Windows gives the main thread 1 MiB, unlike Linux/macOS at 8 MiB. The bundled
regex self-test overflowed that stack even though the same document passed on
Linux, so run the CLI dispatch on an explicit 8 MiB thread on every platform.
The macOS package test compared a raw temp path with a canonicalized one; on
macOS /var is a symlink to /private/var. Compare canonical forms on both sides.
The adversarial security matrix is G3-only: ordinary cargo test --workspace on
a namespace-capable but non-disposable hosted runner turned G0 red. Make it
opt-in (MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY=1 for the G3 lane, or
MARQDO_RUN_STRICT_SECURITY=1 for a developer); the lane still requires the
mechanism and fails on a missing one.
Capture the strict child through launch_strict_capture and classify the
outcome before writing anything. In --json mode a control-plane failure now
emits exactly one error document with a stable code instead of forwarding
bubblewrap stderr and leaving stdout empty; a verified child's valid JSON is
forwarded unchanged with its own exit code. Empty, partial or non-JSON child
output becomes strict.child_invalid.
Route the remaining run --json error paths (mode, grants, missing entry,
trace) through the same contract, classify sandbox launch failures with
StrictFailureKind so probe/spawn/timeout/resource failures stay
distinguishable, and add deterministic routing tests plus forged-marker CLI
coverage. Document the decision in ADR-0053 and spec/security.md 1.2.
This is step 2 of the CI/security RFC (B02/B03).
The CLI referenced Linux-only marker_present/verify_active directly, so
macOS and Windows builds failed with E0425. Add StrictChildState and
inspect_strict_child() to marqdo-sandbox: Linux performs the full identity
verification, while every other platform rejects even a forged
MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE marker. The Linux-only functions are no longer
re-exported from the crate root, so future callers cannot bypass the
platform boundary.
This is step 1 of the CI/security RFC (B01).
- Strict child now gets the verified stdlib tree read-only at
/run/marqdo-stdlib with MARQDO_STDLIB_DIR set, so Compat-C 打印 works under
strict without exposing a host path (ADR-0021 update).
- Add a strict-lane negative: resource.open(file) is refused with
permission.denied; hello/factorial/multi-module and --json still pass.
- StrictHostCommand gains stdlib_dir; CLI discovers the bundle and sandbox
binds it; sandbox tests constructors updated.
Evidence: G-C lane PASS on the disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM (7/7 adversarial
matrix, positive CLI, strict language-resource refusal, forged marker), plus
fmt/clippy/423 local tests.
WHY
- macOS/Windows failed to compile because `cfg!` left `linux::probe()` in the
type-checked branch (E0433).
- GitHub-hosted Linux can pass the strict probe and then fail the real launch
with EAGAIN; the CLI test treated the inspect snapshot as a permanent promise.
- The security matrix shared process-id-based scratch paths, so parallel
`cargo test --workspace` made its own tests clobber each other.
- Condition paragraphs silently ignored executable `Strong`/`Emph`, and
condition parse spans included the code-span backticks.
- The corpus had no native power/control-flow/inert fixtures and no independent
generic Tool consumers.
WHAT
- Dispatch strict detection through `#[cfg]` functions; add a non-Linux
compile/fail-closed regression test.
- Split `linux::run` into an injectable probe/spawn seam; test probe-OK ->
launch-EAGAIN returns LaunchFailed and never executes unrestricted.
- Make the Linux CLI contract accept only (a) successful isolated run or
(b) non-zero, diagnosed, fail-closed refusal with no project stdout.
- Give each security test a unique project/outside path and compile the helper
once.
- Reject executable roles in a condition paragraph; map condition expressions
from the literal bytes inside the backticks.
- Add 10 AST, 8 semantic, 4 compile-negative and 2 runtime-negative fixtures
for power, branch/loop conditions, source spans, inert prose/code fences and
error boundaries.
- Add `sample-view`/`sample-knowledge`/`sample-proof` independent Tool v1
packages and an end-to-end Analysis/Trace consumer test.
- Add a locked path-dependency content-tamper test.
TESTS
- cargo fmt --all -- --check
- cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
- cargo test --workspace --locked
- G-C VM lane (separate evidence commit/run)
CI_URL
- none from this host: the checkout has a Gitee remote and no GitHub
credentials. Windows/macOS CI remains UNVERIFIED.
BREAKING_CHANGE
- An executable node in a list-item condition paragraph is now a hard
`markdown.invalid_construct` error instead of being silently ignored.
SECURITY_SCOPE
- strict remains fail-closed; no downgrade, no new capability, L2 still
rejected. G-C still requires the dedicated self-hosted lane for CI-signed
evidence.
Strict mode now re-executes the CLI inside a Bubblewrap supervisor with
user/mount/PID/net/UTS/IPC namespaces, no-new-privs, all capabilities dropped,
a read-only /project, private /proc and /dev, rlimits, output capture and
wall-clock process-group cleanup. The child verifies PID 1, NoNewPrivs, empty
CapEff, an unshared uid map and loopback-only networking before project code.
- PlatformCapabilities::detect runs a real bwrap probe; no probe, no strict
- strict L1 supports pure Marqdo + Math; Foreign/ABI/worker/kernel/grants/trace
are rejected with exit 2 before sandboxing
- forged MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE is rejected; missing bwrap fails closed
- add adversarial helper, 7-test escape/resource matrix, seeded security lane
script and self-hosted security workflow
- executed G-C lane as uid 1000 in a disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM: 7/7 PASS
plus positive CLI and refusal matrix; evidence in docs/evidence
- ADR-0021, spec/security.md, STATUS/COMPATIBILITY/README/CHANGELOG updated;
ADR-0019 remains for non-Linux/fail-closed rules
- add a hidden __plugin-worker mode that loads one native library in a child
process and serves length-prefixed JSON invoke frames
- add host WorkerPlugin with ready handshake, export cross-check, per-call
timeout and crash/EOF propagation
- route kind: worker without in-process trust; native still requires explicit
trust; wasm is rejected explicitly
- report worker_processes=true while keeping strict OS isolation unavailable
- test successful worker calls and worker crash isolation
- update plugin ABI spec and R2 status
Blueprint section 9: advertise a security guarantee only when it can be
enforced.
- SandboxMode pure/project/strict with stable names.
- PlatformCapabilities detection reports strict isolation as unavailable in
this build with an explicit reason; worker processes are reported false.
- enforce() refuses strict mode when OS-level isolation is not implemented,
instead of pretending a cooperative in-process check is a sandbox.
- Pure/project modes remain available.
Create the Marqdo CLI Rust workspace with the module boundaries from the
development blueprint (section 11):
- marqdo-span: byte spans and line/column mapping shared by every layer
- marqdo-value, marqdo-expression, marqdo-markdown, marqdo-ir
- marqdo-frontend, marqdo-runtime, marqdo-host, marqdo-sandbox
- marqdo-math, marqdo-foreign, marqdo-package
- marqdo-plugin-abi, marqdo-plugin-sdk
- marqdo-cli (binary `marqdo`)
Pin the Markdown parser exactly (comrak =1.0.0, no default features) so the
frozen profile can never drift silently. Dependencies are centralized in
workspace.dependencies; no crate is allowed to add its own version of a shared
dependency.