docs(security): record CM-A11 strict resource verification

- Checked-in raw G-C lane log for 00bdcad: 7/7 adversarial helper matrix,
  positive CLI (Compat-C print via bundled stdlib), strict file-resource
  refusal, external-surface rejection, forged-marker rejection, lane PASS.
- Evidence documents the read-only /run/marqdo-stdlib bind, strict stdio-only
  policy, refused file/TCP/provider resources, and the remaining no-CI-URL /
  Windows/macOS limits.
- STATUS updated to the current 426-test gate and 00bdcad strict result.

Gate: fmt, clippy -D warnings, 426 tests passed; VM lane PASS.
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@@ -40,12 +40,12 @@ byte-identical).
cargo fmt --all -- --check PASS
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings PASS
cargo test --workspace --locked PASS
(47 test binaries, 0 failed; includes 7/7 Linux security tests)
426 passed, 0 failed, 2 ignored; includes 7/7 Linux security tests
```
### G-C security lane (disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM, ordinary user `dev`)
Source: `git archive 8af7262` extracted in the VM (not the dev container).
Source: `git archive 00bdcad` extracted in the VM (not the dev container).
Host: QEMU/TCG, kernel `7.0.0-43-generic`, `systemd-detect-virt --container`
= `none`, bubblewrap 0.11.1 with `bwrap-userns-restrict`, uid 1000.
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ Host: QEMU/TCG, kernel `7.0.0-43-generic`, `systemd-detect-virt --container`
cargo test --workspace --locked (same archive): 47 ok, 0 failed
```
Logs: [`evidence/2026-11-20-strict-gc-8af7262.md`](evidence/2026-11-20-strict-gc-8af7262.md).
Logs: [`evidence/2026-11-20-strict-resource-cm-a11.log`](evidence/2026-11-20-strict-resource-cm-a11.log)
and [`evidence/2026-11-20-strict-gc-8af7262.md`](evidence/2026-11-20-strict-gc-8af7262.md).
This is still a **local VM lane**, not a self-hosted GitHub Actions security URL.
## 2. Work package status
@@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ This is still a **local VM lane**, not a self-hosted GitHub Actions security URL
| 7 | Independent Tool consumers | **Done locally** | `sample-view`/`sample-knowledge`/`sample-proof` E2E test |
| 8 | lock v3 reproducibility | **Implemented; tamper test added** | `package_env` PASS |
| 9 | Analysis/Trace/Tool/ABI/Foreign | **Implemented; supported-matrix bounded** | protocol tests, plugin/worker/foreign tests |
| 10 | Linux strict L1 | **VM PASS at 8af7262; no CI URL** | 7/7 + positive CLI |
| 10 | Linux strict L1 | **VM PASS at 00bdcad; no CI URL** | 7/7 + positive CLI + strict resource refusal |
| 11 | Linux strict L2 | **NOT IMPLEMENTED / UNSUPPORTED** | strict rejects Worker/Foreign/native ABI |
| 12 | Windows Native/Worker ABI | **UNSUPPORTED** | no Windows ABI artifact/claim |
| 13 | RC artifact | **Linux candidate only; no release** | clean-install + checksums; macOS not built here |
@@ -157,8 +158,8 @@ This is still a **local VM lane**, not a self-hosted GitHub Actions security URL
`Memory`; stdout write is capability/output-budget checked and project-file
read/write is path/grant checked; file writes buffer until `close` and
never flush on drop; a `.mq.md` chunked copy loop reproduces a file without a
Rust `copy_file`; strict refuses every resource open until a provider is
verified. Semantic fixture 66 and CLI/host tests.
Rust `copy_file`; strict permits only the stdio console channel and refuses
file/TCP/provider resources (CM-A11 lane PASS). Semantic fixture 66 and CLI/host tests.
- Minimal structure observation/construction (RFC-CM CM-A04, ADR-0023):
value-semantics `list.append/concat`, `map.keys/has/get/set/remove`,
Unicode scalar `text.codepoints`/`text.from_codepoint`, and non-negative
@@ -170,15 +171,15 @@ This is still a **local VM lane**, not a self-hosted GitHub Actions security URL
the Linux EAGAIN contract are UNVERIFIED on GitHub. G1/G2/G3 remain FAIL
until a real run exists.
2. **G-C is VM-verified but not CI-signed.** No self-hosted security-lane URL
for 8af7262 exists.
for 00bdcad exists.
3. Windows Native/Worker ABI is explicitly UNSUPPORTED (no Windows `cc`
fixture lane, Unix-gated worker tests).
4. `fs.write`, `net.request`, `process`, `clock`, `random` are not executed
broker services; unsupported requests must return `capability.unavailable`.
5. Resource streams are a **P3 first slice** only: project-file read and
buffered write plus stdout, but no directories, network, process, device,
generic provider or stdlib `print` migration; strict refuses every
`resource.open` until the provider passes the isolation lane.
5. Resource streams cover project-file read/write, stdout, compatible print,
trusted in-process providers and IP-literal TCP; directories, process,
device, DNS/TLS/HTTP, UDP and provider packaging remain open. Strict permits
only stdio and refuses the rest (CM-A11 lane PASS).
6. uv/npm/venv provisioning is not implemented. Only a pre-provisioned,
digest-pinned directory with a regular-file executable is supported.
7. No Windows/macOS RC archive exists from this host. The release-candidate
@@ -242,6 +243,9 @@ user-written allocator is explicitly **not** claimed.
- [`evidence/2026-11-20-tcp-endpoint.md`](evidence/2026-11-20-tcp-endpoint.md)
— ADR-0034 blocking TCP endpoint, IP grants, DNS refusal, loopback host/CLI
echo tests.
- [`evidence/2026-11-20-strict-resource-cm-a11.md`](evidence/2026-11-20-strict-resource-cm-a11.md)
— CM-A11 strict lane at `00bdcad`: 7/7 adversarial matrix, positive Compat-C
print, strict file-resource refusal, forged-marker rejection and raw log.
- [`evidence/RELEASE_CANDIDATE_0.1.0_8af7262.md`](evidence/RELEASE_CANDIDATE_0.1.0_8af7262.md)
— G0..G12 matrix and RC decision.
- [`security-gate.md`](security-gate.md) — mechanism, attack matrix and strict
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
== adversarial helper matrix ==
Finished `test` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 0.90s
Running tests/security_linux.rs (target/debug/build/marqdo-sandbox/73fdd38fdea71ea2/out/security_linux-73fdd38fdea71ea2)
running 7 tests
test strict_child_cannot_escape_via_proc_or_privileges ... ok
test strict_child_cannot_reach_the_network ... ok
test strict_child_cannot_read_host_files_but_reads_the_project ... ok
test strict_child_cannot_write_outside_or_into_the_project ... ok
test strict_child_identity_is_unprivileged_and_namespaced ... ok
test strict_supervisor_enforces_fd_and_process_limits ... ok
test strict_supervisor_enforces_memory_cpu_and_output_limits ... ok
test result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 7.80s
== build CLI ==
Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 0.67s
strict mechanism: bubblewrap 0.11.1 (user/mount/PID/net/UTS/IPC namespaces + no-new-privs + rlimits)
== positive CLI contract ==
== strict language resources are console-only ==
== external-execution surfaces are refused ==
== forged active marker is rejected ==
G-C security lane: PASS
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
# RFC-CM CM-A11 evidence: strict resource verification
Date: 2026-11-20 (Asia/Shanghai)
Repository: `marqdo-cli`
Source under test: `git archive 00bdcad` (current HEAD)
Related: [ADR-0021](../adr/0021-linux-strict-isolation.md),
[ADR-0030](../adr/0030-print-compat-b-routing.md),
[ADR-0034](../adr/0034-tcp-resource-endpoint.md),
[STATUS §1](../STATUS.md).
Raw lane log: [`2026-11-20-strict-resource-cm-a11.log`](2026-11-20-strict-resource-cm-a11.log)
## Environment
Ubuntu 26.04 disposable QEMU/TCG VM, kernel 7.0.0-43-generic, ordinary user
`dev` (uid 1000), `systemd-detect-virt --container` = `none`, bubblewrap
0.11.1 with the packaged `bwrap-userns-restrict` profile. The dev container
cannot create namespaces, so this is VM-only evidence.
## What was verified
```text
./tests/security/run-lane.sh
adversarial helper matrix: 7 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored
positive CLI contract: PASS
strict language resources are console-only: PASS
external-execution surfaces refused: PASS
forged active marker rejected: PASS
G-C security lane: PASS
```
The 7-test helper matrix covers: no host-file reads beyond `/project`, no
writes outside or into the project, no network, unprivileged namespaces, no
capability escalation, fd/process limits, and memory/CPU/output limits.
The positive CLI contract runs `hello` (Compat-C `打印` through the bundled
stdlib), `factorial --mode strict`, multi-module, and `--json`.
The new strict-resource check runs a `.mq.md` program that calls
`resource.open("file", "README.md", ["read"])` under `--mode strict`; the run
must be non-zero and the diagnostic must contain `permission.denied`. The
bundled stdlib is bind-mounted read-only at `/run/marqdo-stdlib` and its digest
is still verified in the child; this grants no new OS capability.
## Policy verified in code/tests
* Strict permits only `stdio/stdout` with console grant.
* Strict refuses project-file, TCP and registered-provider resource kinds;
`pure` refuses file/TCP/providers too.
* `--allow-read/--allow-write/--allow-foreign/--allow-plugin/--allow-net/
--trace-file/--kernel/--trust-native-plugin` are rejected at the strict L1
flag boundary.
* Strict permits the read-only bundled stdlib so `打印` works; file/network/
process/device remain refused.
* TCP is project-only and strict refuses it (host tests), so the new TCP
endpoint does not widen strict L1.
## Gate
Local container: fmt/clippy/426 tests PASS. VM: 7/7 adversarial + full lane
PASS. Log is checked in; this is a **local VM lane**, not a self-hosted GitHub
Actions security URL and not Windows/macOS evidence.
## Limits
* No remote CI URL for `00bdcad`; G-C remains VM-verified, not CI-signed.
* Windows/macOS strict behavior is not exercised here.
* Strict L2 (Worker/Foreign/native plugin under real isolation) is still not
implemented; L1 refuses those surfaces.
* TCP/HTTP/DNS under strict are refused rather than isolated.