20 KiB
Marqdo Security Model (implemented status)
Status: describes the M0.5 implementation, including honest gaps. This is not a security audit; it documents what the code actually enforces.
Normative implementation:
| Concern | Code |
|---|---|
| Sandbox modes, strict refusal | crates/marqdo-sandbox/src/lib.rs |
| Capability sets and checks | crates/marqdo-host/src/capability.rs |
| Host dispatch and per-op checks | crates/marqdo-host/src/host.rs |
| Project-rooted filesystem | crates/marqdo-host/src/fs.rs |
| Budgets | crates/marqdo-host/src/budget.rs |
| Effect tracing | crates/marqdo-host/src/trace.rs |
| Math/foreign adapters | crates/marqdo-host/src/kernels.rs |
| Foreign child processes | crates/marqdo-foreign/src/lib.rs |
| Plugin loading / in-process plugin calls | crates/marqdo-host/src/host.rs (load_plugin, op_plugin_invoke), crates/marqdo-plugin-abi/src/loader.rs |
| CLI flags and capability construction | crates/cli/src/main.rs, crates/cli/src/commands.rs |
1. Modes
SandboxMode has three values (pure, project, strict), parsed by
SandboxMode::parse and selectable on run/call with
--mode <pure|project|strict> (default: project).
| Mode | Intended guarantee | Actual status in this build |
|---|---|---|
pure |
No external I/O; memory computation and budgets only. | Enforced. Capabilities::pure() = console, math only; every FS/foreign/plugin grant flag makes the CLI exit 2 with "pure mode prohibits external I/O grants". |
project |
Operator-approved project resources under CapabilityHost + bounded resources. |
Enforced for the implemented operations. Defaults equal pure; --allow-read, --allow-write, --allow-net, --allow-env, --allow-process, --allow-foreign, --allow-plugin add grants. resource.open supports stdin read, separate stdout/stderr write, granted project-file read/write (ADR-0025/0026/0040), granted in-process provider kinds (ADR-0033) and granted IP-literal TCP streams (ADR-0034); process/device remain unsupported. Sandboxing is cooperative (in-process checks), not OS isolation; in-process providers are trusted, not sandboxed. |
strict |
Untrusted documents under real OS isolation. | Linux: enforced when the runtime probe passes (ADR-0021). resource.open is refused in strict except for the existing stdio/stdout console channel (console grant); stdin/stderr, file/TCP/provider/process resources remain refused until a provider passes the isolation lane (CM-A11, ADR-0030/0034/0040). PlatformCapabilities::detect() runs a real Bubblewrap smoke test; success reports Available { mechanism }, failure reports Unavailable { reason }. Strict L1 supports the interpreter, console, native Math and the read-only bundled stdlib (published at /run/marqdo-stdlib for the Compat-C print chain); --allow-read/--allow-write/--allow-net/--allow-env/--allow-process/--allow-foreign/--allow-plugin/--plugin/--trust-native-plugin/--kernel/--trace-file are rejected with exit 2. macOS/Windows and Linux hosts without the mechanisms remain Unavailable; there is no fallback to an unrestricted process. |
marqdo inspect <file> --platform prints the detection report, for example:
{
"os": "linux",
"arch": "x86_64",
"strict": {"state": "available",
"mechanism": "bubblewrap 0.11.1 (user/mount/PID/net/UTS/IPC namespaces + no-new-privs + rlimits)"},
"worker_processes": true
}
On a host that cannot create the namespaces the same block is
{"state": "unavailable", "reason": "..."} and strict refuses. Design rule
(blueprint §9): a cooperative in-process check is not a sandbox. See ADR-0021
for the Linux construction, L1 scope and non-goals; ADR-0019 still governs
every other platform.
2. Capability grants
Capabilities (crates/marqdo-host/src/capability.rs) is the effective grant
set for one run:
| Field | Default (pure/project) |
Used by |
|---|---|---|
console: bool |
true |
resource.open("stdio","stdin",["read"]), resource.open("stdio","stdout"/"stderr",["write"]) and the stdlib console chain; a missing grant is permission.denied and stdout/stderr are also bounded by the output budget |
math: bool |
true |
math.* host ops |
fs_read: Vec<String> |
empty | fs.read and project resource.open("file", path, ["read"]) |
fs_write: Vec<String> |
empty | fs.write and project resource.open("file", path, ["write"]) |
net_hosts: Vec<String> |
empty | exact IP-literal grants for resource.open("tcp", "<ip>:<port>", ["read","write"]); DNS is not resolved; --allow-net <IP> adds a grant (ADR-0034) |
env: Vec<String> |
empty | exact-name grants for resource.request("env.get", [name]); no glob and no env.list; --allow-env <NAME> adds a grant (ADR-0043) |
process_programs: Vec<String> |
empty | exact program paths for resource.request("process.run", [program, args]); no shell, env_clear, project root cwd, 5 s timeout, 1 MiB stdout/stderr cap; --allow-process <PROGRAM> adds a grant (ADR-0044); not an OS sandbox |
process: bool |
false |
required together with foreign for foreign.run/foreign.call |
foreign: bool |
false |
foreign kernels |
plugins: Vec<String> |
empty | plugin.invoke and StdHost::load_plugin |
resource_providers: Vec<String> |
empty | registered in-process/worker/C-ABI ResourceProvider kinds; project mode only; helper processes and native libraries are trusted, not sandboxed (ADR-0033/0035/0036); local manifests are host-installed, unsigned (ADR-0037); the C worker helper is a trusted process boundary, not a sandbox (ADR-0038) |
Requests versus grants:
marqdo.yamlcapabilities:is a request. It is parsed and validated (crates/marqdo-package/src/lib.rs) but is not consulted when building the host capability set: only CLI flags/grant APIs produce grants. Declaring a capability never grants it.marqdo.yamlplugins:likewise declares requirements only; it does not install, load or authorize a plugin.- CLI grant flags (
crates/cli/src/main.rs::SandboxArgs):--allow-read <GLOB>and--allow-write <GLOB>(repeatable, project mode only);--allow-net <IP>(repeatable, exact IP literal, project mode only, ADR-0034);--allow-env <NAME>(repeatable, exact environment variable name, project mode only, ADR-0043);--allow-process <PROGRAM>(repeatable, exact program path, project mode only, ADR-0044; the child is not sandboxed);--allow-foreign(project mode only; setsforeign = trueandprocess = true);--allow-plugin <PACKAGE-NAME>(repeatable, project mode only; matches the manifestplugin.name, not the call namespace);--plugin <PATH>(repeatable, loads a plugin after the trust check);--trust-native-plugin(explicit in-process native trust decision).
- There is no plugin-worker flag in this build. Network and environment grants are exact and project-mode only.
2.1 Filesystem grants are project-relative globs
fs.read/fs.write paths go through ProjectFs::resolve before the
capability check:
- empty paths, absolute paths,
..components and root/prefix components are rejected withpermission.denied; .components are dropped; the normalized relative string uses/;- the capability patterns are matched with the
globcrate against that normalized relative path; a leading./is stripped on both sides, so--allow-read ./data/**matchesdata/a.csvand does not matchsecrets/key;--allow-write output/**does not grant reads; - an invalid glob pattern is treated as non-matching (
Pattern::new(...). unwrap_or(false)), so it silently grants nothing (there is no diagnostic).
Additional FS limits (crates/marqdo-host/src/fs.rs):
- reads are capped at
MAX_READ_BYTES = 8 MiB, must be regular files, must be UTF-8, and the canonicalized path must stay inside the project root; - writes create parent directories; before writing, the closest existing ancestor is canonicalized and must stay inside the project root.
Known caveat: for writes, only the closest existing ancestor is checked and the final write uses the non-canonical path. A symlink created between the check and the write (TOCTOU) could escape the root. Reads canonicalize the final path before reading. Full symlink/race hardening is an open P4 item.
2.2 Checks happen at execution points, not only at parse time
Host::invoke is the only path to effects. StdHost::dispatch routes every
HostOp and the checks run immediately before the effect:
fs.read→capabilities.check_read(path)thenProjectFs::read;resource.request("fs.*")→check_read/check_writebefore path resolution;resource.request("env.get")→capabilities.check_env(name)beforestd::env::var;resource.request("process.run")→capabilities.check_process(program)beforeCommand::spawn;fs.write→check_writethenProjectFs::write;- math ops →
capabilities.math(incrates/marqdo-host/src/kernels.rs); - foreign ops →
capabilities.check_foreign(requiresforeign && process); - plugin invoke → the complete export name must be registered, then
capabilities.check_plugin(package)on every call; loading also checks the same grant once; - plugin host-capability requests →
CapabilityBrokerchecks the package and effective grants and executes grantedfs.readthroughProjectFs, returning the real file bytes. Other core capabilities (fs.write,net.request,process, console/math/log/...), and vendor capabilities without a trusted executing handler, returncapability.unavailable; they never pretend an empty reply is success. Unknown/vendor names without a trusted policy entry becomecapability.unavailable/permission.denied; - print → output budget only.
Static analysis may warn, but it never replaces these runtime checks. There is
no host bypass for tests: tests use the same StdHost/Capabilities types.
3. Resource budgets
Budget (crates/marqdo-host/src/budget.rs) is per run:
| Limit | Default | Enforcement |
|---|---|---|
| evaluation fuel | DEFAULT_FUEL = 5_000_000 |
1 unit per statement, 1 per expression node, 1 per branch condition, 1 per loop iteration; exhaustion → resource.exhausted |
| call stack depth | DEFAULT_STACK_LIMIT = 256 |
checked before every function call → resource.exhausted |
| program output bytes | DEFAULT_OUTPUT_BYTES = 1 MiB |
print, stdio/stdout and stdio/stderr output plus fs.read contents are charged; overflow → resource.exhausted |
| wall clock | none by default | --timeout <seconds> sets a deadline; checked between statements/iterations and before loop conditions → resource.exhausted. It does not preempt a running host call. |
| addressable memory | 64 MiB committed total, 16 MiB per region, 64 KiB pages; --max-memory / --max-region-memory override |
Runtime-owned MemoryStore (ADR-0022); create/grow checks both budgets before allocation and failed growth is atomic → resource.exhausted. Memory is pure computation and needs no capability grant in any mode. |
| resource streams | stdin reads over a shared run cursor; stdout/stderr writes charged to the existing output budget; file reads and writer buffers bounded by the 8 MiB per-file limit | Host-owned resource table (ADR-0025/0026/0040); output budget is checked before a stdout/stderr write is buffered; a failed check produces no bytes; writer buffers flush only on close. No separate I/O byte budget yet. |
CLI overrides (run/call): --fuel, --stack, --max-output,
--timeout. Additional fixed limits:
- foreign kernel:
StdHost.foreign_timeout = 10sandforeign_output_limit = 1 MiB(stdout+stderr combined) per call. These are not configurable from the CLI in this build; - plugin wire: request ≤ 16 MiB, result ≤ 64 MiB, error ≤ 1 MiB, metadata
≤ 64 KiB (see
include/marqdo_plugin_abi_v1.h); - math kernel: 1 MB source, 256 parse depth, 512 AST nodes, exponent ≤ 10,000,
exact-result ≤ 1,000,000 bits (
crates/marqdo-math).
These are cooperative budgets in the interpreter and the supervisor. Only foreign child processes are terminated by the host (kill on timeout/output overflow). In-process math and native plugins are not OS-limited.
4. Effect tracing
EffectTrace records one entry per Host::invoke when enabled
(--trace, or implicitly --json for run/call). Entry fields:
{"op":"print","module":"hello.mq.md","span":{"start":43,"end":57},
"duration_micros":3,"result":"ok"}
opis the stableHostOp::name()(print,math.eval,foreign.call,fs.write,plugin.invoke, ...);moduleis the initiating module id;spanis the call site when known;resultis"ok"or the failure code (for examplepermission.denied);- argument values and file contents are not recorded, so ordinary secrets do not leak into traces by design. Paths are also not recorded today.
- In text mode trace entries are printed to stderr (
trace: ...); in JSON mode they are atracearray next to separate programstdout/stderrstrings. Program output is always separate from diagnostics/trace, andstdio/stderrnever shares thestdoutbuffer.
5. Foreign kernels: process isolation, not a sandbox
crates/marqdo-foreign/src/lib.rs runs Python/Node one-shot:
- the program is written to a private temp file (mode 0600 on Unix), the child runs with a fresh private temp directory (mode 0700) as cwd, and both are removed on drop;
- direct
argvexec (no shell, no interpolation); stdin carries the versioned request envelope; stdout/stderr are always piped and captured; - the environment is cleared except
PATH; - on Unix the child is a process-group leader (
setpgid) and the wall-clock deadline/output overflow kills the whole group, including grandchildren; a 2-second reader grace prevents a surviving pipe holder from hanging the host. Non-Unix targets only kill the direct child; - a non-zero exit is data (
RunStatus::Failed, stderr preserved); a timeout isTimedOutforrunand an error for the typedcall.
What this is not: an OS sandbox. The child runs with the host user's
privileges, can open absolute paths, use the network and spawn further
processes. Clearing the environment and changing cwd are hygiene, not
confinement. Grandchildren are not killed when the direct child is killed.
Strict L1 rejects Foreign execution before any sandbox starts, so foreign
execution is only reachable in project mode with --allow-foreign. L2
inheritance is future work (ADR-0021).
6. Plugins: in-process native trust boundary
- The only plugin transport implemented in this build is in-process native
loading (
libloading) aftermanifest.validate(), exact target-triple artifact resolution, sha256 verification, ABI negotiation and export metadata cross-checking (crates/marqdo-plugin-abi/src/loader.rs). - Loading requires three independent things:
--plugin <manifest-or-dir>names the plugin;--trust-native-pluginis an explicit unsafe trust decision;- the manifest package name is granted with
--allow-plugin <name>(checked again on every invocation). Without trust,StdHost::load_pluginreturnspermission.deniedwith the hint that no isolated worker transport exists. There is no isolated worker, Wasm component or out-of-process plugin path in this build.
- A native plugin runs in the host address space. It can read host memory,
call arbitrary syscalls, bypass the capability model entirely and crash or
corrupt the host process. A C ABI is not a sandbox.
--trust-native-pluginmust be treated as equivalent to running the plugin's code as the host user. - Every export is registered by its complete dotted name; a plugin may export
several prefixes, and a conflicting name rejects the whole load atomically.
check --plugin <manifest>(orrun/call --plugin) validates export signatures statically without loading a shared library. - Plugin call sites are written as
<export>(...)in a function body (for examplesolver.add(a=20, b=22)). The namespace is derived from the first manifest export prefix. Calls are made throughHostOp::PluginInvokewith a typedwire_version1 request; the plugin's typed response becomes a Marqdo value (Unitwhen absent). Named arguments are required in this build; positional plugin arguments areruntime.type. - Plugin errors map to structured runtime errors: ABI →
plugin.abi_mismatch, capability →permission.denied, wire/value →runtime.type, unsupported →kernel.unavailable, everything else →plugin.failure. An unloaded namespace issymbol.unknown. - The plugin's host-capability requests are denied by default: the CLI loads
plugins with
LoadOptions::default(), i.e. no capability handler, so everyrequest_capabilitycall fails. Therequires:list inplugin.yamlis only a declaration. marqdo plugin inspectnever loads code: it validates the manifest and verifies the artifact hash only.- Installation, inspection, loading and authorization are four separate
decisions. Copying a plugin into the project or declaring it in
marqdo.yamlgrants nothing.
Known limitations: single namespace per plugin (derived from the first export),
no hot unload/reload, no plugin capability bridge from this CLI, native crash
is a host crash, plugin.invoke cannot be used in pure/strict mode.
7. check and inspect are side-effect free
Neither command executes project code. Specifically:
checkparses, indexes, maps to IR, runs static call validation and reports diagnostics. It never calls a function, never spawns a foreign kernel, never loads a native plugin and never writes files.inspectwith--ast,--units,--signature,--ir,--refsor--platformdoes the same static work and prints metadata.--refsmay read other project source files on demand to resolve link targets, but only parses/analyzes them; nothing is executed or written.plugin inspectreadsplugin.yaml, validates it, resolves the artifact for the host target and computes/compares its sha256. It does notdlopen, instantiate or call the plugin ("loaded": falsein JSON output).run/callfirst perform the same static load; if any diagnostic has error severity, execution is refused before the host or any kernel is touched.fmtonly normalizes line endings/trailing newlines and writes the document when not in--checkmode; it does not execute anything.
8. Open security items
- Strict L1 is implemented and VM-verified on Linux (ADR-0021); strict L2 (Worker/Foreign inheritance) is not implemented, so those surfaces are refused in strict.
consolecapability is not enforced; print is always allowed.- Network capability exists in the model but no host operation uses it; there
is no
--allow-netflag. - Write-path symlink TOCTOU (see §2.1).
- Plugin worker crash isolation and the worker capability bridge are
implemented (not usable in strict L1): both native and worker plugins can
reach the broker's
fs.readexecution when granted. Other core capabilities and vendor handlers remain unavailable. Broker execution is a cooperative API contract, not an OS sandbox; a worker and a native plugin can still issue direct syscalls. plugin_handlewire values are structurally reconstructable, but host authority comes only from thePluginHandleTableowner/run/generation check; untrusted plugin/foreign output containing a handle is rejected (ADR-0014,value-wire.md§4.1).- Budgets do not cover all allocation paths (for example list/table growth inside the interpreter is bounded only by fuel and memory).
--jsonrun output includes the full program stdout string; that is the program's own output, not a host secret, but it is embedded in the JSON document consumers must parse.