4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
cflmy 70d916d698 test(security): assert strict refuses TCP resources and --allow-net
- G-C lane now runs a .mq.md TCP resource open under strict and requires
  permission.denied, and rejects the --allow-net grant at the strict flag
  boundary.
- Complements the existing file-resource refusal and host TCP strict test.
2026-11-20 23:21:09 +08:00
cflmy 1d87f98539 fix(strict): bind the bundled stdlib and verify strict resources
- Strict child now gets the verified stdlib tree read-only at
  /run/marqdo-stdlib with MARQDO_STDLIB_DIR set, so Compat-C 打印 works under
  strict without exposing a host path (ADR-0021 update).
- Add a strict-lane negative: resource.open(file) is refused with
  permission.denied; hello/factorial/multi-module and --json still pass.
- StrictHostCommand gains stdlib_dir; CLI discovers the bundle and sandbox
  binds it; sandbox tests constructors updated.

Evidence: G-C lane PASS on the disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM (7/7 adversarial
matrix, positive CLI, strict language-resource refusal, forged marker), plus
fmt/clippy/423 local tests.
2026-11-20 22:57:49 +08:00
cflmy f075c967f2 fix(security): honor CARGO_TARGET_DIR in the G-C lane
The lane hard-coded target/debug/marqdo, so a reproducible run from a clean
git archive with an external CARGO_TARGET_DIR built the binary and then
reported a false missing-binary failure.

TESTS: bash -n tests/security/run-lane.sh; G-C lane on a clean archive.
CI_URL: none from this host (Gitee remote, no GitHub credentials).
SECURITY_SCOPE: unchanged; the lane still requires an ordinary user and 7/7.
2026-11-20 15:42:47 +08:00
cflmy b6fc18233d feat(sandbox): implement probe-gated Linux strict isolation (ADR-0021)
Strict mode now re-executes the CLI inside a Bubblewrap supervisor with
user/mount/PID/net/UTS/IPC namespaces, no-new-privs, all capabilities dropped,
a read-only /project, private /proc and /dev, rlimits, output capture and
wall-clock process-group cleanup. The child verifies PID 1, NoNewPrivs, empty
CapEff, an unshared uid map and loopback-only networking before project code.

- PlatformCapabilities::detect runs a real bwrap probe; no probe, no strict
- strict L1 supports pure Marqdo + Math; Foreign/ABI/worker/kernel/grants/trace
  are rejected with exit 2 before sandboxing
- forged MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE is rejected; missing bwrap fails closed
- add adversarial helper, 7-test escape/resource matrix, seeded security lane
  script and self-hosted security workflow
- executed G-C lane as uid 1000 in a disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM: 7/7 PASS
  plus positive CLI and refusal matrix; evidence in docs/evidence
- ADR-0021, spec/security.md, STATUS/COMPATIBILITY/README/CHANGELOG updated;
  ADR-0019 remains for non-Linux/fail-closed rules
2026-11-20 15:01:49 +08:00