A document with an executable foreign.call is statically checked without a marker side effect, then run to show the same provider does execute. This guards the 'check/inspect cannot execute untrusted code' contract.
3.7 KiB
Linux strict-isolation security gate (G-C) — evidence report
Status: G-C NOT PASSED. strict remains Unavailable and fails closed.
Snapshot: workspace 0.1.0, 2026-11-20. No release tag.
This report records what was actually probed on the development host and why no
StrictIsolation::Available claim is made. It is evidence, not a plan to
weaken the gate.
1. Host and capability probe
Command output (abridged; host name removed):
user: uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
kernel: Linux 7.0.0-43-generic x86_64
virt: container-other
apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns: 1
max_user_namespaces: 60339
cgroup2 mount: ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,nsdelegate,memory_recursiveprot
cgroup controllers: cpuset cpu io memory hugetlb pids rdma misc dmem
unshare --user --map-root-user true
-> unshare: write failed /proc/self/uid_map: Operation not permitted (exit 1)
unshare --user --map-root-user --net true
-> unshare: unshare failed: Operation not permitted (exit 1)
bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-net --ro-bind / / true
-> bwrap: No permissions to create a new namespace (exit 1)
sudo -n true
-> sudo: The "no new privileges" flag is set, which prevents sudo from
running as root (exit 1)
capsh --print
-> Current: = (no effective capabilities)
-> Bounding set = cap_sys_admin, ... (not effective; no-new-privs=1)
unshare --mount true / --pid --fork true / --net true
-> Operation not permitted (exit 1 each)
The workspace root is writable, but the host root filesystem and cgroup2 mount
are read-only. The process is root inside a container with no_new_privs set;
sudo cannot gain privileges and the parent container refuses namespace
creation. user.max_user_namespaces being non-zero does not help because the
container policy/AppArmor boundary rejects the actual uid_map write.
2. Consequence
- A real Linux adapter (namespaces + seccomp/no_new_privs + cgroup v2 + fd and process-tree control) cannot be built, applied and verified here.
- Implementing an adapter and flipping
Availablewithout executing the escape and resource-limit tests would be a false security claim. It was not done. PlatformCapabilities::detect()continues to reportunavailablewith a reason;enforcerefuses before any host/plugin is constructed. There is no fallback toproject.- Native plugin loading (
--trust-native-plugin) is unrelated to strict mode and remains an explicit in-process trust decision; the broker and worker transport are not OS isolation.
Command evidence:
marqdo run examples/hello.mq.md --mode strict
# exit 1, stderr: refusing to run in strict mode: ...
marqdo inspect examples/hello.mq.md --platform --json
# platform.strict.state == "unavailable"
3. What G-C still requires
- A controllable Ubuntu VM or self-hosted runner that permits user, mount, PID and network namespaces and delegated cgroup v2 controllers, reachable from an ordinary (non-root) test user.
- A trusted supervisor that applies filesystem/network/process/resource policy and reaps the child tree, plus a runtime probe that reports the mechanisms actually applied.
- Execution of the full negative matrix from
docs/STABLE_RELEASE_IMPLEMENTATION.md§10.5 with a malicious helper: direct syscall reads/writes,/procand inherited-fd access, IPv4/IPv6/DNS and Unix sockets, fork/exec, CPU/memory/fd/process/output limits, and--trust-native-pluginrejection. - A security-lane CI URL on the same commit, and only then an ADR that flips
UnavailabletoAvailablefor that specific platform.
Until all four hold, any release must state: strict OS isolation is not available; untrusted code must not be executed with Marqdo expecting isolation.