Update status, compatibility, changelog, README, architecture overview,
ADR status, migration guide, contributor/CI/security/release notes and
the per-file inventory from 'migration pending' to the verified state:
- language SHA ffd1cc9: fmt/clippy clean, workspace 501 passed / 0 failed
/ 2 ignored, stdlib digest regenerated and pack-verified
- green evidence report added; the prior intermediate evidence is marked
superseded
- inventory regenerated: 1015 classified files, 0 pending
- explicit non-claims: Windows/macOS native lanes and the disposable-VM
strict lane were not re-run at this SHA, so the release decision remains
DO NOT RELEASE
Verified: cargo test -p marqdo-cli --test docs_consistency (4/4) and
git diff --check.
5.5 KiB
Reproducing the disposable strict-security VM
The G-C lane was executed in a throw-away Ubuntu 26.04 VM because the primary development host is a container that cannot create namespaces. This document records how that VM was built so the result can be reproduced and so the VM can be registered as a dedicated self-hosted security runner.
Language-syntax migration note. The lane fixtures are
.mq.mdsources and are migrated to RFC-LANG-0002 (architecture/RFC-LANG-0002-unified-semantics.md). The lane has not been re-run atffd1cc9; runtests/security/run-lane.shon the migrated tree before using this VM as evidence for the current syntax. The VM/OS-isolation procedure itself is unchanged. SeeSTATUS.md.
Do not run this on a daily host with valuable data. The VM is disposable; the commands below do not disable AppArmor or any global host protection.
1. Host prerequisites
- QEMU with TCG (
/dev/kvmis not required; the reference run had no KVM). - Network access to
cloud-images.ubuntu.com, Ubuntu archives and crates.io. - ~10 GiB free disk and ~3 GiB RAM for the guest.
On an ordinary Ubuntu host, sudo apt install qemu-system-x86 qemu-utils genisoimage is sufficient. In the reference environment QEMU was unpacked
under .tools/ because the host root was read-only; that directory is
gitignored and is not part of the repository.
2. Cloud image and seed
mkdir -p .tools/vm && cd .tools/vm
curl -L -o resolute.img \
https://cloud-images.ubuntu.com/resolute/current/resolute-server-cloudimg-amd64.img
qemu-img create -f qcow2 -b resolute.img -F qcow2 disk.qcow2 20G
ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N '' -f marqdo_vm_key
Create user-data with an ordinary dev user (passwordless sudo only for
test setup), meta-data with a unique instance id, and wrap both into a
NoCloud ISO with volume label cidata. Any ISO builder works; the reference
run used the pure-Python pycdlib wheel extracted under .tools/py:
python3 - <<'PY'
import pycdlib
iso = pycdlib.PyCdlib()
iso.new(interchange_level=3, vol_ident='cidata', joliet=3, rock_ridge='1.09')
for name, iso_name in {'user-data': 'USER_DATA.;1', 'meta-data': 'META_DATA.;1'}.items():
iso.add_file(name, f'/{iso_name}', rr_name=name, joliet_path=f'/{name}')
iso.write('seed.iso')
iso.close()
PY
user-data must contain the public key:
#cloud-config
users:
- name: dev
sudo: ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL
shell: /bin/bash
groups: [sudo]
ssh_authorized_keys:
- ssh-ed25519 AAAA... your-key
ssh_pwauth: false
package_update: false
package_upgrade: false
3. Boot and connect
qemu-system-x86_64 -accel tcg,thread=multi -cpu max -smp 4 -m 3072 \
-L /usr/share/qemu \
-drive file=disk.qcow2,if=virtio,format=qcow2 \
-drive file=seed.iso,if=virtio,format=raw,readonly=on \
-netdev user,id=n0,hostfwd=tcp:127.0.0.1:2222-:22 \
-device virtio-net-pci,netdev=n0 \
-display none -serial file:console.log -monitor none -no-reboot
Wait for SSH, then:
ssh -p 2222 -i marqdo_vm_key dev@127.0.0.1
4. Guest setup
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y bubblewrap build-essential curl python3
bwrap --version
# install Rust (minimal profile)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y --profile minimal
export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"
Check the mechanisms before running the lane:
systemd-detect-virt --container # must be "none"
unshare --user --map-root-user true # root may need sudo; ordinary user uses bwrap
bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net --ro-bind / / true; echo $?
cat /proc/self/uid_map
findmnt -t cgroup2
Ubuntu 26.04 keeps kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1. The
packaged bwrap-userns-restrict AppArmor profile is what allows the ordinary
user to run Bubblewrap; the lane does not require disabling AppArmor
globally.
5. Copy the source and run the lane
From the host repository root (or from git archive <sha>):
tar --exclude=.git --exclude=.tools --exclude=.cache --exclude=.cargo-home \
--exclude=target --exclude=dist -czf /tmp/marqdo-src.tgz .
scp -P 2222 -i .tools/vm/marqdo_vm_key /tmp/marqdo-src.tgz dev@127.0.0.1:/home/dev/
ssh -p 2222 -i .tools/vm/marqdo_vm_key dev@127.0.0.1
Inside the guest:
mkdir -p ~/marqdo-src && tar -C ~/marqdo-src -xzf ~/marqdo-src.tgz
cd ~/marqdo-src
export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"
./tests/security/run-lane.sh
Expected final line: G-C security lane: PASS. The lane also checks that the read-only bundled stdlib works for 打印 and that a project-file resource.open is refused in strict mode. The script exports
MARQDO_REQUIRE_STRICT_SECURITY=1; a missing bubblewrap, compiler or helper is
a failure, never a skip.
6. Registering as a security runner
Register this VM (not the development container) as a GitHub self-hosted
runner with labels linux and marqdo-security. The workflow
.github/workflows/security-linux.yml targets
runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, marqdo-security]. Keep the runner disposable
and recreate it from this document; do not give the runner access to secrets or
the primary workspace. A CI URL from that runner is still required before a
release may call G-C CI-verified.
Reference environment
Ubuntu 26.04.1 LTS, kernel 7.0.0-43-generic x86_64
QEMU/TCG guest, systemd-detect-virt --container -> none
bubblewrap 0.11.1 (bwrap-userns-restrict)
dev uid 1000, passwordless sudo for setup only