- Strict child now gets the verified stdlib tree read-only at /run/marqdo-stdlib with MARQDO_STDLIB_DIR set, so Compat-C 打印 works under strict without exposing a host path (ADR-0021 update). - Add a strict-lane negative: resource.open(file) is refused with permission.denied; hello/factorial/multi-module and --json still pass. - StrictHostCommand gains stdlib_dir; CLI discovers the bundle and sandbox binds it; sandbox tests constructors updated. Evidence: G-C lane PASS on the disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM (7/7 adversarial matrix, positive CLI, strict language-resource refusal, forged marker), plus fmt/clippy/423 local tests.
5.2 KiB
ADR-0021: Linux strict isolation via Bubblewrap, namespaces and rlimits
Status: Accepted
Date: 2026-11-20
Relates to: ADR-0004, ADR-0019, spec/security.md, stable-release plan §10
Security evidence: docs/evidence/2026-11-20-strict-gc.md
Context
ADR-0019 kept strict mode Unavailable everywhere because no adapter had been
executed against the full escape/resource matrix, and the first development
host could not create any namespace. A disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM with a real
kernel, writable cgroup2, passwordless sudo for test setup and the packaged
Bubblewrap AppArmor profile became available. It can create user, mount, PID,
network, UTS and IPC namespaces as an ordinary user through bwrap.
Decision
1. Dynamic, probe-gated availability
PlatformCapabilities::detect() on Linux runs a real Bubblewrap smoke test
(--unshare-all --as-pid-1, read-only runtime bind, private /proc and
/dev). Strict is Available { mechanism: "bubblewrap ..." } only when that
probe succeeds; otherwise it stays Unavailable with the real reason. There is
still no fallback to project.
2. L1 scope: pure language and native Math only
Strict accepts run/call of documents using the interpreter, console and
native Math. It rejects --allow-read, --allow-write, --allow-foreign,
--allow-plugin, --plugin, --trust-native-plugin, --kernel and
--trace-file with exit 2 before any sandbox starts. Native ABI, worker
plugins and Foreign kernels are therefore not reachable in strict mode in this
release; L2 inheritance is future work.
3. Construction
The trusted supervisor is this process; the restricted child is the same
marqdo executable re-executed under Bubblewrap:
--unshare-all --as-pid-1 --die-with-parent --new-session— user, mount, PID, network, UTS, IPC and cgroup namespaces; the child is PID 1;- read-only binds of
/usr,/bin,/sbin,/lib,/lib64and/etc/ld.so.cache, and of the project tree at/project; - a read-only bind of the program at
/run/marqdo-program; no host/root,$HOME,/etcor other project directories are visible; - private
/proc, minimal/dev, tmpfs/tmp; --clearenv,no_new_privs,--cap-drop ALL;- hard rlimits: CPU, address space (512 MiB), file size, open files (64), processes (64), stack (8 MiB), core (0);
- a supervisor deadline that kills the process group, and bounded capture of stdout/stderr.
The document argument is rewritten to /project/...; only the document token
changes, all other arguments are preserved.
4. Bundled stdlib mount
After CM-A07 Compat-C, 打印 is implemented by the bundled .mq.md stdlib.
Strict therefore bind-mounts the verified stdlib/ tree read-only at
/run/marqdo-stdlib and sets MARQDO_STDLIB_DIR for the child, just like the
program itself. The tree contains only Markdown/read-only data; it grants no
new OS capability, and the loader still verifies its digest in the child. File,
network, process and provider resources remain refused.
5. Child self-verification
The child accepts MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE=1 only if it can verify all of:
getpid() == 1, NoNewPrivs: 1, empty CapEff, a non-initial uid map, and no
non-loopback network interface. A forged marker outside the sandbox fails
before project code runs.
6. Threat model and non-goals
This protects against untrusted Marqdo documents that use the language, interpreter, Math, console, or attempt direct syscalls. It does not sandbox native plugins (rejected), Foreign kernels (rejected), or a malicious kernel. Bubblewrap is the construction mechanism, not a certificate; the runtime probe and self-verification are part of the contract.
Known limits: rlimits are used instead of cgroup-v2 accounting (the VM has writable cgroups, but the released adapter does not yet claim cgroup enforcement); filesystem TOCTOU is limited by read-only mounts but not proven against a racing host user; the project tree is exposed read-only in full; network is isolated by a network namespace rather than a seccomp allowlist. No worker/Foreign L2 claim is made.
Evidence
Executed in a disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM (kernel 7.0.0, container: none,
Bubblewrap 0.11.1, AppArmor bwrap-userns-restrict profile, ordinary user
dev):
- 7/7 adversarial tests: identity, host reads, writes,
/proc/privileges, network, fd/process limits, memory/CPU/output limits; - CLI:
run,call, absolute paths, multi-module, defaultindex.mq.mdand--jsonall succeed under strict; Foreign/ABI/plugin/kernel/trace flags are rejected with exit 2; - forged
MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE=1outside the sandbox exits 1; - removing
/usr/bin/bwrapmakes strictUnavailableand the run exits 1 with no project execution.
Consequences
- Linux strict is available only where the probe succeeds; this container still reports unavailable.
worker_processesremains true for crash isolation, but that is not part of the strict claim.- A future L2 ADR must extend the same supervisor to worker/Foreign processes, with its own escape tests, before those may run under strict.
- A remote self-hosted security-lane URL is still required before a release calls G-C CI-verified; the local VM evidence is recorded separately.