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Records the tagged SHA 2c7c4f31e7 evidence:
same-SHA Woodpecker pipeline #37 PASS (including archive build + cold-install
smoke), fixed-node G4 #38 MEASURED/WARN with 9/9 correctness, the same-SHA
disposable-VM strict G3 PASS, the frozen-binary external conformance manifest
(7/7 categories, unchanged CLI hash), and the archive-only clean-install smoke.
Adds docs/evidence/ci/<sha>/manifest.json in the explicit beta profile
(BETA_RELEASE_CANDIDATE), the strict evidence JSON/log, the G4 report, the
release gate record, the third-party handbook validation matrix/log, and the
user-facing 3.0.0-beta.1 release notes. Updates STATUS, COMPATIBILITY, CURRENT,
CHANGELOG, README, security-gate and the prerelease plan to the exact released
SHA, tag, release URL and archive hashes. No source code changes after the tag.
192 lines
9.4 KiB
Markdown
192 lines
9.4 KiB
Markdown
# Linux strict-isolation security gate (G-C) — evidence
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Status: **PASSED on the current CI-fix series in a local disposable Ubuntu
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VM; Linux strict is enabled only when the runtime probe succeeds. REMOTE G3
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UNVERIFIED: no self-hosted security-lane CI URL exists yet.**
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Current evidence: source SHA `5fcc111a304211dfbb3a4c85d72e0b3f4a2318be`,
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ordinary user `dev` (uid 1000), QEMU/TCG guest, 7/7 adversarial tests plus the
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strict `--json` and inert-`@knowledge` contracts — see
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[`evidence/2026-11-21-strict-gc-5fcc111.md`](evidence/2026-11-21-strict-gc-5fcc111.md).
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The older `8af7262` and `b6fc182` runs are retained below as history.
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Snapshot: product `3.0.0-beta.1`, source `2c7c4f31e7a388d3fcfa717a77067e696ed13854`, 2026-11-22. See ADR-0021
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and ADR-0053. The same-SHA beta G3 run is
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[`evidence/2026-11-22-strict-gc-2c7c4f31.md`](evidence/2026-11-22-strict-gc-2c7c4f31.md)
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(local disposable VM, `outcome: PASS`, uid 1000, container none); it is not a
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remote self-hosted security-lane URL.
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> **Language-syntax status.** The lane was re-run on the RFC-LANG-0002 tree
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> ([`architecture/RFC-LANG-0002-unified-semantics.md`](architecture/RFC-LANG-0002-unified-semantics.md))
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> at `5fcc111`, including the strict `@knowledge`-inert check. The security
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> facts are unchanged: `@exec` is a compile-time projection, not a capability
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> grant; `@knowledge` produces no IR and therefore no host effect; resource,
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> file, network, stdin/stdout, memory and budget checks remain at the
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> `CapabilityHost` boundary, and the strict sandbox is unaffected. See
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> [`STATUS.md`](STATUS.md) for the language gate and
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> [`evidence/2026-11-21-semantics-v2-green.md`](evidence/2026-11-21-semantics-v2-green.md).
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> The earlier `512b9f5`/`0d7e11b`/`990e984` runs are historical evidence;
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> `5fcc111` is the native-green code SHA and also adds the CLI 8 MiB main
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> thread, portable process fixture and the G3-only opt-in gate.
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This report separates three things that are often conflated:
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1. the **mechanism** (Bubblewrap namespaces + rlimits + supervisor),
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2. the **runtime probe** that decides whether `strict` is available, and
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3. the **adversarial evidence** that the boundary actually holds.
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## 1. Why the earlier host could not pass
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The first development host was a root-in-container environment:
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```text
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virt: container-other
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capsh: Current: = (no effective capabilities), no-new-privs=1
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unshare --user/--mount/--pid/--net -> Operation not permitted
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bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net -> No permissions to create a new namespace
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cgroup2 -> ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec
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```
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That environment cannot verify G-C. Strict stayed `Unavailable` there; no
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adapter was faked.
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## 2. Disposable test VM
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A QEMU/TCG Ubuntu 26.04 VM was created from the cloud image (no KVM available
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on the outer host). Inside the VM:
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```text
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OS: Ubuntu 26.04.1 LTS, kernel 7.0.0-43-generic x86_64
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systemd-detect-virt --container: none
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user: dev (uid 1000), passwordless sudo for test setup only
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cgroup2: rw, nsdelegate, controllers: cpuset cpu io memory hugetlb pids rdma misc dmem
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sysctl: apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns = 1
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bubblewrap: 0.11.1 with the packaged `bwrap-userns-restrict` profile
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unprivileged: bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net --ro-bind / / true -> exit 0
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```
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Root can create namespaces, and the packaged Bubblewrap AppArmor profile
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allows the **ordinary user** to run `bwrap` without disabling AppArmor
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globally. The released strict mode runs as this ordinary user.
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## 3. Implemented boundary (ADR-0021)
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`marqdo run --mode strict`:
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* probes Bubblewrap at runtime; failure => `Unavailable`, run exits 1, no
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project code executes;
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* re-executes the CLI under `bwrap --unshare-all --as-pid-1 --die-with-parent
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--new-session --cap-drop ALL --clearenv`;
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* mounts only runtime libraries, `/etc/ld.so.cache`, the program and the
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project tree read-only at `/project`; private `/proc`, minimal `/dev`,
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tmpfs `/tmp`;
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* applies hard rlimits: CPU, 512 MiB address space, 64 fds, 64 processes,
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8 MiB stack, 0 core, output-byte file size;
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* supervises wall-clock time and kills the process group;
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* the child verifies `PID 1`, `NoNewPrivs: 1`, empty `CapEff`, a non-initial
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uid map and no non-loopback interface before running project code;
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* rejects Foreign, native/worker plugins, kernels, read/write grants and trace
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files with exit 2 (strict L1 = pure language + native Math).
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## 4. Adversarial evidence
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The helper is `tests/security/escape_helper.c`, launched through the **same**
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`marqdo-sandbox` supervisor, not through a separate ad-hoc bwrap command. The
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lane is `tests/security/run-lane.sh` and the test is
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`crates/marqdo-sandbox/tests/security_linux.rs`.
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At `8af7262` the same lane was re-run from a clean `git archive` in the
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disposable VM as `dev` uid 1000: 7/7 adversarial tests, positive CLI contract,
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external-surface refusals, and forged-marker rejection all PASS. The command
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now honours `CARGO_TARGET_DIR`; the parallel workspace run also passes all
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seven security tests.
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```text
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7/7 tests PASS:
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strict_child_identity_is_unprivileged_and_namespaced
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strict_child_cannot_read_host_files_but_reads_the_project
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strict_child_cannot_write_outside_or_into_the_project
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strict_child_cannot_escape_via_proc_or_privileges
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strict_child_cannot_reach_the_network
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strict_supervisor_enforces_fd_and_process_limits
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strict_supervisor_enforces_memory_cpu_and_output_limits
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```
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Observed results inside the sandbox (ordinary user `dev`):
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| Case | Observation |
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|---|---|
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| identity | `uid=1000`, `pid=1`, `NoNewPrivs: 1`, `CapEff: 0` |
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| `/etc/shadow`, `/root`, `/home/dev` | `DENIED` |
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| `/project/allowed.txt` | `OK` |
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| write `/home/dev/...`, `/project/...` | `DENIED` (read-only) |
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| write `/tmp` | allowed (private tmpfs; host unaffected) |
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| `/proc/1/root/etc/shadow` | `DENIED`; no inherited fds above stdio |
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| `setuid(0)`, `mount`, `unshare` | `DENIED` |
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| IPv4 connect `1.1.1.1:80`, raw socket | `DENIED` |
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| open `/dev/null` loop | `EMFILE` at <= 64 fds |
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| fork loop | bounded below 200 (user process rlimit) |
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| 768 MiB allocation | denied/killed by 512 MiB `RLIMIT_AS` |
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| infinite CPU loop | stopped by wall-clock/CPU budget |
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| 4 MiB stdout | stopped at the 64 KiB output limit |
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CLI evidence (`dev`, VM):
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```text
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run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict -> 你好,Marqdo (exit 0)
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call factorial 阶乘 --arg n=5 --mode strict -> 120 (exit 0)
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run examples/multi-module/index.mq.md --mode strict -> 12.566... (exit 0)
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run --mode strict --json -> success=true
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run --mode strict --allow-foreign -> exit 2
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run --mode strict --trust-native-plugin ... -> exit 2
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run --mode strict --kernel ... -> exit 2
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run --mode strict --trace-file ... -> exit 2
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MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE=1 run --mode strict -> exit 1 (not PID 1)
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hide /usr/bin/bwrap; run --mode strict -> exit 1 (not installed)
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MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE=1 run --mode strict --json -> one JSON doc,
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code=strict.identity_invalid
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@knowledge payload with resource.open --mode strict -> no host side effect
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```
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### 4.1 Current evidence document
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`5fcc111` was archived with `git archive` and transferred as an ordinary user:
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```text
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tested_sha: 5fcc111a304211dfbb3a4c85d72e0b3f4a2318be
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source archive: sha256:e13af3bbf65c576e57fde46ecf201925ad53fb70bf292b321baa96f154264fd2
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strict-evidence.json: sha256:38be28aa556b04214c4b3bd3cb26e2ad00ad49c1c3a579fc9e7059784ef5c5d0
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lane log: sha256:4f29201ab71b520ae3e0ea599bbff93a89cac8157fbdfc7037fac290477f83b7
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base image: sha256:7b90593f5532b49b7e3fe3d2743f0d1f0d822e5b07cebcd8e00c0df8069ecab9
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guest: Ubuntu 26.04.1, kernel 7.0.0-43-generic, bwrap 0.11.1
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user: dev uid 1000 (root=false), container=none
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runner_kind: disposable-qemu-tcg (not a performance node)
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```
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The machine-readable document is `marqdo.strict-evidence.v1`; it records
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`tested_sha`, archive digest, uid/root, kernel, cgroup2, bwrap/rustc/cargo and
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the outcome. A root PASS is rejected by the generator; this run is non-root.
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## 5. Explicit non-goals / remaining work
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* Strict **L2** (Worker/Foreign inheriting the sandbox) is not implemented;
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those flags are refused in strict. Native ABI is never allowed in strict.
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* rlimits are used instead of cgroup-v2 accounting; the adapter does not claim
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cgroup enforcement.
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* Filesystem TOCTOU is reduced by read-only mounts but not formally proven
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against a racing host user.
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* Network is denied by a network namespace, not a seccomp allowlist.
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* The disposable VM is reproducible from
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[`security-vm.md`](security-vm.md); that document also explains how to
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register it as an ephemeral self-hosted runner.
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* **A remote security-lane CI URL and artifact are still required** before a
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release calls G-C CI-verified. `.github/workflows/security-linux.yml` now
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runs on trusted `master` pushes or an explicit `source_sha`, binds the
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checkout to the tested SHA, writes `strict-evidence.json` and uploads it.
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`MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY=1` makes missing mechanisms fail instead of
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skip.
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* The current run is QEMU/TCG. It is evidence for **isolation correctness**,
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never for performance; see [`performance.md`](performance.md).
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* The adversarial test file is opt-in: ordinary `cargo test --workspace` skips
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it, the lane sets `MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY=1`, and a developer may set
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`MARQDO_RUN_STRICT_SECURITY=1`. A skipped G0 test is not a G3 PASS.
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