Update status, compatibility, changelog, README, architecture overview,
ADR status, migration guide, contributor/CI/security/release notes and
the per-file inventory from 'migration pending' to the verified state:
- language SHA ffd1cc9: fmt/clippy clean, workspace 501 passed / 0 failed
/ 2 ignored, stdlib digest regenerated and pack-verified
- green evidence report added; the prior intermediate evidence is marked
superseded
- inventory regenerated: 1015 classified files, 0 pending
- explicit non-claims: Windows/macOS native lanes and the disposable-VM
strict lane were not re-run at this SHA, so the release decision remains
DO NOT RELEASE
Verified: cargo test -p marqdo-cli --test docs_consistency (4/4) and
git diff --check.
158 lines
5.5 KiB
Markdown
158 lines
5.5 KiB
Markdown
# Reproducing the disposable strict-security VM
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The G-C lane was executed in a throw-away Ubuntu 26.04 VM because the primary
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development host is a container that cannot create namespaces. This document
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records how that VM was built so the result can be reproduced and so the VM can
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be registered as a dedicated self-hosted security runner.
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> **Language-syntax migration note.** The lane fixtures are `.mq.md` sources and
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> are migrated to RFC-LANG-0002
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> ([`architecture/RFC-LANG-0002-unified-semantics.md`](architecture/RFC-LANG-0002-unified-semantics.md)).
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> The lane has not been re-run at `ffd1cc9`; run `tests/security/run-lane.sh` on
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> the migrated tree before using this VM as evidence for the current syntax. The
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> VM/OS-isolation procedure itself is unchanged. See [`STATUS.md`](STATUS.md).
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**Do not run this on a daily host with valuable data.** The VM is disposable;
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the commands below do not disable AppArmor or any global host protection.
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## 1. Host prerequisites
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- QEMU with TCG (`/dev/kvm` is not required; the reference run had no KVM).
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- Network access to `cloud-images.ubuntu.com`, Ubuntu archives and crates.io.
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- ~10 GiB free disk and ~3 GiB RAM for the guest.
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On an ordinary Ubuntu host, `sudo apt install qemu-system-x86 qemu-utils
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genisoimage` is sufficient. In the reference environment QEMU was unpacked
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under `.tools/` because the host root was read-only; that directory is
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gitignored and is not part of the repository.
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## 2. Cloud image and seed
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```bash
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mkdir -p .tools/vm && cd .tools/vm
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curl -L -o resolute.img \
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https://cloud-images.ubuntu.com/resolute/current/resolute-server-cloudimg-amd64.img
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qemu-img create -f qcow2 -b resolute.img -F qcow2 disk.qcow2 20G
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ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N '' -f marqdo_vm_key
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```
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Create `user-data` with an ordinary `dev` user (passwordless sudo only for
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test setup), `meta-data` with a unique instance id, and wrap both into a
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NoCloud ISO with volume label `cidata`. Any ISO builder works; the reference
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run used the pure-Python `pycdlib` wheel extracted under `.tools/py`:
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```bash
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python3 - <<'PY'
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import pycdlib
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iso = pycdlib.PyCdlib()
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iso.new(interchange_level=3, vol_ident='cidata', joliet=3, rock_ridge='1.09')
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for name, iso_name in {'user-data': 'USER_DATA.;1', 'meta-data': 'META_DATA.;1'}.items():
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iso.add_file(name, f'/{iso_name}', rr_name=name, joliet_path=f'/{name}')
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iso.write('seed.iso')
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iso.close()
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PY
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```
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`user-data` must contain the public key:
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```yaml
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#cloud-config
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users:
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- name: dev
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sudo: ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL
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shell: /bin/bash
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groups: [sudo]
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ssh_authorized_keys:
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- ssh-ed25519 AAAA... your-key
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ssh_pwauth: false
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package_update: false
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package_upgrade: false
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```
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## 3. Boot and connect
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```bash
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qemu-system-x86_64 -accel tcg,thread=multi -cpu max -smp 4 -m 3072 \
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-L /usr/share/qemu \
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-drive file=disk.qcow2,if=virtio,format=qcow2 \
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-drive file=seed.iso,if=virtio,format=raw,readonly=on \
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-netdev user,id=n0,hostfwd=tcp:127.0.0.1:2222-:22 \
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-device virtio-net-pci,netdev=n0 \
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-display none -serial file:console.log -monitor none -no-reboot
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```
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Wait for SSH, then:
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```bash
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ssh -p 2222 -i marqdo_vm_key dev@127.0.0.1
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```
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## 4. Guest setup
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```bash
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sudo apt-get update
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sudo apt-get install -y bubblewrap build-essential curl python3
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bwrap --version
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# install Rust (minimal profile)
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curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y --profile minimal
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export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"
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```
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Check the mechanisms **before** running the lane:
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```bash
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systemd-detect-virt --container # must be "none"
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unshare --user --map-root-user true # root may need sudo; ordinary user uses bwrap
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bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net --ro-bind / / true; echo $?
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cat /proc/self/uid_map
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findmnt -t cgroup2
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```
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Ubuntu 26.04 keeps `kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1`. The
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packaged `bwrap-userns-restrict` AppArmor profile is what allows the ordinary
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user to run Bubblewrap; the lane does **not** require disabling AppArmor
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globally.
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## 5. Copy the source and run the lane
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From the host repository root (or from `git archive <sha>`):
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```bash
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tar --exclude=.git --exclude=.tools --exclude=.cache --exclude=.cargo-home \
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--exclude=target --exclude=dist -czf /tmp/marqdo-src.tgz .
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scp -P 2222 -i .tools/vm/marqdo_vm_key /tmp/marqdo-src.tgz dev@127.0.0.1:/home/dev/
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ssh -p 2222 -i .tools/vm/marqdo_vm_key dev@127.0.0.1
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```
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Inside the guest:
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```bash
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mkdir -p ~/marqdo-src && tar -C ~/marqdo-src -xzf ~/marqdo-src.tgz
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cd ~/marqdo-src
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export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"
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./tests/security/run-lane.sh
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```
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Expected final line: `G-C security lane: PASS`. The lane also checks that the read-only bundled stdlib works for `打印` and that a project-file `resource.open` is refused in strict mode. The script exports
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`MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY=1`; a missing bubblewrap, compiler or helper is
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a failure, never a skip.
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## 6. Registering as a security runner
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Register this VM (not the development container) as a GitHub self-hosted
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runner with labels `linux` and `marqdo-security`. The workflow
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`.github/workflows/security-linux.yml` targets
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`runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, marqdo-security]`. Keep the runner disposable
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and recreate it from this document; do not give the runner access to secrets or
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the primary workspace. A CI URL from that runner is still required before a
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release may call G-C CI-verified.
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## Reference environment
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```text
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Ubuntu 26.04.1 LTS, kernel 7.0.0-43-generic x86_64
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QEMU/TCG guest, systemd-detect-virt --container -> none
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bubblewrap 0.11.1 (bwrap-userns-restrict)
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dev uid 1000, passwordless sudo for setup only
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```
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