- Strict child now gets the verified stdlib tree read-only at /run/marqdo-stdlib with MARQDO_STDLIB_DIR set, so Compat-C 打印 works under strict without exposing a host path (ADR-0021 update). - Add a strict-lane negative: resource.open(file) is refused with permission.denied; hello/factorial/multi-module and --json still pass. - StrictHostCommand gains stdlib_dir; CLI discovers the bundle and sandbox binds it; sandbox tests constructors updated. Evidence: G-C lane PASS on the disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM (7/7 adversarial matrix, positive CLI, strict language-resource refusal, forged marker), plus fmt/clippy/423 local tests.
113 lines
5.2 KiB
Markdown
113 lines
5.2 KiB
Markdown
# ADR-0021: Linux strict isolation via Bubblewrap, namespaces and rlimits
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Status: **Accepted**
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Date: 2026-11-20
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Relates to: ADR-0004, ADR-0019, `spec/security.md`, stable-release plan §10
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Security evidence: `docs/evidence/2026-11-20-strict-gc.md`
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## Context
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ADR-0019 kept strict mode `Unavailable` everywhere because no adapter had been
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executed against the full escape/resource matrix, and the first development
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host could not create any namespace. A disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM with a real
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kernel, writable cgroup2, passwordless sudo for test setup and the packaged
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Bubblewrap AppArmor profile became available. It can create user, mount, PID,
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network, UTS and IPC namespaces as an ordinary user through `bwrap`.
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## Decision
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### 1. Dynamic, probe-gated availability
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`PlatformCapabilities::detect()` on Linux runs a real Bubblewrap smoke test
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(`--unshare-all --as-pid-1`, read-only runtime bind, private `/proc` and
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`/dev`). Strict is `Available { mechanism: "bubblewrap ..." }` only when that
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probe succeeds; otherwise it stays `Unavailable` with the real reason. There is
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still no fallback to `project`.
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### 2. L1 scope: pure language and native Math only
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Strict accepts `run`/`call` of documents using the interpreter, console and
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native Math. It rejects `--allow-read`, `--allow-write`, `--allow-foreign`,
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`--allow-plugin`, `--plugin`, `--trust-native-plugin`, `--kernel` and
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`--trace-file` with exit 2 before any sandbox starts. Native ABI, worker
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plugins and Foreign kernels are therefore not reachable in strict mode in this
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release; L2 inheritance is future work.
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### 3. Construction
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The trusted supervisor is this process; the restricted child is the same
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`marqdo` executable re-executed under Bubblewrap:
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* `--unshare-all --as-pid-1 --die-with-parent --new-session` — user, mount,
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PID, network, UTS, IPC and cgroup namespaces; the child is PID 1;
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* read-only binds of `/usr`, `/bin`, `/sbin`, `/lib`, `/lib64` and
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`/etc/ld.so.cache`, and of the project tree at `/project`;
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* a read-only bind of the program at `/run/marqdo-program`; no host `/root`,
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`$HOME`, `/etc` or other project directories are visible;
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* private `/proc`, minimal `/dev`, tmpfs `/tmp`;
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* `--clearenv`, `no_new_privs`, `--cap-drop ALL`;
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* hard rlimits: CPU, address space (512 MiB), file size, open files (64),
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processes (64), stack (8 MiB), core (0);
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* a supervisor deadline that kills the process group, and bounded capture of
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stdout/stderr.
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The document argument is rewritten to `/project/...`; only the document token
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changes, all other arguments are preserved.
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### 4. Bundled stdlib mount
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After CM-A07 Compat-C, `打印` is implemented by the bundled `.mq.md` stdlib.
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Strict therefore bind-mounts the verified `stdlib/` tree read-only at
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`/run/marqdo-stdlib` and sets `MARQDO_STDLIB_DIR` for the child, just like the
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program itself. The tree contains only Markdown/read-only data; it grants no
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new OS capability, and the loader still verifies its digest in the child. File,
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network, process and provider resources remain refused.
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### 5. Child self-verification
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The child accepts `MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE=1` only if it can verify all of:
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`getpid() == 1`, `NoNewPrivs: 1`, empty `CapEff`, a non-initial uid map, and no
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non-loopback network interface. A forged marker outside the sandbox fails
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before project code runs.
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### 6. Threat model and non-goals
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This protects against untrusted Marqdo documents that use the language,
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interpreter, Math, console, or attempt direct syscalls. It does not sandbox
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native plugins (rejected), Foreign kernels (rejected), or a malicious kernel.
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Bubblewrap is the construction mechanism, not a certificate; the runtime probe
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and self-verification are part of the contract.
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Known limits: rlimits are used instead of cgroup-v2 accounting (the VM has
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writable cgroups, but the released adapter does not yet claim cgroup
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enforcement); filesystem TOCTOU is limited by read-only mounts but not proven
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against a racing host user; the project tree is exposed read-only in full;
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network is isolated by a network namespace rather than a seccomp allowlist. No
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worker/Foreign L2 claim is made.
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## Evidence
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Executed in a disposable Ubuntu 26.04 VM (kernel 7.0.0, `container: none`,
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Bubblewrap 0.11.1, AppArmor `bwrap-userns-restrict` profile, ordinary user
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`dev`):
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* 7/7 adversarial tests: identity, host reads, writes, `/proc`/privileges,
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network, fd/process limits, memory/CPU/output limits;
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* CLI: `run`, `call`, absolute paths, multi-module, default `index.mq.md` and
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`--json` all succeed under strict; Foreign/ABI/plugin/kernel/trace flags are
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rejected with exit 2;
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* forged `MARQDO_STRICT_ACTIVE=1` outside the sandbox exits 1;
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* removing `/usr/bin/bwrap` makes strict `Unavailable` and the run exits 1 with
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no project execution.
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## Consequences
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* Linux strict is available **only where the probe succeeds**; this container
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still reports unavailable.
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* `worker_processes` remains true for crash isolation, but that is not part of
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the strict claim.
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* A future L2 ADR must extend the same supervisor to worker/Foreign processes,
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with its own escape tests, before those may run under strict.
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* A remote self-hosted security-lane URL is still required before a release
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calls G-C CI-verified; the local VM evidence is recorded separately.
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