Files
marqdo/doc/design/v-safe-json.md
cflmyandCursor 8f1010f967 Ship oracle journal values, bytecode/frontend hardening, and replay-policy Lean.
Host exposes oracle journals as language values with refuse/copy gates; bytecode and foreign session paths get modularized; applications and verification replay-policy sources land with Lake builds ignored.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-11-06 15:04:27 +08:00

3.8 KiB

(V_{\mathsf{safe}}) JSON integer contract (host ↔ Lean)

Canonical Lean model: MarqdoThesis/PLDI/proofs/MarqdoProof/MarqdoProof/ForeignJSON.lean. Host mapper: src/host/json.rs (json_to_value / value_to_json).

This document freezes runtime conformance of the Marqdo JSON bridge to the mechanized (V_{\mathsf{safe}}) integer domain. It is not a verified compilation of the Rust interpreter.

Domain

MAX_SAFE = 9007199254740991   # 2^53 - 1

(V_{\mathsf{safe}}) values (mechanized):

JSON Marqdo
null None
bool Bool
integer with |n| ≤ MAX_SAFE Int
string Text
array List
object Map

Host extension (not in Lean SafeVal): JSON non-integer numbers → Value::Num(f64). Non-finite numbers (NaN/Inf) are refused on encode and in Python/Node oracle responses, including nested payloads. Floats are documented host behavior; they are not claimed as mechanized (V_{\mathsf{safe}}) fidelity.

Encode (value_to_json)

  • Value::Int(n) with |n| ≤ MAX_SAFE → JSON number.
  • Value::Int(n) with |n| > MAX_SAFE → refuse (error).
  • Value::Handle(_) → refuse (json: session handle cannot be serialized).
  • Column-table Map whose fields are all List with unequal lengths → refuse (json: table column arity mismatch).
  • Nested List / Map: any child refuse fails the whole tree.
  • GFM table parse also refuses unequal row width (table row arity mismatch) before a value is built.
  • Wide integers that must cross a language boundary: author converts to a decimal string (∈ (V_{\mathsf{safe}})); the foreign program may use BigInt / Python int on that string.

Foreign oracle (session_eval / session_get)

Python/Node session bootstraps sanitize results with the same integer gate before JSON emission. An Ω response containing an OOD integer is a fault (host Err), not a soft ok:false cell record. Stdout text that authors json.parse themselves is still gated by host json_to_value.

Decode (json_to_value)

  • JSON integer with |n| ≤ MAX_SAFE → Int.
  • JSON integer with |n| > MAX_SAFE → refuse.
  • JSON unsigned integer > i64::MAX → refuse (do not coerce via f64 or Text).
  • Nested array/object: any child refuse fails the whole tree.
  • Decimal-string encodings of wide integers → Text (in domain).

Error prefix

All refuse messages use a fixed prefix for probes and diagnostics:

json: integer outside V_safe (±(2^53-1)): <n>

In-domain roundtrip

±MAX_SAFE, bool, null, string, array, and object roundtrips through encode → decode must succeed. Integers MAX_SAFE+1, -MAX_SAFE-1, 2^53, 2^60, 2^60+1 (and nested forms) must refuse.

Non-claims

  • Not verified Rust ↔ Lean compilation.
  • Not arbitrary host-object fidelity (DataFrame, functions, heap sharing).
  • Not automatic BigInt promotion inside Node/Python bootstraps.
  • Document-level Value::Int may still hold i64 values that are OOD for JSON; the gate fires when those values enter JSON encode/decode.

Strict request boundary update

The numeric gate applies to the represented value, including integer-valued floats and exponent notation. 9007199254740992.0 and 9.007199254740992e15 are refused; fractions such as 1.5 remain in the host extension. serde_json uses float_roundtrip to avoid endpoint decoding loss. The strict text decoder rejects duplicate object keys and unequal column maps before information is lost. One-shot, call_many and persistent input paths use recursive domain admission; code, handle and secret values are not copied implicitly. Auto-detection may leave non-JSON output as text, but valid JSON outside the domain is a refusal, including in batch results.