Strict mode now re-executes the CLI inside a Bubblewrap supervisor with
user/mount/PID/net/UTS/IPC namespaces, no-new-privs, all capabilities dropped,
a read-only /project, private /proc and /dev, rlimits, output capture and
wall-clock process-group cleanup. The child verifies PID 1, NoNewPrivs, empty
CapEff, an unshared uid map and loopback-only networking before project code.
- PlatformCapabilities::detect runs a real bwrap probe; no probe, no strict
- strict L1 supports pure Marqdo + Math; Foreign/ABI/worker/kernel/grants/trace
are rejected with exit 2 before sandboxing
- forged MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE is rejected; missing bwrap fails closed
- add adversarial helper, 7-test escape/resource matrix, seeded security lane
script and self-hosted security workflow
- executed G-C lane as uid 1000 in a disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM: 7/7 PASS
plus positive CLI and refusal matrix; evidence in docs/evidence
- ADR-0021, spec/security.md, STATUS/COMPATIBILITY/README/CHANGELOG updated;
ADR-0019 remains for non-Linux/fail-closed rules
A document with an executable foreign.call is statically checked without a
marker side effect, then run to show the same provider does execute. This
guards the 'check/inspect cannot execute untrusted code' contract.
- adopt docs/STABLE_RELEASE_IMPLEMENTATION.md as the single next-phase plan
- archive the stale M0.5 status snapshot under docs/history/
- record real local gate results, the red baseline CI, the Windows autocrlf
reproduction and the unresolved macOS/native-CI status
- add COMPATIBILITY.md (protocol versions + honest platform matrix),
CHANGELOG.md, dual license files, docs/releasing.md and docs/security-gate.md
- keep strict fail-closed: document the container EPERM/read-only cgroup probe
and the exact G-C requirements instead of claiming isolation
- document foreign environment binding (ADR-0020) and add a release-candidate
CI job that is gated on all platform jobs