Files
marqdo-cli/docs/security-gate.md
T
cflmy 18d9f39562 docs(release): reconcile status, compatibility and release evidence
- adopt docs/STABLE_RELEASE_IMPLEMENTATION.md as the single next-phase plan
- archive the stale M0.5 status snapshot under docs/history/
- record real local gate results, the red baseline CI, the Windows autocrlf
  reproduction and the unresolved macOS/native-CI status
- add COMPATIBILITY.md (protocol versions + honest platform matrix),
  CHANGELOG.md, dual license files, docs/releasing.md and docs/security-gate.md
- keep strict fail-closed: document the container EPERM/read-only cgroup probe
  and the exact G-C requirements instead of claiming isolation
- document foreign environment binding (ADR-0020) and add a release-candidate
  CI job that is gated on all platform jobs
2026-11-20 13:58:40 +08:00

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# Linux strict-isolation security gate (G-C) — evidence report
Status: **G-C NOT PASSED. `strict` remains `Unavailable` and fails closed.**
Snapshot: workspace `0.1.0`, 2026-11-20. No release tag.
This report records what was actually probed on the development host and why no
`StrictIsolation::Available` claim is made. It is evidence, not a plan to
weaken the gate.
## 1. Host and capability probe
Command output (abridged; host name removed):
```text
user: uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
kernel: Linux 7.0.0-43-generic x86_64
virt: container-other
apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns: 1
max_user_namespaces: 60339
cgroup2 mount: ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,nsdelegate,memory_recursiveprot
cgroup controllers: cpuset cpu io memory hugetlb pids rdma misc dmem
unshare --user --map-root-user true
-> unshare: write failed /proc/self/uid_map: Operation not permitted (exit 1)
unshare --user --map-root-user --net true
-> unshare: unshare failed: Operation not permitted (exit 1)
bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net --ro-bind / / true
-> bwrap: No permissions to create a new namespace (exit 1)
sudo -n true
-> sudo: The "no new privileges" flag is set, which prevents sudo from
running as root (exit 1)
```
The workspace root is writable, but the host root filesystem and cgroup2 mount
are read-only. The process is root inside a container with `no_new_privs` set;
`sudo` cannot gain privileges and the parent container refuses namespace
creation. `user.max_user_namespaces` being non-zero does not help because the
container policy/AppArmor boundary rejects the actual `uid_map` write.
## 2. Consequence
- A real Linux adapter (namespaces + seccomp/no_new_privs + cgroup v2 + fd and
process-tree control) cannot be built, applied and verified here.
- Implementing an adapter and flipping `Available` without executing the escape
and resource-limit tests would be a false security claim. It was not done.
- `PlatformCapabilities::detect()` continues to report `unavailable` with a
reason; `enforce` refuses before any host/plugin is constructed. There is no
fallback to `project`.
- Native plugin loading (`--trust-native-plugin`) is unrelated to strict mode
and remains an explicit in-process trust decision; the broker and worker
transport are not OS isolation.
Command evidence:
```bash
marqdo run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict
# exit 1, stderr: refusing to run in strict mode: ...
marqdo inspect examples/hello.mq.md --platform --json
# platform.strict.state == "unavailable"
```
## 3. What G-C still requires
1. A controllable Ubuntu VM or self-hosted runner that permits user, mount,
PID and network namespaces and delegated cgroup v2 controllers, reachable
from an ordinary (non-root) test user.
2. A trusted supervisor that applies filesystem/network/process/resource
policy and reaps the child tree, plus a runtime probe that reports the
mechanisms actually applied.
3. Execution of the full negative matrix from
`docs/STABLE_RELEASE_IMPLEMENTATION.md` §10.5 with a malicious helper:
direct syscall reads/writes, `/proc` and inherited-fd access, IPv4/IPv6/DNS
and Unix sockets, fork/exec, CPU/memory/fd/process/output limits, and
`--trust-native-plugin` rejection.
4. A security-lane CI URL on the same commit, and only then an ADR that flips
`Unavailable` to `Available` for that specific platform.
Until all four hold, any release must state: **strict OS isolation is not
available; untrusted code must not be executed with Marqdo expecting isolation.**