Replace the Strong/Emph/List/Quote mapping in place with the single @exec/@knowledge heading-mode model, unified payload carriers and keyword control flow. - add the authoritative RFC, ADR-0052 and a historical ADR index - rewrite spec/mapping.md and spec/expression.ebnf as the normative mapping/statement grammar; update evaluation, references, math, foreign, package-format, plugin-abi, security and schema notes - rewrite README, AGENTS, COMPATIBILITY and CHANGELOG for the breaking language change; update the architecture index/overview and active docs - mark superseded planning docs, compute RFCs, evidence and syntax-role ADRs as historical/superseded without rewriting their decisions - add migration guide, per-file inventory and dev-only audit scripts The frontend/stdlib migration is completed in the following commits; this commit contains documentation only.
154 lines
7.1 KiB
Markdown
154 lines
7.1 KiB
Markdown
# Linux strict-isolation security gate (G-C) — evidence
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Status: **PASSED in a disposable Ubuntu VM; Linux strict is enabled only when
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the runtime probe succeeds.** Current convergence evidence is for source
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archive `8af7262` (see
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[`evidence/2026-11-20-strict-gc-8af7262.md`](evidence/2026-11-20-strict-gc-8af7262.md));
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the earlier `b6fc182` run is retained below as history. **No remote
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self-hosted security-lane CI URL exists yet.**
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Snapshot: workspace `0.1.0`, 2026-11-20. See ADR-0021.
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> **Language-syntax migration note.** This evidence predates RFC-LANG-0002
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> ([`architecture/RFC-LANG-0002-unified-semantics.md`](architecture/RFC-LANG-0002-unified-semantics.md)):
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> the `.mq.md` fixtures and the example paths used by the lane are being
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> migrated to the unified syntax, and the lane must be re-run on the migrated
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> tree before it is cited as evidencing the new syntax. The **security facts
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> here do not change** — `@exec` is a compile-time projection, not a capability
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> grant; `@knowledge` produces no IR and therefore no host effect; resource,
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> file, network, stdin/stdout, memory and budget checks remain at the
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> `CapabilityHost` boundary, and the strict sandbox is unaffected. See
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> [`STATUS.md`](STATUS.md) for the current red/green state.
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This report separates three things that are often conflated:
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1. the **mechanism** (Bubblewrap namespaces + rlimits + supervisor),
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2. the **runtime probe** that decides whether `strict` is available, and
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3. the **adversarial evidence** that the boundary actually holds.
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## 1. Why the earlier host could not pass
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The first development host was a root-in-container environment:
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```text
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virt: container-other
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capsh: Current: = (no effective capabilities), no-new-privs=1
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unshare --user/--mount/--pid/--net -> Operation not permitted
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bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net -> No permissions to create a new namespace
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cgroup2 -> ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec
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```
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That environment cannot verify G-C. Strict stayed `Unavailable` there; no
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adapter was faked.
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## 2. Disposable test VM
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A QEMU/TCG Ubuntu 26.04 VM was created from the cloud image (no KVM available
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on the outer host). Inside the VM:
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```text
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OS: Ubuntu 26.04.1 LTS, kernel 7.0.0-43-generic x86_64
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systemd-detect-virt --container: none
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user: dev (uid 1000), passwordless sudo for test setup only
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cgroup2: rw, nsdelegate, controllers: cpuset cpu io memory hugetlb pids rdma misc dmem
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sysctl: apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns = 1
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bubblewrap: 0.11.1 with the packaged `bwrap-userns-restrict` profile
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unprivileged: bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net --ro-bind / / true -> exit 0
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```
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Root can create namespaces, and the packaged Bubblewrap AppArmor profile
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allows the **ordinary user** to run `bwrap` without disabling AppArmor
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globally. The released strict mode runs as this ordinary user.
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## 3. Implemented boundary (ADR-0021)
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`marqdo run --mode strict`:
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* probes Bubblewrap at runtime; failure => `Unavailable`, run exits 1, no
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project code executes;
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* re-executes the CLI under `bwrap --unshare-all --as-pid-1 --die-with-parent
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--new-session --cap-drop ALL --clearenv`;
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* mounts only runtime libraries, `/etc/ld.so.cache`, the program and the
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project tree read-only at `/project`; private `/proc`, minimal `/dev`,
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tmpfs `/tmp`;
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* applies hard rlimits: CPU, 512 MiB address space, 64 fds, 64 processes,
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8 MiB stack, 0 core, output-byte file size;
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* supervises wall-clock time and kills the process group;
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* the child verifies `PID 1`, `NoNewPrivs: 1`, empty `CapEff`, a non-initial
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uid map and no non-loopback interface before running project code;
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* rejects Foreign, native/worker plugins, kernels, read/write grants and trace
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files with exit 2 (strict L1 = pure language + native Math).
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## 4. Adversarial evidence
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The helper is `tests/security/escape_helper.c`, launched through the **same**
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`marqdo-sandbox` supervisor, not through a separate ad-hoc bwrap command. The
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lane is `tests/security/run-lane.sh` and the test is
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`crates/marqdo-sandbox/tests/security_linux.rs`.
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At `8af7262` the same lane was re-run from a clean `git archive` in the
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disposable VM as `dev` uid 1000: 7/7 adversarial tests, positive CLI contract,
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external-surface refusals, and forged-marker rejection all PASS. The command
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now honours `CARGO_TARGET_DIR`; the parallel workspace run also passes all
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seven security tests.
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```text
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7/7 tests PASS:
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strict_child_identity_is_unprivileged_and_namespaced
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strict_child_cannot_read_host_files_but_reads_the_project
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strict_child_cannot_write_outside_or_into_the_project
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strict_child_cannot_escape_via_proc_or_privileges
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strict_child_cannot_reach_the_network
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strict_supervisor_enforces_fd_and_process_limits
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strict_supervisor_enforces_memory_cpu_and_output_limits
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```
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Observed results inside the sandbox (ordinary user `dev`):
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| Case | Observation |
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|---|---|
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| identity | `uid=1000`, `pid=1`, `NoNewPrivs: 1`, `CapEff: 0` |
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| `/etc/shadow`, `/root`, `/home/dev` | `DENIED` |
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| `/project/allowed.txt` | `OK` |
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| write `/home/dev/...`, `/project/...` | `DENIED` (read-only) |
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| write `/tmp` | allowed (private tmpfs; host unaffected) |
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| `/proc/1/root/etc/shadow` | `DENIED`; no inherited fds above stdio |
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| `setuid(0)`, `mount`, `unshare` | `DENIED` |
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| IPv4 connect `1.1.1.1:80`, raw socket | `DENIED` |
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| open `/dev/null` loop | `EMFILE` at <= 64 fds |
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| fork loop | bounded below 200 (user process rlimit) |
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| 768 MiB allocation | denied/killed by 512 MiB `RLIMIT_AS` |
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| infinite CPU loop | stopped by wall-clock/CPU budget |
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| 4 MiB stdout | stopped at the 64 KiB output limit |
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CLI evidence (`dev`, VM):
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```text
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run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict -> 你好,Marqdo (exit 0)
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call factorial 阶乘 --arg n=5 --mode strict -> 120 (exit 0)
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run examples/multi-module/index.mq.md --mode strict -> 12.566... (exit 0)
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run --mode strict --json -> success=true
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run --mode strict --allow-foreign -> exit 2
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run --mode strict --trust-native-plugin ... -> exit 2
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run --mode strict --kernel ... -> exit 2
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run --mode strict --trace-file ... -> exit 2
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MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE=1 run --mode strict -> exit 1 (not PID 1)
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hide /usr/bin/bwrap; run --mode strict -> exit 1 (not installed)
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```
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## 5. Explicit non-goals / remaining work
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* Strict **L2** (Worker/Foreign inheriting the sandbox) is not implemented;
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those flags are refused in strict. Native ABI is never allowed in strict.
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* rlimits are used instead of cgroup-v2 accounting; the adapter does not claim
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cgroup enforcement.
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* Filesystem TOCTOU is reduced by read-only mounts but not formally proven
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against a racing host user.
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* Network is denied by a network namespace, not a seccomp allowlist.
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* The disposable VM is reproducible from
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[`security-vm.md`](security-vm.md); that document also explains how to
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register it as a dedicated self-hosted runner.
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* **A remote security-lane CI URL is still required** before a release calls
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G-C CI-verified. `.github/workflows/security-linux.yml` targets a dedicated
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self-hosted runner; `MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY=1` makes missing
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mechanisms fail instead of skip.
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