Strict mode now re-executes the CLI inside a Bubblewrap supervisor with user/mount/PID/net/UTS/IPC namespaces, no-new-privs, all capabilities dropped, a read-only /project, private /proc and /dev, rlimits, output capture and wall-clock process-group cleanup. The child verifies PID 1, NoNewPrivs, empty CapEff, an unshared uid map and loopback-only networking before project code. - PlatformCapabilities::detect runs a real bwrap probe; no probe, no strict - strict L1 supports pure Marqdo + Math; Foreign/ABI/worker/kernel/grants/trace are rejected with exit 2 before sandboxing - forged MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE is rejected; missing bwrap fails closed - add adversarial helper, 7-test escape/resource matrix, seeded security lane script and self-hosted security workflow - executed G-C lane as uid 1000 in a disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM: 7/7 PASS plus positive CLI and refusal matrix; evidence in docs/evidence - ADR-0021, spec/security.md, STATUS/COMPATIBILITY/README/CHANGELOG updated; ADR-0019 remains for non-Linux/fail-closed rules
96 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
96 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
# ADR-0019: Strict-mode availability gate
|
|
|
|
Status: **Accepted; Linux availability superseded by ADR-0021**
|
|
Date: 2026-11-20
|
|
Relates to: ADR-0004 (strict mode refuses without isolation), blueprint §9
|
|
|
|
## Context
|
|
|
|
`strict` is the only mode that may claim isolation for untrusted documents.
|
|
The project must never advertise strict execution merely because an isolated
|
|
worker process or a cooperative path check exists. At the time of this ADR no
|
|
platform adapter has passed the required OS-level escape and resource tests.
|
|
|
|
The environment used for this stabilization work cannot create namespaces
|
|
(`unshare`/`bwrap` return "Operation not permitted"), so a real Linux adapter
|
|
cannot be built *and verified* here. Landlock is present but covers filesystem
|
|
rules only; it does not by itself satisfy the network/process/resource and
|
|
child-tree requirements in `docs/CORE_STABILIZATION_AND_ECOSYSTEM_GATE.md`
|
|
§13.
|
|
|
|
## Superseding note (2026-11-20)
|
|
|
|
The fail-closed principle and the per-platform, test-gated availability rule in
|
|
this ADR remain in force. A concrete Linux adapter has since passed the
|
|
security matrix in a disposable Ubuntu VM and is specified by **ADR-0021**:
|
|
strict becomes `Available` only when the Bubblewrap probe succeeds at runtime.
|
|
This ADR remains authoritative for every other platform and for the rule that
|
|
availability must never be assumed.
|
|
|
|
## Decision
|
|
|
|
### 1. Strict stays unavailable until the gate passes
|
|
|
|
`PlatformCapabilities::detect` reports `StrictIsolation::Unavailable` with a
|
|
platform-specific reason on every platform. `enforce` refuses strict before any
|
|
host or plugin is constructed. There is no fallback to `project`, no "warn and
|
|
continue", and no opt-in flag that silently disables the refusal.
|
|
|
|
This state is deliberate design output, not an incomplete branch: G-B does not
|
|
depend on it, and every unsupported platform must fail closed.
|
|
|
|
### 2. Availability is a per-platform, test-gated decision
|
|
|
|
A platform may report `Available { mechanism }` only when all of the following
|
|
hold on that platform and are covered by CI on a dedicated security lane:
|
|
|
|
* filesystem visibility restricted to the project and explicit grants;
|
|
escapes via `..`, absolute paths, symlinks and TOCTOU are denied;
|
|
* network socket creation/connection denied unless explicitly granted;
|
|
* process creation denied unless explicitly granted; the child tree is reaped
|
|
and leaves no orphans;
|
|
* resource limits for CPU, memory, file descriptors, process count, output and
|
|
wall clock are enforced;
|
|
* plugin workers and foreign kernels inherit the same restrictions, or strict
|
|
refuses to load them;
|
|
* the adapter is probed at runtime; failure to obtain the mechanisms leaves
|
|
strict `Unavailable` with the real reason;
|
|
* `--trust-native-plugin` and in-process native loading are rejected in strict,
|
|
since C ABI code shares the host address space;
|
|
* a probe/escape test suite demonstrates denial of reading `/etc/...`, writing
|
|
outside the project, connecting to the network and spawning a process.
|
|
|
|
Until then, `strict` must refuse even when other flags (`--allow-foreign`,
|
|
`--plugin`, `--trust-native-plugin`, read/write grants) are present.
|
|
|
|
### 3. Capability execution is not isolation
|
|
|
|
The broker executing `fs.read` for native and worker plugins (ADR-0018) is a
|
|
cooperative API contract with audit; it does not prevent a plugin from issuing
|
|
direct syscalls. It is not evidence for strict availability.
|
|
|
|
### 4. Observability
|
|
|
|
`marqdo inspect --platform --json` exposes the state and reason. The CLI test
|
|
suite asserts that the state is `unavailable` and that a strict run exits 1 with
|
|
a refusal message. Changing this contract requires this ADR to be superseded
|
|
together with the security test suite.
|
|
|
|
## Consequences
|
|
|
|
* No G-C claim is made. Documentation and CI must not describe worker
|
|
processes, Landlock-only filesystems or in-process brokers as a sandbox.
|
|
* A future adapter must add a new ADR, runtime probe, security lane and negative
|
|
tests before flipping `Unavailable` to `Available`.
|
|
* Platform-specific reasons remain actionable but do not leak secrets or host
|
|
layout details.
|
|
|
|
## Tests
|
|
|
|
* `strict_mode_refuses_without_isolation` (CLI): refusal, exit 1, no stdout,
|
|
JSON error envelope.
|
|
* `platform_reports_strict_unavailable` (CLI): `inspect --platform --json`
|
|
reports `state: unavailable` with a non-empty reason.
|
|
* Existing worker tests remain explicitly labelled crash isolation, not OS
|
|
isolation.
|