/process resources remain refused until a provider passes the isolation lane (CM-A11, ADR-0030/0034/0040). `PlatformCapabilities::detect()` runs a real Bubblewrap smoke test; success reports `Available { mechanism }`, failure reports `Unavailable { reason }`. Strict L1 supports the interpreter, console, native Math and the read-only bundled stdlib (published at `/run/marqdo-stdlib` for the Compat-C print chain); `--allow-read/--allow-write/--allow-net/--allow-env/--allow-foreign/--allow-plugin/--plugin/--trust-native-plugin/--kernel/--trace-file` are rejected with exit 2. macOS/Windows and Linux hosts without the mechanisms remain `Unavailable`; there is **no fallback** to an unrestricted process. |
| `project` | Operator-approved project resources under `CapabilityHost` + bounded resources. | **Enforced for the implemented operations.** Defaults equal `pure`; `--allow-read`, `--allow-write`, `--allow-net`, `--allow-env`, `--allow-process`, `--allow-foreign`, `--allow-plugin` add grants. `resource.open` supports stdin read, separate stdout/stderr write, granted project-file read/write (ADR-0025/0026/0040), granted in-process provider kinds (ADR-0033) and granted IP-literal TCP streams (ADR-0034); process/device remain unsupported. Sandboxing is cooperative (in-process checks), not OS isolation; in-process providers are trusted, not sandboxed. |
| `strict` | Untrusted documents under real OS isolation. | **Linux: enforced when the runtime probe passes (ADR-0021).** `resource.open` is **refused** in strict except for the existing `stdio/stdout` console channel (console grant); stdin/stderr, file/TCP/provider/process resources remain refused until a provider passes the isolation lane (CM-A11, ADR-0030/0034/0040). `PlatformCapabilities::detect()` runs a real Bubblewrap smoke test; success reports `Available { mechanism }`, failure reports `Unavailable { reason }`. Strict L1 supports the interpreter, console, native Math and the read-only bundled stdlib (published at `/run/marqdo-stdlib` for the Compat-C print chain); `--allow-read/--allow-write/--allow-net/--allow-env/--allow-process/--allow-foreign/--allow-plugin/--plugin/--trust-native-plugin/--kernel/--trace-file` are rejected with exit 2. macOS/Windows and Linux hosts without the mechanisms remain `Unavailable`; there is **no fallback** to an unrestricted process. |
`marqdo inspect <file> --platform` prints the detection report, for example:
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ set for one run:
| `fs_write: Vec<String>` | empty | `fs.write` and project `resource.open("file", path, ["write"])` |
| `net_hosts: Vec<String>` | empty | exact IP-literal grants for `resource.open("tcp", "<ip>:<port>", ["read","write"])`; DNS is not resolved; `--allow-net <IP>` adds a grant (ADR-0034) |
| `env: Vec<String>` | empty | exact-name grants for `resource.request("env.get", [name])`; no glob and no `env.list`; `--allow-env <NAME>` adds a grant (ADR-0043) |
| `process_programs: Vec<String>` | empty | exact program paths for `resource.request("process.run", [program, args])`; no shell, `env_clear`, project root cwd, 5 s timeout, 1 MiB stdout/stderr cap; `--allow-process <PROGRAM>` adds a grant (ADR-0044); not an OS sandbox |
| `process: bool` | `false` | required together with `foreign` for `foreign.run`/`foreign.call` |
| `foreign: bool` | `false` | foreign kernels |
| `plugins: Vec<String>` | empty | `plugin.invoke` and `StdHost::load_plugin` |
@@ -81,6 +82,8 @@ Requests versus grants:
ADR-0034);
* `--allow-env <NAME>` (repeatable, exact environment variable name, project
mode only, ADR-0043);
* `--allow-process <PROGRAM>` (repeatable, exact program path, project mode
only, ADR-0044; the child is not sandboxed);
* `--allow-foreign` (project mode only; sets `foreign = true` and
`process = true`);
* `--allow-plugin <PACKAGE-NAME>` (repeatable, project mode only; matches the
@@ -125,6 +128,8 @@ before reading. Full symlink/race hardening is an open P4 item.
* `resource.request("fs.*")` → `check_read`/`check_write` before path resolution;
* `resource.request("env.get")` → `capabilities.check_env(name)` before
`std::env::var`;
* `resource.request("process.run")` → `capabilities.check_process(program)`
before `Command::spawn`;
* `fs.write` → `check_write` then `ProjectFs::write`;
* math ops → `capabilities.math` (in `crates/marqdo-host/src/kernels.rs`);
* foreign ops → `capabilities.check_foreign` (requires `foreign && process`);
+1
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ module; a mismatch is a hard error.
- `data/csv.mq.md` — quoted single-row CSV parser and formatter
- `data/table.mq.md` — value-returning table select/filter/sort/append/set/join/group/GFM
- `env.mq.md` — explicitly granted `env.get` names over `resource.request`
- `process.mq.md` — explicitly granted `process.run` with timeout/output caps
- `datetime.mq.md` — UTC ISO-8601 format/parse over Unix milliseconds (pure)
- `clock.mq.md` — project-mode `clock.now` over `resource.request`
- `path.mq.md` — lexical join/basename/dirname/extension/normalize (no I/O)
+10
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@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
## 运行
`(程序, 参数列表)`
在项目模式下运行一个显式授权的可执行文件。程序路径必须与
`--allow-process PROGRAM` 精确匹配;不经过 shell,清空环境变量,
工作目录是项目根,stdin 为空。5 秒超时、1 MiB stdout/stderr 上限,
结果形状为 `{status, stdout, stderr}`。
*resource.request("process.run", [程序, 参数列表])*
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
{
"name": "marqdo-stdlib",
"version": "0.1.0",
"digest": "sha256:9ec0ba1a50db6bd8423ce3485ad5433fb3b8140032f61c6b4a6dd9bc97416f47"
"digest": "sha256:c7208520e3eef1fdc98327055092f9d52081851f652dd970d4f602e30e58e75f"
}
+10
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
---
import:
process: "std:process"
---
## main
**结果 = process.运行("/bin/echo", ["hello"])**
*[结果.ok, 结果.value.status, 结果.value.stdout, 结果.value.stderr]*