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release(3.0.0-beta.1): product version migration, beta gates, archive tooling and developer docs
REL-01: workspace/CLI/Analysis product version 3.0.0-beta.1 with updated
Cargo.lock; project.marqdo is enforced against the running core with
package.marqdo_range_invalid/package.marqdo_incompatible fail-closed
diagnostics; Tool SemVer prerelease negotiation tests; init template and
examples use the beta range. Verify init derives the project name from the
target directory instead of falling back to 'example'.

REL-02: beta support matrix is Linux x86_64 only; macOS/Windows are explicitly
experimental/unclaimed; strict policy and G4 Beta-only WARN are documented for
the release evidence.

REL-03: deterministic release packaging (tools/release/package.py) ships the
CLI and provider worker together with SOURCE_SHA, RELEASE_INFO.json,
known-limitations, specs, developer docs, examples incl. built plugin/provider
artifacts and consumers; tools/release/smoke.py cold-install tests the archive.

REL-04: docs/developers entry pages; corrected and self-contained third-party
integration handbook; stale Proposed/native-only/informational spec claims
fixed; release/status/compatibility/changelog/releasing docs updated.

REL-05: release_evidence.py gains an explicit beta profile
(BETA_RELEASE_CANDIDATE) distinct from the stable profile; Woodpecker build
step now packages and smoke-tests the archive on every pipeline.

Adds a runnable Resource Provider v2 example and corrects check --emit to
Analysis v2.
2026-11-22 02:31:32 +08:00

9.1 KiB

Linux strict-isolation security gate (G-C) — evidence

Status: PASSED on the current CI-fix series in a local disposable Ubuntu VM; Linux strict is enabled only when the runtime probe succeeds. REMOTE G3 UNVERIFIED: no self-hosted security-lane CI URL exists yet.

Current evidence: source SHA 5fcc111a304211dfbb3a4c85d72e0b3f4a2318be, ordinary user dev (uid 1000), QEMU/TCG guest, 7/7 adversarial tests plus the strict --json and inert-@knowledge contracts — see evidence/2026-11-21-strict-gc-5fcc111.md. The older 8af7262 and b6fc182 runs are retained below as history. Snapshot: product 3.0.0-beta.1, 2026-11-22. See ADR-0021 and ADR-0053.

Language-syntax status. The lane was re-run on the RFC-LANG-0002 tree (architecture/RFC-LANG-0002-unified-semantics.md) at 5fcc111, including the strict @knowledge-inert check. The security facts are unchanged: @exec is a compile-time projection, not a capability grant; @knowledge produces no IR and therefore no host effect; resource, file, network, stdin/stdout, memory and budget checks remain at the CapabilityHost boundary, and the strict sandbox is unaffected. See STATUS.md for the language gate and evidence/2026-11-21-semantics-v2-green.md. The earlier 512b9f5/0d7e11b/990e984 runs are historical evidence; 5fcc111 is the native-green code SHA and also adds the CLI 8 MiB main thread, portable process fixture and the G3-only opt-in gate.

This report separates three things that are often conflated:

  1. the mechanism (Bubblewrap namespaces + rlimits + supervisor),
  2. the runtime probe that decides whether strict is available, and
  3. the adversarial evidence that the boundary actually holds.

1. Why the earlier host could not pass

The first development host was a root-in-container environment:

virt: container-other
capsh: Current: = (no effective capabilities), no-new-privs=1
unshare --user/--mount/--pid/--net -> Operation not permitted
bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net -> No permissions to create a new namespace
cgroup2 -> ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec

That environment cannot verify G-C. Strict stayed Unavailable there; no adapter was faked.

2. Disposable test VM

A QEMU/TCG Ubuntu 26.04 VM was created from the cloud image (no KVM available on the outer host). Inside the VM:

OS:               Ubuntu 26.04.1 LTS, kernel 7.0.0-43-generic x86_64
systemd-detect-virt --container: none
user:             dev (uid 1000), passwordless sudo for test setup only
cgroup2:          rw, nsdelegate, controllers: cpuset cpu io memory hugetlb pids rdma misc dmem
sysctl:           apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns = 1
bubblewrap:       0.11.1 with the packaged `bwrap-userns-restrict` profile
unprivileged:     bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net --ro-bind / / true -> exit 0

Root can create namespaces, and the packaged Bubblewrap AppArmor profile allows the ordinary user to run bwrap without disabling AppArmor globally. The released strict mode runs as this ordinary user.

3. Implemented boundary (ADR-0021)

marqdo run --mode strict:

  • probes Bubblewrap at runtime; failure => Unavailable, run exits 1, no project code executes;
  • re-executes the CLI under bwrap --unshare-all --as-pid-1 --die-with-parent --new-session --cap-drop ALL --clearenv;
  • mounts only runtime libraries, /etc/ld.so.cache, the program and the project tree read-only at /project; private /proc, minimal /dev, tmpfs /tmp;
  • applies hard rlimits: CPU, 512 MiB address space, 64 fds, 64 processes, 8 MiB stack, 0 core, output-byte file size;
  • supervises wall-clock time and kills the process group;
  • the child verifies PID 1, NoNewPrivs: 1, empty CapEff, a non-initial uid map and no non-loopback interface before running project code;
  • rejects Foreign, native/worker plugins, kernels, read/write grants and trace files with exit 2 (strict L1 = pure language + native Math).

4. Adversarial evidence

The helper is tests/security/escape_helper.c, launched through the same marqdo-sandbox supervisor, not through a separate ad-hoc bwrap command. The lane is tests/security/run-lane.sh and the test is crates/marqdo-sandbox/tests/security_linux.rs.

At 8af7262 the same lane was re-run from a clean git archive in the disposable VM as dev uid 1000: 7/7 adversarial tests, positive CLI contract, external-surface refusals, and forged-marker rejection all PASS. The command now honours CARGO_TARGET_DIR; the parallel workspace run also passes all seven security tests.

7/7 tests PASS:
  strict_child_identity_is_unprivileged_and_namespaced
  strict_child_cannot_read_host_files_but_reads_the_project
  strict_child_cannot_write_outside_or_into_the_project
  strict_child_cannot_escape_via_proc_or_privileges
  strict_child_cannot_reach_the_network
  strict_supervisor_enforces_fd_and_process_limits
  strict_supervisor_enforces_memory_cpu_and_output_limits

Observed results inside the sandbox (ordinary user dev):

Case Observation
identity uid=1000, pid=1, NoNewPrivs: 1, CapEff: 0
/etc/shadow, /root, /home/dev DENIED
/project/allowed.txt OK
write /home/dev/..., /project/... DENIED (read-only)
write /tmp allowed (private tmpfs; host unaffected)
/proc/1/root/etc/shadow DENIED; no inherited fds above stdio
setuid(0), mount, unshare DENIED
IPv4 connect 1.1.1.1:80, raw socket DENIED
open /dev/null loop EMFILE at <= 64 fds
fork loop bounded below 200 (user process rlimit)
768 MiB allocation denied/killed by 512 MiB RLIMIT_AS
infinite CPU loop stopped by wall-clock/CPU budget
4 MiB stdout stopped at the 64 KiB output limit

CLI evidence (dev, VM):

run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict            -> 你好,Marqdo (exit 0)
call factorial 阶乘 --arg n=5 --mode strict       -> 120 (exit 0)
run examples/multi-module/index.mq.md --mode strict -> 12.566... (exit 0)
run --mode strict --json                          -> success=true
run --mode strict --allow-foreign                 -> exit 2
run --mode strict --trust-native-plugin ...       -> exit 2
run --mode strict --kernel ...                    -> exit 2
run --mode strict --trace-file ...                -> exit 2
MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE=1 run --mode strict          -> exit 1 (not PID 1)
hide /usr/bin/bwrap; run --mode strict            -> exit 1 (not installed)
MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE=1 run --mode strict --json   -> one JSON doc,
                                                     code=strict.identity_invalid
@knowledge payload with resource.open --mode strict -> no host side effect

4.1 Current evidence document

5fcc111 was archived with git archive and transferred as an ordinary user:

tested_sha:            5fcc111a304211dfbb3a4c85d72e0b3f4a2318be
source archive:        sha256:e13af3bbf65c576e57fde46ecf201925ad53fb70bf292b321baa96f154264fd2
strict-evidence.json:  sha256:38be28aa556b04214c4b3bd3cb26e2ad00ad49c1c3a579fc9e7059784ef5c5d0
lane log:              sha256:4f29201ab71b520ae3e0ea599bbff93a89cac8157fbdfc7037fac290477f83b7
base image:            sha256:7b90593f5532b49b7e3fe3d2743f0d1f0d822e5b07cebcd8e00c0df8069ecab9
guest:                 Ubuntu 26.04.1, kernel 7.0.0-43-generic, bwrap 0.11.1
user:                  dev uid 1000 (root=false), container=none
runner_kind:           disposable-qemu-tcg (not a performance node)

The machine-readable document is marqdo.strict-evidence.v1; it records tested_sha, archive digest, uid/root, kernel, cgroup2, bwrap/rustc/cargo and the outcome. A root PASS is rejected by the generator; this run is non-root.

5. Explicit non-goals / remaining work

  • Strict L2 (Worker/Foreign inheriting the sandbox) is not implemented; those flags are refused in strict. Native ABI is never allowed in strict.
  • rlimits are used instead of cgroup-v2 accounting; the adapter does not claim cgroup enforcement.
  • Filesystem TOCTOU is reduced by read-only mounts but not formally proven against a racing host user.
  • Network is denied by a network namespace, not a seccomp allowlist.
  • The disposable VM is reproducible from security-vm.md; that document also explains how to register it as an ephemeral self-hosted runner.
  • A remote security-lane CI URL and artifact are still required before a release calls G-C CI-verified. .github/workflows/security-linux.yml now runs on trusted master pushes or an explicit source_sha, binds the checkout to the tested SHA, writes strict-evidence.json and uploads it. MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY=1 makes missing mechanisms fail instead of skip.
  • The current run is QEMU/TCG. It is evidence for isolation correctness, never for performance; see performance.md.
  • The adversarial test file is opt-in: ordinary cargo test --workspace skips it, the lane sets MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY=1, and a developer may set MARQDO_RUN_STRICT_SECURITY=1. A skipped G0 test is not a G3 PASS.